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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study evaluates the domestic and international trade and marketing policies 
in India and analyzes the effects of deregulating domestic markets and liberalizing 
external trade on the food grain sector.  
Historically, India￿s food policy has involved heavy government intervention in 
all aspects of the food grain market ￿ pricing, procurement, stocking, transport and 
marketing. The Food Corporation of India (FCI) is the principal parastatal agency 
responsible for marketing food grains within the country and controls nearly 50 percent 
of the grain markets. An analysis of the performance of the FCI, however, reveals 
enormous and mounting costs of operations that present a huge financial burden for the 
Government of India (GOI). This study offers a comparison of the costs and functioning 
of the FCI with that of private traders, in order to suggest policy options for reform. The 
results show that private traders operate at costs lower than those incurred by the FCI in 
both storage and trade, despite several controls and restrictions imposed upon them. 
Therefore, the finding from this study is that there is a strong case for reform from the 
efficiency point of view. 
In this regard, the government has already initiated steps to encourage private 
participation in grain markets. The role of the FCI is proposed to be restricted to timely 
sales and purchases in order to maintain stability in food prices and exports and imports 
of food grains, as and when required. The budgetary savings of the central government 
realized by limiting the role of FCI can be used to provide subsidy to the states for the 
specific purpose of procuring grains through their agencies, private or public. Given the 
cost factor, they can choose the most appropriate way to purchase grain. However, there 
is more that needs to be done. If price distortions are eliminated, farmers could shift away 
from rice and wheat and diversify to high value farming that offers higher market price 
such as fruits and vegetables, poultry and dairy. Subsidized loans could be offered to 
improve the restricted access to credit and to encourage private storage facilities that are iii   
used co-operatively. In line with this, the National Policy on Handling and Storage of 
Food grains envisages greater private sector participation in building storage capacities 
for rental use by government agencies and also in the development of infrastructure for 
integrated bulk handling, storage and transportation of food grains. 
Another major contribution of this study is to analyze and quantify the impacts of 
relaxation of restrictions on private domestic trade of rice and wheat based on a spatial 
equilibrium model of inter-state trade that takes place under arbitrage opportunities. A 
unique feature in the analysis of Indian grain markets is that wholesale and retail traders 
are considered as a separate set of agents in addition to consumers, producers and the 
government. The analysis produces some interesting results.  
Public sector agencies perceive private traders as competitors to the FCI. Based 
on this, the general perception is that private trade will mimic the behavior of FCI by, for 
example, transporting grains from Punjab in the north of the country to Kerala in the 
south. However, contrary to this perception, results from this study show that private 
trade does not necessarily take place only and directly between a surplus and a deficit 
state. The results show that it is possible for a deficit state to import grains from a 
neighboring deficit state, which in turn could import from another deficit or a surplus 
state or even from abroad depending on arbitrage benefits. With freer domestic trade, 
markets reveal all information needed to private profit maximizers who obviously choose 
the least cost options of trade.  
As restrictions on domestic trade are relaxed, prices stabilize across states and 
there are welfare gains to producers, consumers and wholesale traders at the national 
level. The gains are much higher in the case of wheat compared to rice. This could be due 
to the fact that the rice market continues to be controlled through levy procurement. 
There is a steep reduction in government costs from deregulating domestic trade as costs 
of procurement and storage both fall, especially due to lower wheat procurement since 
traders prefer to sell wheat to other states rather than to the FCI, since it fetches them a 
better price than the Minimum Support Price (MSP). In a liberalized domestic and iv   
foreign trade regime, it is also found that states make new trading partners domestically 
and may even prefer to trade with foreign partners in order to make the best of price 
differences.  
The gains illustrated to accrue from liberalizing domestic and foreign trade are 
derived from small policy changes that reduce/ eliminate movement restrictions and also 
from reduced transportation cost. The problem of excess stock accumulation would 
however not be solved by these policy changes alone. Much higher gains in efficiency 
and economic welfare are possible if opening up the markets for both domestic and 
external trade is accompanied by investment in roads and other infrastructure, lower MSP 
for wheat (just sufficient to act as an insurance in low price years), abolition of the levy 
on rice procurement and decentralization of FCI￿s operations.   
It is thus socially efficient to open up markets for trade in grains by encouraging 
private agents to participate in marketing and investment. This can be facilitated by a 
number of long-term policy changes to reduce transaction costs of private traders. These 
include encouraging investment and modernization through improved infrastructure (e.g., 
roads/ ports/ storage), a larger scale of operation (e.g., bulk handling/ transport) and 
innovations (e.g., fuel-efficient trucks). The government also needs to develop better 
institutions for improving market information, grading facilities etc. 
As for external policy, the era of globalization has brought with it new 
opportunities as well as challenges to the food security system. Being a signatory to the 
WTO, the country is moving towards greater openness in agricultural trade. The 
challenges are in terms of developing appropriate marketing infrastructure and 
institutions to deal with trade in agricultural commodities and formulate appropriate 
policies to deal with price risk. The opportunities include reduced dependence on buffer 
stocks and a greater dependence on trade for price stabilization. As India becomes a 
major force in the global rice and wheat markets, new strategies are required to sustain its 
position. To achieve this end, the government plans to promote exports through providing 
long-term credit, removing export restrictions, establishing Agricultural Export Zones v   
and providing transport subsidies to export rice and wheat from government warehouses. 
However, there is a need to improve facilities for grading, improve measuring standards, 
and address quality problems. Exporters also face problems of storage and distribution. In 
order to take full advantage of growing export opportunities, they would need to have 
reliable port and domestic infrastructure facilities, which are currently lacking, rather 
than transport subsidies. The ports are highly congested, with obsolete equipment, and 
are managed by government-controlled port trusts that are plagued by bureaucracy. 
Improving these essential facilities through critical investments and institutional changes 
away from government dominated controls and towards greater private sector 
participation, would go a long way in reducing the high handling costs and margins of 
exporters, thereby making India more competitive in the world grain markets.  
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ACHIEVING FOOD SECURITY IN A COST EFFECTIVE WAY 




Shikha Jha and P.V. Srinivasan
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
Two implicit but important components of the Indian food policy have been to 
stabilize food grain supplies and prices over time through stock policies and across 
regions by procuring grains from surplus areas and supplying in deficit areas. Policies that 
supported price incentives, food distribution, subsidy and investment in research, 
irrigation, and other forms helped to expand wheat and rice output substantially. The food 
grain market in the country has been characterized by a significant government presence 
in pricing, procurement, stocking, marketing and distribution and transport which began 
in the days of food shortages, when dependence on food grain imports was high and 
imports were canalized, as a result of which restrictions were imposed on domestic and 
foreign trade and storage of grains through policies such as the Essential Commodities 
Act (ECA) and zoning that regulates or prohibits private trade in food grains across broad 
zones. The government￿s control through active participation in storage and trading 
activities was based on the belief that ￿speculative￿ activities by private operators can be 
destabilizing and that legal restrictions to counteract their collusive and manipulative 
practices may not succeed. Such controls in grain markets led to significant regional price 
variations as well as high costs of operations. The government also imposes Selective 
Credit Controls that specify minimum margins & commodity specific interest rates. In 
addition to these, private agents face problems due to inordinate delay at check posts, bad 
roads and infrastructure.  
                                                 
1 Professors, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) General A. Vaidya Marg, 
Goregaon (East)Mumbai ￿ 400 065, India.   2 
In recent years, the situation has become one of excess supply as government 
procurement especially for wheat turned out to be more in the nature of providing price 
support to farmers. In 2002 stocks in government warehouses exceeded 60 million 
tonnes, half of which had to be kept in the open ground due to lack of any proper storage 
facilities. Simultaneously, at least one fourth of India￿s population ￿ about 250 million ￿ 
remained underfed. Thus while on the one hand the domestic policy environment 
contributed significantly to long-term grain production; it also led to the current situation 
of large market surpluses alongside persistent food access problems. While India has long 
been food secure at the national level, it has become increasingly clear in recent years 
that it has a long way to go in attaining household level food security.  
Taking stock of the unsustainable situation, the government began to revamp its 
grain distribution programs since the mid-1990s by focusing specifically on poor 
consumers. Policies to offload stocks such as subsidized grains for new schemes and for 
exports along with higher allocations for existing food and nutrition programs did bring 
down the stocks but they still remain close to 50 million tones in 2003, several times the 
amount sufficient to tide over unforeseen circumstances. But the changing domestic and 
international scene means that the surpluses may not be a long-term phenomenon. 
Among the various steps being taken by the government of India towards deregulation of 
both domestic and international trade of agricultural commodities is a new policy to 
remove restrictions on interstate movement of commodities. The Tenth Plan has proposed 
to do away with the ECA and repeal and replace it with an emergency act that can be 
applied by notification for a limited period of time to a specified commodity in a 
specified region. With a recent initiative taken by the central government, the state 
governments are expected to introduce appropriate laws to remove restrictions to enable 
farmers and companies to jointly promote both domestic and foreign trade. With the 
changing external economic scenario, the country now will have to implement 
agricultural economic reforms to meet WTO obligations and to take advantage of the 
opportunities thrown up by a more liberalized world market. 
However, there is still a great deal of reluctance on the part of policy makers to 
open imports (and sometimes even exports), and allow private sector to operate freely in   3 
the grain markets, for fear of jeopardizing food security. In the existing situation, freeing 
of domestic trade would in fact imply a reduced need for protecting farmers￿ prices, as 
regional exports out of surplus areas would raise the local prices there and reduce them in 
deficit regions. Centralized procurement may not be needed any more and decentralized 
procurement is likely to be more effective. Moreover, traders in bordering states such as 
West Bengal and the North-East may find it easier to export to Bhutan, Bangladesh or 
other neighboring countries. Similarly during periods of shortage they could import from 
other countries rather than depending on central government stocks. In short, domestic 
market efficiency could be greatly increased and social welfare enhanced by encouraging 
larger private sector participation and withdrawal of public operations in areas where it is 
no longer desirable. The latter in turn may lead to higher marketing efficiency and lower 
transactions costs.  
In this Report we address several issues associated with these concerns and the 
changing policy scenario. For example, what would happen if all domestic controls on 
grain marketing go, especially movement restrictions, centralized procurement including 
levy on rice millers, and stocking limits on traders?  Will the private sector come in a big 
way? Will food security be assured? Would division of FCI into smaller corporations solve 
the current problems? These questions become important in the current context of fast 
track reforms such as diversification of agriculture and removal of control (on storage, 
movement and marketing of agricultural produce), which are identified by the Tenth Five 
Year Plan as the two important areas for employment creation. The Plan also emphasizes 
adjustment of Minimum Support Price for food grains and other commodities so as to 
promote diversification of agriculture both in terms of geographical coverage and crop 
diversification. Shifting of cropping pattern in their favour of new areas like pulses and 
oilseeds that are more labour-intensive will boost employment generation per unit of 
output. A higher output of these crops is also necessary to increase the weight of these 
items in the average food consumption basket, necessary for meeting the nutritional 
requirements.   4 
1.2 METHODOLOGY 
We begin with an overview of trade and marketing policy perspective and 
consider issues such as how government marketing and trade policies in the past have 
impacted food security. Given the changing global economic environment under the 
WTO, and domestic acceptance to economic reforms, what should be the policy agenda 
with respect to marketing and trade policies for India￿s most important staple crops, rice 
and wheat, which dovetails the food security concerns with domestic and external trade 
liberalization? This discussion is followed by an evaluation of the parastatal Food 
Corporation of India vis-￿-vis the private sector operators in trading and marketing based 
on data, government policies, literature on the role of the private sector and the policy 
obstacles it has faced. We examine the relative efficiency of functioning of private traders 
within the current system and what potential gains can be obtained through reform 
measures.  
Having described the policy scene and effectiveness of the public sector agency, 
we evaluate the effects on regional food security of removing restrictions on domestic 
private trade of food grains. In doing so, we address some important questions such as: 
Have zonal restrictions on trade of food grains served the purpose of effectively 
transferring grains from surplus to deficit areas? Has the control on free private 
movement enhanced price stability across regions? Are such controls desirable? What 
would happen if the restrictions were removed? This part of the study maps potential 
gains through a spatial modeling of 18 regions in India. The results indicate that gains 
could be significantly large if the government is bold enough to take this step. And, these 
gains could be realized without compromising on the food security front.  
Decentralized procurement is another major policy objective that the current 
government in India is pursuing to fulfill the requirements of PDS, which has been 
adding to spiraling costs to the exchequer. The main question we try to answer in this 
context is: What would happen if India decentralized procurement of rice and wheat to 
serve the PDS and restricted central procurement to cover only buffer stock 
requirements? For this purpose, we extend our spatial equilibrium model by including   5 
additional features such as regional procurement prices, lower minimum support price for 
the central government and calculation of costs of central and state governments 
separately. Our calculations show that there are potential gains in welfare to consumers 
and producers.  
1.3  ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT  
Our objective of the study is to obtain cost effectiveness and potential efficiency 
gains from various reforms. In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of trade and marketing 
policy perspective and analyze how government marketing and trade policies have 
influenced food security. In the next Chapter we compare and contrast the role, efficiency 
and effectiveness of FCI in relation to the private traders and agents. We present the 
spatial equilibrium model framework in Chapter 4. We follow this up in Chapter 5 by 
evaluating the effects on food security of relaxing restrictions on private trade of food 
grains in India. Finally, we conclude the Report in Chapter 6 providing some policy 
recommendations based on the analysis. It is hoped that this study would help policy 
makers by bridging some information gap with in-depth research and analysis of the data 
and past policies.  
 
2.  GRAIN MARKETING AND TRADE POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The major underlying objective of the Indian government￿s food policy is to 
protect both consumers and producers. With agricultural output continuing to depend 
heavily on monsoons, the government places great importance on stabilizing grain prices 
and income to farmers through price support policies. In order to protect consumers’ 
interests it attempts to prevent prices from reaching exorbitant levels through buffer stock 
operations and distribution of grains at subsidized prices. Given these objectives, grain 
storage forms an integral part of the government’s food policy. While a part of public   6 
stocks are used for the operations of various food-based welfare programs, the rest act as 
a buffer to counter fluctuations in output and are used for market intervention operations 
to stabilize open market prices. 
This Chapter evaluates the government￿s domestic and international trade and 
marketing policies and their effects on the food grain sector. It reviews the nature, degree 
and impact of the government policies, particularly, distortions in marketing and trade 
policies related to wheat and rice, on food security at the national and household levels 
with a special focus on the 1990s and early 2000s. The Chapter analyses the historical 
evolution of policies and their effectiveness in meeting objectives such as protecting 
consumers and providing incentives to producers. It also examines issues that arise from 
liberalizing external trade and the role that private storage and foreign trade can play in 
containing the rising costs of government intervention.  
While trade liberalization has emerged as an important element of agricultural 
economic reform in India, it has not been accompanied by commensurate reforms in the 
domestic grain markets. Lack of domestic reforms adversely affects domestic production 
and consumption by distorting consumer and producer prices, impacting private trade and 
in turn stifling growth of the agricultural sector in general, which cannot take advantage 
of liberalized trade or cope with external competition.  
In Section 2.2 we describe the evolution of domestic policies pertaining to pricing 
and distribution controls in food markets. In the next Section we review external food 
policy, followed in Section 2.4 by a discussion of the emerging role of the private sector. 
Finally, in Section 2.5 we present a summary of recent policy initiatives and conclude the 
Chapter.  
2.2  DOMESTIC MARKETING: PRICING AND DISTRIBUTION CONTROLS 
The Government of India (GOI) and various state governments are involved in 
several food-based interventions. Table 2.1 presents the salient features of various food-
based programs run by the governments. These can be broadly classified into price   7 
subsidy schemes, food for employment schemes and nutrition based programs. A major 
element of GOI￿s food intervention comprises procurement of food grains at minimum 
support prices (MSP), maintenance of buffer stocks and distribution of grains at 
subsidized rates through the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS), which is 
India￿s most expensive food security program. TPDS aims to ensure access by the poor 
and other vulnerable groups to essential food commodities at subsidized prices below 
GOI￿s economic costs. The program supplies rice, wheat, and sugar nationally, and other 
commodities such as edible oils and coarse grains in some states. It follows a 2-tiered 
pricing structure for people below and above the poverty line. Antyodaya Anna Yojana 
(AAY) is a new scheme to serve the poorest of the poor through a price subsidy that is 
much higher than that the TPDS subsidy for those below the poverty line.  
Apart from distribution of grains at subsidized rates, another component of GOI￿s 
food intervention comprises procurement of food grains, i.e., wheat, rice and coarse 
grains, which serves the purposes of food-based programs, providing remunerative prices 
to farmers, building buffer stock of food grains to counter fluctuations in prices and 
meeting any emergencies like drought/ failures of crop. The buffer stocks are vital to the 
food management policy of the Government. Grains are procured by the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI, a GOI agency) in association with State procuring agencies 
under the price support scheme. For wheat, the government offers to buy all grain that 
comes forth for sale at its MSP. In the case of rice part of the procurement is in the form 
of paddy at its MSP, which is custom milled and the rest, which is the major part, is 
procured as rice in the form of a statutory levy imposed by some States/ Union Territories 
(UTs) on rice millers/ dealers.
2 The levy percentage varies from 10% in Pondicherry to 
75% in Haryana, Punjab, Orissa, etc. Rice millers are paid levy rice prices fixed by the 
Government.  
                                                 
2 In this report, we interchangeably refer to States/ Union Territories as states.   8 
Table 2.1￿Safety Net Programs￿Interventions, Financing Arrangements and 
Coverage 
 
Program/Scheme  Volume of Food-Based Transfer  Program Interventions 
A. Targeted Public 
Distribution System 
BPL/ APL: 35 kg rice and wheat/ 
family/ month 
Price subsidies on rice wheat, sugar, edible 
oils.  
1. Antyodaya Anna 
Yojna 
35 kg of rice and wheat per family 
classified as poorest of the poor 
A higher price subsidy on rice and wheat 
than BPL rates 
2. Annapurna Scheme  10 kg/ month/indigent senior citizen  Free grain to indigent senior citizens 
B. Food grain Price 
Stabilization 
  Food grain procurement and price support, 
rice and wheat buffer stocks and open market 
sales at below market prices; Controls on 
private storage, movement, access to credit, 
rice milling, external trade 
C. Food for Work 
1.Jawahar Gram 
Samriddhi Yojana 
1 kg of rice or wheat/workday  Employment in lean agricultural season for 
rural workers below poverty line  
2. Employment 
Assurance Scheme 
1 kg of rice or wheat/workday  100  days  employment  during  lean 
agricultural season up to 2 members/family 
3. Swarnjayanti Gram 
Swarozgar Yojana 
Up to 5 kg grains per person per day  Employment at minimum wage, partly paid 
in kind  
4. Food-for-Work  Food grains up to 5 kg per man-day  Employment in natural calamity areas 
D. Mid-Day Meals 
Scheme 
3 kg rice or wheat/child/month for 
10 mos. Or cooked meal 
(100gm/day) for 200 days 
Cooked meal or distribution of food grains to 
primary schools 
E. Nutrition Schemes 
with Food 
Supplementation 
1. Integrated Child 
Development Services 
Scheme/ Tamil Nadu 
Integrated Nutrition 
Program 
0 to 6 yrs: 300 calories (ready to eat 
food) + 8-10 gm protein for 300 
days 
Malnourished Children: 600 
calories + 20 gm protein for 300 
days 
Adolescent girls: 500 calories + 20-
25 gm protein for 300 days 
Pregnant & nursing mothers: 500 
calories + 20-25 gm protein for 300 
days 
Supplementary feeding, growth monitoring 
and promotion, nutrition and health 
education to adult women and adolescent 
girls, pre-school education to 3-6 years old, 
immunization, health check-ups and 
referrals, income generating programs  
2. Pradhan Mantri 
Gramodaya Yojana 
300 calories and 8-10 gms of 
protein for Grade I and II children, 
double the amount for Grade III and 
IV children. 
Supplementary feeding 
3. Balwadi Nutrition 
Program 
300 calories + 12 ￿15 gm protein 
for 270 days 
Supplementary feeding to children 3-5 yrs, 
promote child￿s social and emotional 
development 
4. Day Care Centers  300 calories + 12 ￿15 gm protein 
for 270 days 
Day care services to children below 5 yrs to 
low income families, supplementary 
nutrition, health care, medical check up and 
immunization 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2001).   9 
The operations of the entire program are carried out by FCI, which is reimbursed 
its ￿economic cost￿ net of sales realization in the form of ￿food subsidy￿ by GOI. The 
food subsidy includes subsidy for rice, wheat and sugar and for buffer stock management. 
In 1990-91, total grain price subsidy plus buffer stock subsidy was 2.33% of total central 
government expenditure (Rs.24.50 billion). By 2001-02, it multiplied more than six times 
and became 4.41% of central government expenditure (Rs.160.68 billion). See Table 2.2. 
The budget estimate of food subsidy (including for sugar) at Rs.212 billion or $4.3 billion 
during 2002-03 constitutes 5.17% of central government expenditure. This translates to 
per capita subsidy of merely Rs.17 per head per month.  
Table 2.2￿Food Subsidy of GOI  









subsidy as % of 
total food 
subsidy 
Share in Total 
GOI 
Expenditure (%) 
Share in GDP 
(%) 
1990-91  24.50  0.00  2.33  0.48 
1992-92  28.50  0.00  2.56  0.48 
1992-93  28.00 4.51 16.11 2.27  0.41 
1993-94 52.00  12.46  23.96  3.90  0.70 
1994-95 45.34  18.53  40.87  2.80  0.49 
1995-96 50.78  14.19  27.94  2.78  0.46 
1996-97  51.66 7.63 14.77 2.46  0.42 
1997-98  75.00 9.37 12.49 3.23  0.54 
1998-99 87.00  15.96  18.34  3.11  0.53 
1999-00 92.00  18.94  20.59  3.03  0.51 
2000-01 102.32  42.33  41.37  2.88  0.53 
2001-02 160.68  56.80  35.35  4.41  0.77 
 
Source: Jha and Umali Deininger (2003). 
 
For strengthening the operational machinery of PDS, GOI gives financial 
assistance to states/UTs for construction of godowns, purchase of mobile vans/trucks and 
for training, research and monitoring. While food subsidy provision is made in the non-
Plan budget of GOI, the Planning Commission provides funds for such PDS Plan 
Schemes. Despite reports that a large number of godowns for which GOI provided funds 
were not constructed, many were not put to intended use and many state governments did  10  
not purchase mobile vans for which funds were released, GOI continues to fund the 
operation. 
2.2.1  Support Price Policy 
GOI follows a Minimum Support Price (MSP) Policy for 24 major crops. Since 
early 1990s, the concept of MSP was adopted for paddy, wheat and various other crops. 
The policy is effective for rice and wheat in five major surplus states. The Commission 
for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) recommends levels at which MSP should be 
fixed based on several considerations. These include the cost of cultivation, the overall 
shortage of grains as reflected by the trend in wholesale prices and the need to keep in check 
the rate of inflation in the consumers’ interest. These recommendations take into account 
the variations in these costs across regions while explicitly incorporating cost estimates 
provided by states. Although the MSP is supposed to be based on a set of economic 
criteria that includes cost, its fixation by the government is influenced by various non-
economic factors such as demands from chief ministers of grain-surplus states and rising 
expectations of rich farmers represented by politically strong farm lobbies [see, e.g., Rao 
(2001)]. These pressures have resulted in ever-rising MSP. In recent years, MSP was 
raised so much that it reached the level of market price, especially for wheat.
3 According 
to the Economic Survey (2001), the annual average increase in MSP of rice and wheat 
was higher than average inflation during 1992-93 to 1999-00. Chand (2003) reports that 
in 2001-02 harvest season, presence of official procurement machinery did not allow the 
market price of wheat and common paddy to fall below the level of MSP in the major 
surplus states of Punjab and Haryana. This situation forced the government to buy and 
accumulate stocks. For wheat the support prices have been fixed at such high levels over 
                                                 
3 High procurement prices paid to farmers have encouraged planting of wheat production, which increased 
by 37% between 1990 and 2000. Relatively higher MSP for rice and wheat increased the profitability of 
these crops and motivated the farmers to divert their areas to these crops from coarse cereals, pulses and 
even oilseeds as in the case of Punjab.    11  
the years that the CACP refrained from making any recommendation for this price for the 
2000-01 season.  
According to the Economic Survey (2002), the government agreed that the high 
MSP ￿applied to wheat and rice and near monopoly procurement by FCI have led to an 
unsustainable situation where food stocks with FCI have risen to levels that have little 
probability of being used.￿ FCI￿s actual stocks exceeded several times its own norm of 
stocking, going beyond 60 million tonnes in July 2002, before falling to about 50 million 
tonnes by end of September 2002 due to release of stocks at subsidized prices to 
exporters and increased offtake through redesigned TPDS and other food-based programs 
that have been revived/ initiated.
4 The excessive rise in the MSP has not only led to 
accumulation of stocks and contributed to the rise in market prices of wheat and rice, the 
credit blocked in these stocks also puts pressure on interest rates and can crowd out more 
productive investment. Several committees and researchers have recommended that the 
MSP should be truly a "minimum" support price by including in it only the variable costs, 
namely the costs of inputs and wages (including family labour). See, among others, 
Expenditure Reforms Commission (2001), GOI (2001), GOI (2002a) and Parikh et al 
(2003). Box 2.1 summarizes the recommendations of GOI (2001).  
 
                                                 
4 The buffer stock norms that ranged from 14.5 to 22.3 million tonnes in different months during 1992-98 
were subsequently raised to 15.8 to 24.3 million tonnes [Chand (2003)]. Such a practice has also been 
followed in the past to cover up the rising discrepancy between actual stocks and buffer norms.  12  
Box 2.1￿Selected Recommendations of GOI (2001)  
 
1)  The central budget should make a provision for national food subsidy and distribute it among states 
according to a prescribed formula using updated poverty ratios. The state governments could 
supplement this with their own resources. Rice and wheat should be supplied to States/UTs at full 
economic cost. 
2)  Quantum of total food subsidy to be provided, issue prices and quotas of food grains, subsidy 
involved in food stamps etc. should be decided by the state governments. 
3)  There should be greater decentralization of operations; states should be free to procure cereals and 
maintain buffer stocks.  Any rules and regulations obstructing states should be removed. 
4)  In the long run food subsidy should be confined to the population below the poverty line. In the short 
run, to offload stocks, cereals can be supplied under PDS to the APL population at a concessional 
rate. 
5)  Food subsidy should be restricted to rice and wheat. State specific schemes can be introduced for 
PDS distribution of coarse grains in states with decentralized system of procurement. Coarse cereals 
subsidy to States will however be covered under the overall subsidy allocation made as per 
recommendation 1. 
6)  It may be more efficient to supply subsidized grains through a system of food stamps or food credit 
cards (smart cards). To ensure minimization of any potential design problem a committee could 
examine the operational details and feasibility of experimental introduction of such systems. 
7)  MSP should not exceed the sum of variable cost and family wages.  
8)  The Essential Commodities Act and (State) Agricultural Produce Marketing Acts that hamper the 
growth of free trade in agricultural goods should be reviewed. 
9)  The food policy should continue to have stabilization of cereals prices as one of its objectives.  This 
can be achieved through the operation of a buffer stock combined with timely intervention by the FCI 
in domestic markets and a liberal import-export policy for food grains. 
 
 
2.2.2  Targeted Public Distribution System 
TPDS, India￿s most expensive food security program with a price subsidy, was 
introduced in June 1997. The shift to TPDS was a significant milestone in the GOI￿s food 
security strategy as it targeted a larger food grain subsidy to the poor relative to the non-
poor. Its predecessor, the Public Distribution System (PDS), by contrast was a general 
entitlement scheme and was widely criticized on several grounds for its failure to serve 
the population below the poverty line. See, among others, Comptroller and Auditor  13  
General of India ￿ CAG (2000), DrŁze (2001), Dutta and Ramaswami (2001), Jha and 
Srinivasan (2001a), Umali Deininger and Deininger (2001) and Shariff et al (2002). It not 
only failed to reach the poor, but also provided meager income support and suffered from 
urban bias, leakage, diversion and deteriorating quality of grain supplied due to relaxed 
specification for procurement. Between 30%-40% of subsidy is estimated to be lost 
through leakage
5 and inefficiency of the procurement and distribution system both at 
central and state levels. PDS was also criticized for lack of transparent and accountable 
delivery systems, inadequate allocation and poor quality, negligible coverage and low 
offtake in states with high concentration of poor due to non-availability of stock, while 
the offtake contributed less than 10% of beneficiary requirement in most states.  
In order to redirect more of the subsidy to the poor, in 1997 the GOI launched a 
re-designed program, the TPDS, which excluded the population above the poverty line 
(APL). It included a 2-tiered pricing structure for families based on their poverty levels. 
Special white cards were issued to families Below Poverty Line (BPL) with an 
entitlement of 10 kg of food grains per month per family at specially subsidized prices, 
set at half the FCI￿s economic costs. This was meant to benefit about 60 million poor 
families. APL families were issued yellow ration cards and supplied grains at a higher 
price set equal to the economic cost so that the entire consumer subsidy could be directed 
to the BPL population.  
TPDS is operated under the joint responsibility of the Central and State 
Governments. The Central Government takes the responsibility for procurement, storage, 
transportation and bulk allocation of food grains, at subsidized prices. The GOI supplies 
grains to states at Central Issue Price (CIP) for distribution to consumers. The 
responsibility of distribution to consumers rests with State Governments. State 
governments are also responsible for identification of the BPL families as per the poverty 
estimates of the Planning Commission based on the methodology of the ￿Expert Group￿ 
                                                 
5 Grains issued (supplied) through PDS minus grains received by households from PDS.  14  
on estimation of proportion and number of poor. State TPDS food grain allocations are 
sold at subsidized prices through a network of more than 4,60,000 fair price shops 
(FPSs). State Civil Supplies Corporations and State Marketing Federations draw the food 
grains from designated FCI depots located throughout the country for distribution and 
sale at FPSs. These shops are private retail outlets operating on commission basis (about 
7%).  The final size of the rations that households could purchase varies by State. TPDS 
subsidies are allocated to states according to their shares of the population living below 
the official poverty line based on 1993-94 poverty estimates.  
GOI finances the TPDS price subsidy associated with the food grains that it 
allocates to each State. State governments finance the intra-state TPDS distribution costs 
(e.g., storage, transport, losses). By charging prices different from CIP for both APL and 
BPL categories, some states give additional price subsidy
6 to consumers while others 
impose a tax in terms of an average price higher than CIP. Data for 2000-01 shows that 
the state of Andhra Pradesh provided an additional TPDS subsidy of Rs.607 million, 
Haryana Rs.2.5 million and Maharashtra Rs.324 million while Madhya Pradesh imposed 
a tax of Rs.296 million. GOI has now allowed states to fix Retail Issue Price (RIP) 
according to their actual costs of transport, incidental charges and ￿fair margin￿ to ration 
shop owners so as improve the viability of their operations and to rationalize retail-end 
prices. 
Some state governments failed to establish an effective mechanism for 
identification of BPL families and issue ration cards to the identified households. By 
1999, 18 states/ UTs had not completed the process of identification of the poor. This 
resulted in nationally 18% of the population, and in Nagaland, Manipur and Meghalaya 
respectively 88%, 64% and 50% of families not owning ration cards. The number of BPL 
households covered increased only marginally from 63.2 million in 1998 to only 65.2 
million in 2001. 
                                                 
6 State PDS subsidy = Offtake * (Central Issue Price - State Issue Price).   15  
There were other more serious problems in both design and implementation of 
TPDS. The entitlements were changed from a per capita norm to a family norm as each 
BPL household was entitled to a uniform 10 kg of grain irrespective of family size and 
need. For a five-member family, this amounted to 2 kg per person per month, which is 
merely 18% of the minimum cereal intake of 135 kg per person per year recommended 
by the Indian Council of Medical Research.
7 There is evidence of a significant reduction 
in 2000-01 in off-take relative to allocations and high leakage of food grains. In the light 
of continuing criticism, GOI increased the allocation to each BPL family from 10 kg to 
20 kg per month at 50% of FCI￿s economic cost from April 1, 2000. However, no 
changes were made towards APL allocation. From December 1, 2000 the allocation of 
food grains under BPL quota is based on the population of states as in March 2000, 
average size of households in the state as in 1991 and the poverty ratio of the state as in 
1993-94.  
As the redesigned TPDS continued to perform poorly, coupled with excess stocks 
adding to the rising share of storage cost in food subsidy (Table 2.2), GOI introduced 
further changes. GOI (2002a) recommended that the quota for BPL families depend on 
the number of family members with each such family allowed to purchase up to 5 kg per 
person per month at the announced BPL price or an allocation of 20 kg per family 
whichever is higher. Any additional requirement may be provided at the APL price. See 
Box 2.2 for a summary of relevant recommendations of GOI (2002a). From July 2001, 
BPL allocation of food grains was increased from 20 kg to 25 kg per family per month 
with CIP at 48% of economic cost. Furthermore, to offload some more of the stocks, GOI 
started selling grain from FCI stocks at BPL prices for export purposes. Grains offloaded 
for exports rose from a negligible amount in 1997/98 to 4.69 million tonnes in 2001/02. 
GOI also introduced a discounted rate of 70% of the economic cost for allocation of food 
grains to APL families. From April 1, 2002, the allocation of food grains was increased to 
                                                 
7 GOI (2002a) estimate the monthly family requirement to be 73 kg.  16  
35 kg per family per month for AAY, BPL and APL families for a period of one year. At 
the same time, the government also reduced the issue price for APL rice and wheat by Rs. 
100 per quintal for a period of three months. The offtake under TPDS between April 
2002 and June 2002 rose to 2.35 million tonnes for rice and 1.61 million tonnes for wheat 
against 1.85 million tonnes and 0.99 million tonnes respectively for the corresponding 
period in 2001. Increased offtake resulted in reduced stocks, which in turn reduced cost 
of storage.  
While TPDS showed a poor performance at the national level, state level data 
showed a better reach to the poor. World Bank (2002) reports that the policy changes 
resulted in significantly higher shares of food grains reaching the poorer states. Analysis 
of the National Sample Survey (NSS) 50
th round (1993/94) and the 55
th round (1999/00) 
too indicates some improvement in targeting of the benefits of the public distribution 
system [Jha and Umali Deininger (2003)].   
Box 2.2￿Selected Recommendations of GOI (2002a) on Public Distribution System 
1)  Reintroduce universal PDS with uniform Central Issue Prices (with no distinction between varieties) 
one each for rice and wheat respectively, for all consumers in all parts of the country. 
Fix the CIP at FCI￿s all-India average acquisition cost based on MSP. Allocate grain to states based 
on population and a monthly per capita quota to be specified from time to time.  
2)  Set up an independent central watchdog body, comprising officials, experts and others, to monitor use 
of cash grants and grants under the food for welfare schemes. 
3)  In the long run, introduce a food coupon system outside PDS outlets to allow wider choice to 
consumers. Index the value of the coupon to food inflation. 
4) For  decentralized  procurement,  give states in cash the difference between the full state-specific 
economic cost and the CIP on their entire PDS distribution. 
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2.3  EXTERNAL TRADE POLICY 
The design of external trade policies in India has been influenced by the 
prevailing domestic and international economic situation over time. The Export and 
Import (EXIM) Policy for food grains is decided by the Ministry of Commerce in 
consultation with the Ministries of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs & Public 
Distribution. The policy regarding export and import of food grains is as follows. 
With a view to discourage import of wheat into the country, in 2000-01 the 
Government introduced 50% tariff on imports of wheat and 80% on import of rice 
without any exemption even to official agencies.  
As noted earlier, India continues to be plagued by mounting stocks due to rising 
production and attractive procurement prices that encourage farmers to sell their crops to 
the government. The excess stocks have led the government to subsidize exports. For 
instance, in 2002-03 the government sold wheat to exporters for less than the 
procurement price and covered transport, storage, and other handling costs. A side effect 
of this policy has been that stocks sold for export at a subsidized price are diverted to 
domestic market fetching the traders a higher price. For example, in 2000-01 as against 
the release of 1.6 million tonnes of wheat for export, actual export was 0.682 million 
tonnes only [Chand (2003)]. 
In the post WTO period international prices of rice and wheat plunged to lowest 
levels during the last twenty years while the domestic prices in India rose upward largely 
due to continued hike in support price. This made it profitable to import wheat but 
adversely affected rice exports. Chand (2003) argues that as a consequence of this, 
private traders imported 1.33 million tonnes of wheat during 1999-00 despite record level 
of buffer stock in the country. The government in turn had to impose high tariff and even 
resort to canalization to control imports. Moreover, decline in international prices and rise 
in domestic prices made it difficult to dispose of large public stocks of rice and wheat for 
export at acquisition cost to the government, which was thus forced to subsidize for  18  
export even though it charged a much higher price to domestic consumers. From April 
2002, government started releasing rice from its stock for export. 
Table 2.3￿Export and Import Policy (as on 26th October, 1999) 
Item  Import  Export 
Paddy  Canalized. Import through FCI.  Restricted. Export permitted under license. 
50% or more broken-import freely 
allowed. 
Free. Export allowed subject to registration 
of contracts with APEDA. 
Rice-Basmati 





40% or more broken and common and 
coarse varieties-import freely allowed. 
Other rice-import canalized through FCI. 
Free. Export allowed subject to registration 
of contracts with APEDA. 
Wheat  Canalized. Import through FCI. However, 
import by Roller Flour Mills either directly 
or through STC/MMTC/PEC for milling 
purposes allowed freely. 
Export permitted against license subject to 
quantitative ceilings as may be notified by 
Ministry of Commerce (DGFT) from time to 
time and registration of contracts with 
APEDA. For 1999-2000 a ceiling of 1.00 
million tonnes has been fixed. 
Wheat 
products 
Restricted ￿ Consumer goods ￿ Not 
permitted to be imported except against 





Bajra, Ragi & 
Jowar) 
Canalized. Import through FCI.  Export permitted subject to an annual 
quantitative ceiling of 1.00 lakh tonnes. 
However, export of Hybrid Jowar produced 
ad Kharif crop is free. 
Pulses  Free  All types including flour made there under 
except those in consumer packs up to 5.00 
kg. Restricted, export permitted under 
license. Export of pulses in consumer packs 




2.3.1  WTO and Trade Liberalization 
Gulati and Narayanan (2003) argue that trade liberalization by developing 
countries helps alleviate their poverty provided domestic policies (market access, 
domestic support and food aid) of developed countries such as the US do not pass on the  19  
￿burden of adjustment￿ of world prices on to competitive developing countries such as 
Thailand, Vietnam and India. This problem could be sorted out through multilateral trade 
negotiations. Hoda and Gulati (2002) list several directions that India can take in future 
negotiations relating to AOA.  
In recent years high-price support to wheat farmers and levy procurement of rice 
led to a large grain stockholding by GOI causing a drain on the government￿s resources 
as carrying cost of buffer stocks grew at about 15% per annum in late 1990s. But in spite 
of the high costs, the government in the past has shown a general preference for domestic 
buffer stocks over external trade to stabilize domestic prices. This is due to the 
apprehension that foreign markets can be unreliable sources of supply and demand and 
the higher price variability in these markets may induce greater instability in domestic 
prices. For instance, by simulating the effects of free trade in rice in five Asian countries, 
Islam and Thomas (1996) show that free trade increases domestic price variability to 
levels several times higher than historically observed. Since world prices are much more 
volatile than domestic prices, by linking the latter to the former through liberalization of 
trade, there is a perceived potential risk of exposing domestic producers and consumers to 
greater price instability. Note that in general, domestic and world market prices differ 
from each other due to trade margins, cost of transportation to the port, port charges and 
other handling charges. In addition to this, if government imposes any trade tax/subsidy, 
this would also contribute to the difference between domestic and world prices. If trade 
margins were reduced through better port and infrastructure facilities, it would increase 
the possibility for greater volumes of trade and lead to a greater exposure of the domestic 
economy to world prices and their instability. 
Ever since India became a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
(AOA) in 1995, a concern that has been raised repeatedly is whether agricultural trade 
liberalization would destroy India￿s food security. This is a critical issue since a large 
section of the population is dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, and the poor 
consumers already spend an overwhelming share of their income on food. See Box 2.3  20  
for concerns arising from WTO. Some of the fears from external trade liberalization have 
been that removal of quantitative restrictions (QRs) would flood the country with imports 
and bring in greater domestic price instability.  
Although AOA has been perceived to be a threat to the country, the government 
has implemented several reforming policies. Notable among them are: market access 
(QRs were abolished in 2001 and tariffs bound at ceiling levels), domestic support 
(product and non-product specific below de-minimis) and no export subsidies except 
grain exports since 2000-01. Contrary to fears, despite the abolition of QRs imports have 
not flooded the country since existing tariff levels are sufficient to check imports. The 
actual tariffs are far below bound rates for most tariff lines. Also, Srinivasan and Jha 
(2001) show through counterfactual simulations that when world prices are stable, 
domestic price variability is reduced due to liberalized trade by India. The extent of 
reduction in price fluctuations depends on the level of exposure to trade. Moreover, AOA 
does not restrict some of the main elements of Indian food policy, namely, buffer stocks, 
PDS, MSP (within de-minimis limits) and input subsidies (to low-income and resource-
poor farmers but within de-minimis limits). All this means that food security options can 
be pursued by reforming FCI and PDS and by removing restrictions (storage limits, 
levies, and other marketing controls) on domestic private marketing.   21  
Box 2.3￿AOA and WTO Concerns 
 
There is a fear that with trade liberalization, cheap imports would threaten food security, wipe 
out production base, create unemployment and deepen poverty while exports would reduce domestic 
availability of cheap food. There is also a feeling that the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(AOA) is an ￿unequal treaty￿ unduly favouring the rich countries.  
The AOA is built on three pillars: market access, domestic support and export competition. 
Reduction commitments were drawn up for different countries, with several exemptions to developing 
countries. The permissible limit (de-minimis) on distortionary domestic support ￿ both product-specific 
and non-product specific ￿ was 10% of the value of production for developing countries and 5% for 
developed countries. India has no reduction commitments, either with respect to domestic support or 
export competition. It has additional exemptions under the Special and Differential Treatment Clause. 
Subsidies for market promotion, international freight and internal transport of export consignments are 
exempt from reduction. India has commitments only in the area of market access. It bound its tariffs at 
ceiling levels, i.e., tariffs should not exceed this limit. Even after the WTO Agreement India continued 
with quantitative restrictions (QRs) for balance-of payments reasons (exempt from tariffication 
requirements). But after dispute settlement proceedings initiated by the US, it agreed to abolish QRs with 
effect from April 1, 2001. 
AOA has had little role to play in shaping agricultural policies in India since 1995. Domestic 
support: product-specific support is negative for most products and below the de minimis for others. 
Non-product-specific support is also below the de minimis limit even without taking into account input 
subsidy exemptions. India does not provide export subsidies except for wheat exports since 2000-01. 
Market access: after renegotiations India has revised rice tariff bound upwards from the level during the 
Uruguay Round, which was among the highest in the world. But the applied rate of customs tariff is far 
below the ceiling bindings.  
Agricultural trade liberalization has not had detrimental effects on India￿s food security. AOA 
does not threaten the food security since rice and wheat in India have been both efficient import 
substitutes and export competitive for several years in the past 3 decades. Removal of QRs and import 
liberalization has not led to any surge in imports. AOA does not prohibit Green Box measures for food 
security such as public stockholding and domestic food aid. Demand for a ￿food security box￿ or a 
￿development box￿ could be losing propositions, since it would only reinforce demands from highly 
protected developed countries (in Europe and East Asia) to include their multifunctionality concerns as 
exempt support. 
Domestic marketing reforms should be undertaken so that there is one integrated market for 
food within India and restrictions do not prevent inter-regional flows in a timely and efficient manner. In 
the context, apart from price reform, a crucial link is institutional reform in both procuring and 
distribution, which must be undertaken to ensure better household food security. Proper targeting of food 
subsidies and eventually moving on to a food stamp system should also be pursued.  
 
 
Source: Hoda and Gulati (2002). 
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2.4  ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR  
Control of the private sector in grain markets takes various forms such as 
regulation of trade and stocks and price controls. There are formal and informal 
restrictions on trading, storage and inter-state movement of agricultural produce. In 
addition there are other ills of controls including harassment by officials, corruption and 
bribery. The consequence of such conditions is to slow down the movement of grains 
from surplus to deficit regions, increase price variation across regions and add to the 
costs of marketing/ trading, making domestic prices internationally uncompetitive. 
Physical storage of grain by government agencies too can lead to inefficiencies. By 
stabilising prices, buffer stock policies reduce the incentives for private storage. 
But the government has been procuring substantial parts of marketed surplus from 
food surplus states. Chand (2003) notes that the share of official agencies in market 
arrivals of rice steadily increased at the cost of the private sector. It increased from about 
1/3
rd to 2/3
rd between 1995-96 and 2001-02. Similarly, for wheat, the government￿s share 
increased from less than ‰ to more than ￿ during the same period. Several factors caused 
the downtrend in private share: lower rate of increase in retail than procurement and 
wholesale prices, expectation of low future prices due to a large build-up of public stocks 
and subsidized sale from stocks for exports and for open market sales. All these made it 
more attractive for private trade to buy from the government agencies than from the 
market.  
Since government agencies usually have a soft budget constraint they do not have 
incentives to carry out cost saving measures. Grain losses are reported to be large during 
transit as well as under storage. There is shortage of good quality storage facilities 
resulting in the rotting of grains in godowns. Even the available facilities are not utilised 
optimally due to a lack of backward and forward linkages resulting from a weak system  23  
of grain handling, storage and transportation [Singh (1999)].
8 On the other hand, price 
stabilisation can be achieved at lower costs by schemes that do not require physical 
handling of the commodity, e.g., international trade, subsidy to private storage, use of 
variable levies and interest subsidy.
9 In the Indian context, Pursell and Gulati (1993), e.g., 
recommended deregulating domestic wheat market and abolishing compulsory 
acquisition at below-market prices of rice.  
The government policy had all along failed to recognize the complementary role 
that private storage can play in stabilizing prices. It considered private storage to be 
destabilizing and imposed several restrictions on their operations. In spite of these 
drawbacks, private traders manage to operate at lower costs. Unfortunately, despite 
evidence of lower trading margins and storage costs for private traders as opposed to 
public agencies the government continues with several restrictions. Regulations such as 
Essential Commodities Act (1956) were meant to tackle scarcity situation by curbing/ 
controlling the activities of private traders/ speculators/ hoarders. But stringent rules and 
declining credibility of regulated markets have resulted in falling share of produce sold 
through these markets [Chand (2003)]. Sale through informal markets also allows traders 
to avoid various kinds of market charges and taxes ￿ mandatory in regulated markets, 
which vary across states and are perceived to be excessive. Moreover inefficiency of 
parastatal organizations involved in procurement and marketing, such as FCI, has been a 
matter of debate in economic reforms.  
While the public sector does have a role to play in facilitating appropriate 
economic environment and building infrastructure, an expanding role for the private 
sector can promote competition, stabilize prices and encourage production patterns 
                                                 
8 To strengthen transport infrastructure to reach PDS to rural, hilly, remote and other geographically 
inaccessible areas that lacked regular ration shops, the central government provided financial assistance to 
states for procuring delivery vans/ trucks. But despite such funds, many states did not buy the 
recommended mobile vans nor construct the required godowns. 
9 See, for example, Bigman and Reutlinger (1979), Jha and Srinivasan (1997), Knudsen and Nash (1990) 
and Srinivasan and Jha (2001).  24  
commensurate with non-distortionary prices. The underlying objective of reforms in the 
food sector should therefore be to promote/ provide a level playing field to private 
operators and traders. According to the Expenditure Reforms Commission (2001) 
induction of the private sector in procurement operations will indirectly lead to a 
reduction in the cost of procurement to FCI. The report points out that some costs due to 
statutory and non-statutory charges (e.g., mandi charges and purchase tax) paid to 
agencies in Punjab and Haryana, adding up to more than 9% of MSP for wheat, could be 
avoided. A similar suggestion is made by GOI (2002a) to bring such charges outside the 
purview of the system and arrange to cover them through government budgets.  
2.5  RECENT POLICY INITIATIVES AND THE STEP FORWARD 
In terms of domestic food policy, the government is supporting some of the 
largest food distribution and nutrition programs in the world that aim to have a direct, 
positive and immediate impact of alleviating household food insecurity. But pervasive 
inefficiencies in implementation and lower allocations than requirements observed in 
several food-based programs seriously undermine their ability to achieve the intended 
goals. Studies have shown that when its not possible to identify the poor in a cost-
effective manner, then programs designed with a self-selection or self-targeting 
mechanism can limit the subsidy to the poor or the target group [e.g., Chander (2001), 
Coady et al (2002), Jha and Srinivasan (2003a) and van de Walle (1998)]. The 
government is making attempts to improve the effectiveness of public spending on its 
programs by rationalizing expenditure, adopting better targeting methods such as through 
income-based identification and social and demographic characteristics etc. Such 
reforms, if followed through properly, could help make public food spending much more 
worthwhile. An important challenge in the future therefore is increasing the effectiveness 
of these expenditures so that it will reach the most food insecure and nutritionally 
vulnerable people of the country.   25  
The government is also initiating steps to encourage private participation in grain 
markets. The role of FCI is proposed to be restricted to timely sales and purchases to 
maintain stability in food prices and resort to exports and imports of food grains, when 
required. But more needs to be done. If price distortions are eliminated, then based on the 
relative prices, farmers could take advantage by shifting to crops that offer higher market 
price than rice and wheat. There are various options to support farmers that do not require 
direct market intervention by the government. They include subsidy to private storage, 
loans for private storage, crop insurance, futures contracts and commodity options, 
commodity programs designed to assist producers in orderly marketing by taking off the 
pressure to sell at harvest time, interest subsidy etc. In various countries, commodity 
programs provide support to producers through deficiency-payment, loans and acreage-
reduction programs. Policy options other than holding public buffer stocks, which could 
improve the restricted access to storage and credit include government loans or subsidies 
that may be offered to encourage private storage facilities that are used co-operatively. In 
this line, the National Policy on Handling and Storage of Foodgrains envisages 
encouragement of private sector for building storage capacities for rental use by 
government agencies and also development of infrastructure for integrated bulk handling, 
storage and transportation of food grains. 
As for external food policy, foreign trade in food grain has not been effectively 
used as a policy measure due to fears of destabilizing domestic prices. Import of food 
grains had been canalized through FCI. Exports were subject to quotas and were required 
to fetch a specified minimum export price. Some of these restrictions have, however, 
been relaxed in recent years due to the mounting stocks of food grains with the 
government and also due to market access requirement under the WTO agreement. 
As India becomes a major force in the global wheat and rice export markets, new 
strategies are required to sustain its position. As part of a new strategy, the government 
plans to promote exports through long-term credit, removal of export restrictions, 
establishment of Agricultural Export Zones and transport subsidies for exports of wheat  26  
and rice from government warehouses. But it also needs to improve facilities for grading 
and measuring standards, and address quality problems. In order to take full advantage of 
growing exports, the exporters would need to have better port and domestic infrastructure 
facilities, which are currently very meager. The ports are highly congested, have obsolete 
equipment, are managed by government controlled port trusts and thus marred by 
bureaucracy. The exporters in general also face distribution and storage problems. Loading a 
ship takes enormous time and is extremely slow compared to international standards. 
Improving these facilities would go a long way in reducing the high handling costs and 
margins of exporters. 
Undertaking reforms in these areas could make India competitive with 
competitors such as Vietnam and Pakistan for rice and the United States for wheat, 
especially in Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern regions. For example, Indian wheat has 
captured about 40% of the market share in Bangladesh, largely from the US by exporting 
wheat at significant discounts. A similar observation can be made from Philippines, 
Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Malaysia too. One of the reasons for the 
Indian wheat capturing major shares in these markets is that despite its low quality 
compared to U.S. and other origin wheat, Indian wheat is being used in the production of 
flour rather than feed.   27  
3.  ROLE OF FCI VERSUS THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Government intervention in grain markets of India is well entrenched. Different 
ministries and departments of Government of India (GOI) carry out operations relating to 
price support policies, buffer stocking and price stabilization, and subsidized distribution 
of grains under various welfare programs, often with help from state governments and 
part funding from donor agencies and international organizations. The main functions of 
the Department of Public Distribution in the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Public 
Distribution are: formulation and implementation of national policies on procurement, 
import and export, movement, storage, distribution of food grains (rice, wheat and 
coarse-grains) to consumers, administration of subsidies including implementation of 
Targeted Public Distribution System with special focus on poor, buffer stocking, 
provision of storage facilities for the maintenance of Central Reserves of food grains and 
promotion of scientific storage, quality control and specifications of food grains. In 
carrying out its functions, the Department is assisted by its two Public Sector 
Undertakings viz. the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and the Central Warehousing 
Corporation (CWC) and the subordinate offices, namely Save Grain Campaign Offices, 
Indian Grain Management Research Institute and its 5 Field Stations. 
FCI is a central government agency involved in procurement, storage, transport, 
and allocation to states and distribution of food grains within the country on behalf of 
GOI. It is reimbursed its ￿economic cost￿ net of sales realization in the form of ￿food 
subsidy￿ by GOI. The food subsidy includes subsidy for rice, wheat and sugar and for 
buffer stock management. The operation of FCI has been an integral element of the 
Indian food policy. This Chapter evaluates the role of FCI based on data, government 
policies, the literature on the role of the private sector, the policy obstacles it has faced 
and the (in)efficiency of public sector performance. It critically assesses the present  28  
situation with respect to provision of food security by the government programs and 
policies. In particular, this Chapter examines the relative efficiency of functioning of 
private traders within the current system and what potential gains can be obtained 
through reform measures. Some of the suggestions made are substantiated by quantitative 
results obtained from simulation analyses presented in Chapters 4 and 5.  
3.2  ORGANIZATION AND MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF FCI 
FCI was set up under the Food Corporations Act 1964 in order to provide 
effective price support to farmers, cater to the Public Distribution System (PDS) and 
maintain operational buffer stocks to ensure National Food Security 
(http://fciweb.nic.in/fcitod_ind.htm). It operates through a country-wide network of about 
60,000 employees with its Corporate Office in New Delhi, 5 Zonal Offices, 22 Regional 
Offices practically in all the State capitals, 1 Port Operation Office, 173 District Offices 
and over 2178 depots (as on 31.03.2002). A Board of Directors provides general 
superintendence, direction and management of the affairs and business of the 
Corporation. 
There are three agencies in the public sector which are engaged in building large 
scale storage/ warehousing capacity namely, FCI, Central warehousing Corporation 
(CWC) and 16 State Warehousing Corporation (SWCs). FCI has a network of storage 
depots located all over India. These depots include silos, godowns and an indigenous 
method developed by FCI, called Cover and Plinth (CAP), which refers to storage of food 
grains in the open with covering of stacks with specially fabricated polythene covers 
(http://fcamin.nic.in/civil_ind.htm). It has over 23 million tonnes (owned & hired) of 
storage capacity in over 1700 godowns all over India. As on 1.11.2002 the total capacity 
available with FCI for storage of food grains including the capacity hired from Central 
Warehousing Corporation and State Warehousing Corporation was about 36 million 
tonnes of which more than 20 million tonnes was hired. The average utilization of the 
warehousing capacity of FCI between April, 2000 to November 2000 was about 75%.  29  
In the words of GOI (2002a), ￿If the dimensions and the nation-wide character of 
the FCI￿s operations are taken into account, the independent powers enjoyed by the 
management of the FCI are indeed impressive.￿ The Corporation has autonomy in several 
functions. It can decide on the break-up of storage as between godowns, under plinth and 
cover, on the methods for preservation of food grains and on intra-country movement of 
grains from procurement centres to storage points to consuming areas. Moreover, it is 
also up to the FCI to choose the quantity of procurement that is transported by rail and by 
road. FCI also enjoys a significant degree of autonomy in field operations such as 
decisions pertaining to procurement agencies, the agency-wise percentage of 
procurement, the mandis to be attached to each of the agencies, estimation of its credit 
requirement and negotiations with RBI. 
The operations of FCI helped to give impetus to sustain higher yields in the post-
green revolution era and ensured stability in food supplies. To nurture the green 
revolution, GOI introduced the scheme of minimum assured price, announced before the 
crop season and based on cost of production, inter-crop price parity, market prices and 
other relevant factors. At present, in the immediate post-harvest season, FCI and state 
government agencies establish about 8,000 centers for wheat and 4,000 centers for paddy 
to facilitate purchase of food grains at assured prices. The centers are selected so that the 
farmers do not have to travel more than 10 kms. The price support operations have 
sustained farmers￿ income and provided impetus for higher investment in agriculture.  
Through FCI, GOI purports to make available a steady availability of food grains 
to consumers at a fixed price, which is lower than the actual costs due to a consumer 
subsidy that absorbs a part of the overhead costs. FCI￿s operations relating to sale of state 
food grain allocations at subsidized prices are carried out through a network of more than 
460,000 fair price shops (FPSs) spread throughout the country, making coverage almost 
universal. State Civil Supplies Corporations and State Marketing Federations draw the 
grains from designated FCI depots located throughout the country for distribution and 
sale at FPSs. These shops are private retail outlets operating on commission basis (about  30  
7%).  However, as this is insufficient to generate reasonable profits, corruption and 
leakage is said to be rampant.
10  
3.3  CAPITAL, COST STRUCTURE AND SUBSIDY 
While FCI purchases food grains for the central pool at the procurement prices, it 
issues the same through programs such as TPDS at the Central Issue Prices (CIP) fixed 
by GOI. The issue price does not cover the full cost incurred by the Corporation in the 
procurement, movement, storage and distribution of food grains. The difference 
constitutes consumer subsidy for the Public Distribution System and other welfare 
schemes, and is paid to the Corporation by GOI (Table 3.1). FCI also maintains Central 
Pool buffer stock of food grains on behalf of the government, which reimburses its 
carrying costs. The stocks are maintained by FCI and state governments and their 
agencies in different states. The total stock in the central pool as on December 1 2002 
was 51.54 million tonnes.  
Traditionally, FCI purchased about 15-20% of India’s wheat production and 12-
15% of its rice production for price stabilisation, public distribution and other works. In 
the last two decades, procurement has increased from 4 million tonnes to over 25 million 
tonnes per annum (http://fcamin.nic.in/pol_ind.htm). But sale (or ￿offtake) through its 
distribution have not been commensurate. At present, the amount paid to the farmers/ 
millers during wheat/ rice procurement season totals to about Rs.41 billion for paddy and 
Rs.43 billion for wheat in Punjab and Rs.45 billion for levy rice in Andhra Pradesh. 
                                                 
10 For instance, in her study on Bihar, Mooij (1999) found that it is difficult for the PDS dealers to make 
profits without being corrupt.  31  
Table 3.1￿Food Subsidy Released to FCI 
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1 crore = 10 millions 
GOI also provides funds to FCI to meet the cost of fixed assets like offices, 
godowns, silos, railway sidings and weighbridges. For financing food grains and sugar 
operations entrusted to the Corporation, the working capital is provided by a consortium 
of 44 banks. As on March 31 2001, the authorized capital of FCI was Rs.2500 crores and 
paid-up capital Rs.2300 crores. Recent trends in the components of FCI￿s costs indicate 
that procurement incidentals, distribution, administrative and carrying costs all put 
together form a high percentage of the actual purchase cost of grain. The high operating 
costs of FCI give rise to a high cost-benefit ratio for the public distribution system (PDS) 
[Jha and Srinivasan (2001a)]. Also, as Gulati et al (2000) note, ￿the gap between the cost 
and revenues of the FCI has been sharply widening over the years leading to spiralling 
government subsidies. ... Per unit costs of its operations have been substantially higher 
than that of private traders. The lack of accountability within the FCI and the knowledge 
that the government will cover the costs, if necessary, have made the inefficient 
operations possible￿. These observations suggest that by encouraging private trade FCI 
could reduce its costs of operation.   32  
3.4  RELATIVE COSTS AND PERFORMANCE OF FCI VIS-￿-VIS PRIVATE 
TRADERS 
The functioning of the FCI has been specifically analyzed over the years in great 
detail by, among others, Government of India (1991), Gulati et al (2000), ASCI (2001) 
and more recently by GOI (2002a). The main focus of these studies has been particularly 
on its cost aspects, with some suggestions for how to streamline these. A general 
recommendation has been that along with its other activities, the FCI continue its role of 
stabilizing the food grains market.  
As a result, the FCI is overburdened with mounting food stocks without adequate 
capacity to store and the accompanying mounting costs. Large stockholding, in turn, has 
added to rising storage costs. In late 1990s, the carrying cost of buffer stock grew at the 
rate of 15% per annum. One of the most significant observations from various studies is 
that the hike in procurement prices/ MSP of wheat and paddy since 1989-90 apparently to 
support the PDS and buffer stock policy but often under strong farm and political lobby 
m surplus states has contributed substantially to the increasing costs of the system. 
Recently these increases have exceeded the inflation rate [GOI (2001)]. Moreover, during 
the 1990￿s the quantities procured through price support operations for jowar, maize and 
bajra too have grown larger year after year leading to heavy storage losses because of 
their limited shelf life and difficulty in selling these coarse grains through the PDS. Much 
of the procurement has even been sold at heavy loss as cattle feed [GOI (2002a)].  
While the rising cost of FCI can be partly attributed to the government￿s support 
price policy, part of its high cost is also due to inefficiencies in its operations [see, among 
others, Government of India (1991) and Gulati et al (2000)]. That is, the costs incurred by 
the Corporation can be classified into two categories: those that are policy induced and 
costs related to its operational efficiency. The former, comprising costs arising from 
operations at MSP, CIP, specification of grain quality, buffer stock norms, railway 
freight, procurement incidentals etc., make up close to 70% of the economic cost of FCI. 
This component can be reduced by reforms to correct market distortions created by  33  
policies such as MSP and levy. But, apart from this FCI also needs to become more 
efficient by concentrating only on a subset of its current work areas, leaving the rest to 
the private sector.  
It is well established that private traders move grain from surplus to deficit areas 
and store grain from peak to lean season take advantage of arbitrage benefits arising from 
price differences. In consequence, they stabilize prices across regions and over time. A 
number of studies have argued that creating an environment for private traders to operate 
on level playing field would bring about overall social welfare gains to the economy [see, 
among others, Chand (2002), GOI (1991, 2001, 2002b), Gulati et al (2000), Jha and 
Srinivasan (1999), Umali Deininger and Deininger (2001) and World Bank (1999)]. 
Simulations carried out for this Report and presented in Chapter 5 also point in the same 
direction.  
Nair (2000, pp.326) observes that private trade is now emerging as an important 
source of supply of food grains. For instance, despite the formation of the Southern Food 
Zone in early 1960s, private trade in Kerala supplied an amount (17% of total cereal 
consumption) that exceeded the PDS supply and it is now ￿likely to be of a higher order￿. 
Due to zonal restrictions, such private trade takes place through illegal channels as the 
variety of rice preferred in Kerala and produced in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu has a 
market only in Kerala and the FCI does not take this factor into account. Interestingly, 
farmers in these two supplying states have so far required permits from their governments 
for direct sales outside the state [GOI (2000)]. Moreover, with rising production in other 
states, rice is also smuggled into Kerala from states as distant as Maharashtra, Punjab, 
Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. The traders have been arguing for freeing 
of domestic trade in food grains so that open market supply could be increased, prices 
reduced and supply equalised among deficit states.  
Government policy in the past assumed that private storage is destabilizing and 
failed to recognize the complementary role that it can play in stabilizing prices over time. 
According to Gulati et al (2000), government interventions in the food grains market  34  
were designed to curb "speculative activities" of private "profiteers" in the belief that they 
operated in inefficient and disintegrated markets although it was established as early as 
1973 that the Indian grain markets were efficient and integrated and that in the given 
market conditions, these traders could not earn above-normal profits. But the government 
continues to treat them as speculative agents. They are not permitted to hold more than a 
certain amount of stocks under the Essential Commodities Act (ECA) so that they cannot 
reap economies of scale. Their cost of stockholding is further increased by imposing 
Selective Credit Controls (SCC), which require minimum margins and commodity 
specific interest rates thereby restricting the availability of credit to private storage 
agents.  
The above observations lead one to ask whether private sector operators function 
with lower or higher margins than the FCI and whether they can be relied upon for 
fulfilling certain objectives such as market price stabilisation and transit of goods from 
surplus to deficit regions. While this has been a major point of controversy in the debate 
on the changing role of FCI, in the past adequate evidence on private trade margins and 
storage costs for private agents was not available to make a conclusive comparison of 
FCI costs with those of private operators. However, some new documentation of such as 
comparison demonstrates that in spite of various physical and financial constraints 
private traders operate at lower costs [see, e.g., Tyagi (1990), World Bank (1999), Gulati 
et al (2000) and Jha and Srinivasan (2001a)]. Box 3.1 presents a description of the 
marketing channels in wheat and rice markets. 
Box 3.2 shows that private sector does not enjoy a level-playing field. However, 
in spite of such drawbacks, private traders incur lower costs of trading and storage and 
operate with thinner margins. Tyagi (1990), who analysed data for the period 1970-71 to 
1988-89, brought out very clearly that retail margins of private traders were much lower 
than the post-procurement costs incurred by FCI. From a comparison of margins he found 
that private trade distributed both rice and wheat with a margin that was far lower than 
that required for distributing PDS grains through the public channel. In a more recent  35  
study, World Bank (1999) also noted that both procurement/ processing margins and total 
margins for private trade in rice and wheat are lower than the FCI (Table 3.2).  
Chand (2002) provides one of the latest estimates of private marketing costs and 
margins, which comprise different elements for paddy and wheat markets. Tables 3.3 and 
3.4 present the items of cost. Using data for wheat from Khanna market in Punjab during 
April-June, 2000 he finds that after purchase of wheat the seller pays purchase tax (4%), 
surcharge (1%), market fee and rural development fund (4%) and commission (2.5%) as 
percent of its farm harvest price. These are the statutory charges that make up 11.5% of 
the price paid by wholesalers to producers in the assembly market.  
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Box 3.1￿Private Marketing Chain for Wheat and Rice 
Wheat 
After purchasing wheat from producers in assembly market, the wholesaler pays the statutory 
charges comprising purchase tax, surcharge, market fee, and rural development fund and commission. 
Wheat is then filled in bags of about 95 kg weight
11, which are then stitched, weighed and transported 
either to godowns for storage and sale in subsequent months or despatched directly to secondary markets 
mainly in deficit states. Wholesaler bears labour charges for filling, stitching, weighing and loading and 
unloading and charges for transporting produce to godown. Wholesaler also pays for packaging material, 
which is generally used twice. Adding all these costs to farm harvest price yields wholesale price in the 
surplus state. Output stored for sale in subsequent months incurs storage charges and interest on working 
capital, which is financed by private (18% annual interest) and institutional sources. At the time of sale in 
the lean period, wholesaler incurs costs of loading and forwarding charges.  Wholesalers in Khanna mandi 
charge a margin of Rs. 20 per bag as profit. The actual margin of wholesalers in wheat trade is reported to 
be Rs. 25.10 per quintal. Wheat sold to other states also costs transportation charges particularly by road 
(truck). The price variation between wholesale and retail level differs across states due to differences in 
their tax structure.  These estimates show that retail wheat price in different states would range between 
30%-105% higher than farm harvest price in Punjab, being at the lower end in surplus states. The margin 
increases with the distance of deficit states from surplus states and time difference after harvest season.   
Paddy/ Rice 
One major difference between rice and wheat marketing is that the former involves processing/milling of 
paddy to convert it into rice. Farmers sell paddy to rice millers/ wholesalers who pay 11.5% per cent of 
the purchase price (farm harvest price) of paddy as statutory charges. They also pay for cost of gunny bag 
(can be used thrice and then sold for Rs. 2), bag filling and stitching, weighing, loading and transport to 
rice mill. Rice millers sell rice husk and rice bran to recover a large part of the cost of processing paddy 
into rice. They charge FCI Rs. 13 per quintal of paddy to process paddy to rice under custom milling 
arrangement. This generates a margin to the millers. After milling, rice is stacked/stored, which involves 
cost of labour, capital and gunny bag. As one quintal of rice is extracted from 1.5 quintals of paddy, all 
these costs and cost of one-quintal paddy are multiplied by a factor of 1.5 to get cost of one-quintal rice to 
wholesaler. Sale of rice by wholesalers to retailers in surplus states or to wholesalers in deficit states 
involves wholesaler’s margin and transport costs. Given this cost structure, retail price of rice increases to 
2.25 times the farm harvest price of paddy by month of September in following year. During the peak 
time, retail prices of rice by private trade in most of the deficit states would be close to 3 times the paddy 
price during October to December.   
 
Source: Chand (2002). 
 
                                                 
11 Size of bag is now being changed to 50 kg.   37  
Box 3.2￿Comparing FCI and Private Traders 
 
Special treatment to FCI 
•  Commercial borrowing rates 3-6% lower than private traders: In 1997 
°  FCI: 14.6% 
°  Private traders: 18% 
•  Exemption from Selective Credit Controls (SCC) 
•  Subsidised rail freight 
 
Restrictions on private agents 
•  Curb on "speculative activities" of private "profiteers" who operate in ￿inefficient and 
disintegrated markets￿  
•  Limit on stockholding under the Essential Commodities Act (ECA) ￿ restricts reaping of 
economies of scale 
•  Imposition of SCC that require minimum margins and commodity specific interest rates ￿ 
restricts availability of credit and increases cost of stockholding 
•  Zonal restrictions on movement of grains 
•  Prices prevented from becoming excessively high by resorting to imports ￿speculative 
expectations of private traders remain stable 
 
Factors behind FCI￿s poor performance 
•  Lack of explicit price stabilisation policy (politically determined procurement price also acts as 
support price) 
•  Diseconomies of scale despite its large scale of operation  
•  Low capacity utilisation of warehouses 
•  Storage cost of owned godowns 70% higher than hired godowns 
•  Movement of its stocks multiple times between its warehouses 
•  Unscientific, inadequate storage  ￿ quality deterioration, ageing of grain, health risk 
•  FCI wholesale marketing cost 10-15% higher than private marketers 
•  Prescribed narrow marketing margin insufficient to cover costs 
•  Departmental wages 4-5 times and contract wages 2 times the market wages 
 
Factors behind private traders￿ better performance 
•  Avoidance of mandi charges by buying directly from farmers 
•  Re-use of gunny bags several times (unlike FCI) 
•  Movement of grains by trucks, which are more easily available (than railway wagons) and have 
lower transit losses. 
 
 
Source: Jha and Srinivasan (2001a).  38  




Private  Rs./ q  Public  Rs./ q  Ratio of private to 
public costs (%) 
Procurement & processing  157  FCI-procurement agency & 
processing 
179 88  % 
Distribution & wholesaling  20  State distribution agency  13  160 % 
Total 177  Total  191  93  % 
Wheat Marketing 
Wholesale in assembly market  60  FCI-procurement agency & 
processing 
119 51  % 
Wholesale in secondary market  63  State distribution agency  26  247 % 
Total 123  Total  145  85  % 
 




Table 3.3￿Wheat trade from surplus to deficit area: Private marketing costs and 
margins 
 
Harvest season  Subsequent season  Type of State 
April ￿ June  July - next March 
Surplus  1.Statutory marketing charges 1. Statutory marketing charges 
   2.Cost of labour and bag   2. Cost of labour and bag  
      3. Storage cost for 45 days (half) of harvest season 
      4. Storage charges for lapsed months 
      5. Interest cost for 45 days (half) of harvest season  
      6. Interest cost for lapsed month 
      7. Wholesaler’s margin 
Deficit  1. (1) and (2) as above  1. (1) to (7) as above 
   2. Wholesaler’s margin  2. Wholesaler’s margin 
   3. Forwarding charges  3. Forwarding charges 
   4. Transport cost  4. Transport cost 
 
Source: Chand (2002), Table 5.1.  39  
Table 3.4￿Paddy to Rice trade: Private marketing costs and margins 
Harvest season  Subsequent season  Type of State 
October - December  Next January ￿ September 
Surplus  1. Statutory marketing charges  1. Statutory marketing charges 
   2. Cost of labour and bag used for paddy
3. Carriage to rice mill 
2. Cost of labour and bag used for paddy 
3. Carriage to rice mill 
   4. Processing cost  4. Processing cost 
   5. Cost of bag for rice  5. Cost of bag for rice 
   6. Handling/ stacking charges  6. Handling/ stacking charges 
   7. Rice miller’s margin  7. Rice miller’s margin 
      8. Storage charges for 45 days (half) of harvest season 
      9. Storage charges for lapsed months 
      10.Interest cost for 45 days (half) of harvest season  
      11. Interest cost for lapsed months 
      12. Wholesaler’s margin 
Deficit  1. (1) to (7) as above  1. (1) to (12) as above 
   2. Wholesaler’s margin  2. Wholesaler’s margin 
   3. Forwarding charges  3. Forwarding charges 
   4. Transport cost  4. Transport cost 
 
Source: Chand (2002), Table 5.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 shows a break-up of private costs and marketing margins vis-￿-vis 
those of FCI. Clearly labour, interest and administrative costs comprise a significant 
component of FCI costs. Interestingly, FCI also shows diseconomies of scale despite its 
large scale of operation and moves its stocks several times between its warehouses. There 
are several reasons for lower private operating costs. They avoid mandi charges by 
buying directly from farmers; re-use gunny bags several times (unlike FCI); move grains 
by trucks which are more easily available (than railway wagons) and have lower transit 
losses. Note that it is perfectly legal for private traders to buy directly from farmers 
thereby avoiding but NOT evading mandi charges.
12 In addition, in order to cover their 
loss due to levy sales to FCI, the rice millers apparently sell low-quality grains to FCI and 
                                                 
12 FCI is unable to do so as it is apparently required to pay mandi charges on all its purchases. This adds to 
its costs.  40  
good-quality in the open market. In contrast to this FCI, which receives subsidised rail 
freight and credit rates and is not restricted by Selective Credit Controls (SCC), ECA and 
zones, incurs much higher operational costs. As private traders rely to larger extent on 
road transport and do not enjoy rail subsidy, their transport costs are higher than FCI 
(Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.1￿Trading Costs and Wholesale Marketing Margins of Private Traders 
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Statutory charges
 
Sources: Chand (2002) and GOI (2002a).  41  

































































































































































































Sources: FCI, Directorate of Economics and Statistics and Chand (2002). 
In comparing FCI margins with those of private traders it is to be noted that while 
the relatively higher administrative and other costs of FCI (partially due to excess 
staffing) are signs of inefficiency, this may not be the case with respect to some other 
cost items. For example, the higher marketing costs of the FCI are partly due to the 
transportation of grain over longer distances to meet its procurement obligations and the 
PDS requirements in distant consuming areas. Part of the economic cost of FCI is also 
due to statutory and non-statutory charges paid to state governments and their agencies, 
which include mandi charges, purchase tax and infrastructure cess (amounting to around 
14% of procurement price in 2000-01 in case of wheat). One would, however, expect the 
private sector to be more efficient in handling and marketing operations minimizing loss 
and theft of food grains, since it operates within a hard budget constraint.  
Using an estimated relationship between public storage costs and capacity 
utilisation, assuming that private agents operate at a higher capacity utilisation but with 
lower labour and establishment costs, Jha and Srinivasan (2001a) inferred private storage 
cost to be 70% of FCI storage cost in 1999-2000. In Figure 3.3 we present the private  42  
cost thus estimated and the actual FCI costs. Note that the slope of actual cost curve of 
FCI is much steeper in the 1990s than in the early 1980s and it is also steeper than the 
private cost curve. That is, its annual average actual costs are rising faster than they were 
in the past and faster than the current private costs. This observation also favours 
promotion of private stockholding. However, it must be emphasized that although private 
storage plays a complementary role, one cannot rely solely on it. Jha and Srinivasan 
(1997), using a dynamic stochastic simulation model, find that private storage leads to 
price stabilization but only to a limited extent. Thus a judicious combination of public 
and unhindered private storage would be better.  
3.5 FUTURE  DIRECTIONS 
The analysis of the previous Section suggests that, there is substantial scope for 
improving efficiency in the operations of the FCI. In a decade-old report, GOI (1991) made 
several suggestions to reduce FCI￿s costs of operation such as by improving its storage 
capacity utilization and downsizing its staff strength. It also recommended staggered 
procurement with decentralized storage. Since procurement operations are normally 
completed within a couple of months of harvesting, they add substantially to procurement 
cost, transportation and storage cost, physical damage and loss of grains. The Report 
suggested a financial (loan) package to farmers to hold on to their stocks by designing an 
appropriate instrument/ contract to provide them liquidity. Different procurement prices 
over the cropping cycle could be used to carry out staggered procurement. For example, 
following Hotelling￿s Rule of Intertemporal Arbitrage, procurement price could be 
increased through the harvesting season by adding to it the cost of storage.  
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Figure 3.3￿Unit Public and Private Storage Cost 
Source: Jha and Srinivasan (2001a). 
Moreover, to begin with, price support should be at reasonable levels according to 
scientific criteria to both bring in efficiency and to prevent high costs to FCI. GOI 
(2002a) suggests adhering to quality norms for procurement as well. As procurement, and 
in turn stocks with FCI, decline, private sector would more readily come to the market 
since the fear of future flooding of market with offloading of public stocks would 
subside. Higher private sector purchases would lift up market prices and in turn reduce 
the requirement of price support. Consequently government costs would fall. The costs of 
operation of FCI can be further reduced by decentralizing procurement and storage and 
avoiding cross hauling of grain that takes place in the current centralized system. 
Decentralization would help to ensure market efficiency and reduce the economic costs 
of running the PDS. It would also put an end to the trading of blame by the state and 
central governments for the poor functioning of the system. In the current system ￿State 







































Estimated private cost Observed FCI cost Poly. (Observed FCI cost) 44  
Centre, for its part, blames State governments for failing to make full use of their existing 
allotments.￿ [DrŁze (2001)].  
Such a major change therefore has to be brought in with careful analysis. ASCI 
(2001) recommend breaking up of FCI into state-level food corporations to encourage 
states￿ participation and involvement. But given the past records of the working of FCI, 
this recommendation might amount to dividing a larger problem into several smaller 
problems that may add up to more than the whole. This calls, in particular, for analyzing 
the center-state relations in the light of the states￿ sovereign powers, their interests and 
priorities that may differ from those of the central government and the fact that the PDS 
and procurement policy was originally a central government initiative. For example, the 
criteria for central allocation to states are not explicitly stated and there is a wide 
discrepancy between what states demand from the center and what is allocated to them 
[Radhakrishna and Subbarao (1997)]. 
While the government has announced its intention to decentralise the system, for 
such a system to take shape, the centre would require support and co-operation from state 
governments. It should ensure that over time the states take over the procurement 
operations and the food subsidy bill of the central government does not rise as in the past. 
To better serve the poor through the PDS, its targeting should be improved and its 
requirements purchased from free market in the nearest and cheapest local markets. 
Apart from decentralization three are several other suggestions that have been 
made by various expert committees. Recommendations for FCI made by GOI (2002a) are 
presented in Box 3.3. GOI (2001) recommends that FCI maintain a minimum level of 
buffer stock and then undertake open market operations within a prescribed price band by 
releasing stocks in the open market when shortages are prevalent and prices are high and 
purchase grains from the open market when there is excess supply and prices are 
depressed. The FCI should thus limit its role of providing too high a price support since a 
high level of buffer stock can itself contribute to inflation. Moreover, the present level of  45  
food credit, exceeding Rs.400 billion, also has significant macro economic implications 
and impact on money supply.  
Box 3.3￿Observations and Recommendations of GOI (2002a) regarding FCI 
 
•  There is ￿clear need for FCI to change￿ to ￿enable faster, commercially oriented decision making￿; it 
would help ￿FCI to operate autonomously, accountably and cost-effectively￿. 
•  No basic change in structure: FCI should maintain Central Pool, carry out long-distance movement and 
make direct market intervention for price stabilization but handle only major cereals not coarse cereals. 
•  It should tackle the ￿serious diseconomies￿ arising from ￿abnormal stock levels￿ by full utilization of 
silo capacity, increasing the height of stacks, redesign of plinth and specification for LDPE sheets. 
•  Measures are needed to control the quality of grains in storage beginning from installation of 
mechanical cleaners at farm-level, tighter inspection and ban on relaxation of procurement standards. 
•  FCI should follow the principle of ￿first-in, first-out￿ for stock disposal and introduce modern 
computerized systems of inventory control and management. 
•  The uneconomic procurement centres should be entrusted to state government agencies rather than 
FCI, especially in Punjab and Haryana. 
•  Losses occur at mandis, during transport, storage, loading/ unloading, stacking/destacking and issue 
for PDS. FCI has a ￿poor record of fixing responsibility for storage losses and effecting recovery. 
There is a need for corrective action.￿  
•  Introduce a Memorandum of Understanding between FCI and GOI to commercialize FCI￿s operations 
through greater operational flexibility in procurement, storage, buffer stocking, distribution, open 
market sales and exports and by providing subsidies to cover all activities entrusted to FCI.  
•  While private operators, including foreign bulk grain traders get accurate and timely market 
information without any nation-wide network, FCI￿s market intelligence does not. It should go for a 
national computerized information network. 
•  Food credit to FCI at 11.65% rate of interest is ￿in the nature of a running account and there is no 
deadline for repayment￿. It is ￿not based on commercial principles￿ and ￿bulk of the outstanding credit 
is on stocks. There should be clear credit limits related to ￿ higher buffer stock norm￿.  
•  The internal audit division, staffing 600 people, should shift emphasis from establishment audit to 
more core issues such as subsidy, budgetary control, external trade, open market operations, 
procurement incidentals etc. 
 
The restriction on private grain trade must be lifted and competitive forces 
allowed playing a larger role in reducing intermediation costs. In particular the 
constraints and restrictions on entry of modern food procurement, transport, processing 
and distribution companies must be removed so that the benefits of modern management  46  
practices like silo storage, logistics and large scale processing can flourish.  This will 
benefit both farmers and consumers. According to GOI (2001), the government should 
also make efforts to evolve a standardized grain grading system which would benefit 
farmers, traders and consumers by lowering transaction costs, providing growers with 
rewards for delivering quality output and incentives to use quality enhancing 
technologies and practices and facilitate integration of domestic markets with world 
markets. FCI should transfer more and more of its marketing functions under concession 
arrangements and management contracts to the private sector and encourage it to invest 
in more modern grain handling systems.  
The size of the current surplus stock has exposed GOI to particularly large 
physical and financial losses, and provided a stronger rationale to push exports apart from 
seeking outlets through domestic distribution programs. Several avenues have been 
suggested for reducing the large buffer stocks. GOI has set up a Technical Group on 
Buffer Stocking Policy to suggest maximum and minimum stocking norms. GOI (2002b) 
suggests lowering of issue price and encouraging exports in the short run and 
reformulation of price support policy in the longer run. The scope of anti-poverty 
programs would have to be expanded if food stocks have to be reduced substantially. 
Given the excess food stocks, from an economic point of view, the opportunity cost of 
releasing these stocks is probably zero. As an even more drastic step, if the cost of 
procurement plus procurement incidentals is treated as sunk cost, then some rough 
calculations show that the government would save by giving grains away for free, since it 
has already incurred costs of procurement. Consider for example, the data for 2001-02. 
With carrying cost of about Rs.240/ quintal
13 and distribution cost (freight, handling, etc. 
plus carrying charges to state agencies) about Rs.140/q, a net saving of approximately 
Rs.100/q would occur by giving away grains for free distribution rather than stocking. 
Incidentally, this is almost equal to the unit transportation cost of FCI from Punjab to 
                                                 
13 This is the average cost with total carrying cost of Rs. 13,915 crores and buffer stock of about 58 million 
tonnes.  47  
Kerala ￿ perhaps the longest distance covered by FCI in the country. This means that 
GOI can use these savings to even pay for transporting the grains to deficit areas.  
While excess stocks can be used for schemes such as food-for-work and other 
anti-poverty programs in the short run, however, the government has to contend with 
several constraints in doing this. DrŁze (2001) points out that the poor financial condition 
of the states makes it difficult for them to bear the cash costs or the non-wage component 
of food-for-work schemes. This partly accounts for the low off-take of PDS food grains 
by the states from what is allocated to them by the Center. The governments are not in a 
position to bear the administrative and other associated costs entailed in operating such 
schemes. Another problem in disposing of the large stocks is that the total absorption of 
grains by various anti-poverty programs currently run in the country is limited. The 
quantity that can possibly be exported, even at lower than domestic market prices, is in 
the range of only 3-4 million tonnes.  
The opportunity cost of releasing the buffer stocks is perhaps negative, 
considering that the government will also save on the carrying cost of excessive stocks 
provided it maintains a minimum to buffer against the possibility of a few years of 
consecutively poor monsoons. There is a related problem though of higher (subsidized) 
supply leading to a drop in the market price, necessitating further procurement by the 
government to provide the minimum price support to farmers. The only way this can be 
tackled in the short run is to lower or at least freeze the MSP. In the long run, such stock 
build up should be avoided by providing support to farmers aimed at boosting food grain 
demand (through income generation programs) rather than raising support prices. This 
could be done through alternative income-support measures to replace MSP, such as 
deficiency payment to farmers in poor crop years.  
With the pressure to streamline FCI mounting, in 2001, of the 55,000 FCI staff 
who handle wheat and rice procurement and distribution operations, the FCI management 
dismissed more than 100 employees and charge-sheeted 10,000 more for transit and  48  
storage losses of grain. It also issued a circular to the effect that employees responsible 
for shortage/transit losses beyond 0.5 per cent will be penalized and recovery of such 
losses will be made from them. Such a drastic step has been taken for the first time since 
the creation of the agency in 1965. Employees who have taken to agitation to press for 
withdrawal of the circular have obviously opposed it. The employees union has in turn 
pointed to the senior staff and to unrecorded losses in railway transit for over past 30 
years, diversion of funds in purchase of gunny bags, wooden racks and polythene covers 
etc. [reported in Daily Excelsior (2001)]. In a similar instance of diversion of grain 
reported from Andhra Pradesh, food aid provided by GOI was reportedly resold to FCI as 
locally grown grain. As a consequence, not only did GOI apparently stop the aid to the 
state but the state government itself suspended more than 350 government officials and 
elected village representatives for misappropriating rice [BBC (2002)]. 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Being a signatory to the WTO, the country is moving towards more open trade in 
agriculture. The era of globalization has brought with it new opportunities as well as 
challenges to the food security system. The challenges are in terms of developing 
appropriate marketing infrastructure and institutions to deal with trade in agricultural 
commodities. The opportunities under liberalized external trade are in terms of reduced 
dependence on buffer stocks for price stabilization, suggesting a reduced role for FCI. 
Efficiency considerations too suggest that the role of FCI should be restricted to price 
stabilisation. Simultaneously, under a deregulated domestic market, private traders are 
expected to play a greater role in the distribution of food grains. Unfortunately, despite 
evidence of lower trading costs and margins for private operators as opposed to public 
agencies, the government so far seems to be wary of private trade and continues with 
policies such as SCC to impose a credit squeeze and limit stock holdings of traders.  
Efficient functioning of private agents would require the removal of restrictions 
introduced under the Essential Commodities Act such as limits on stock holdings and  49  
controls on movement of grain outside state boundaries and sometimes even district 
boundaries. Such controls curtail growth and result in the development of secluded states. 
For instance, with its continually declining food grain production, Orissa depends more 
on its neighboring states such as Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh for its food grain 
supplies, which are not easy to procure through the normal market route. In Tamil Nadu, 
the zoning policy promotes smuggling out of a particular variety of rice (red boiled ￿ 
matta) that is produced, but not locally preferred for consumption. An immediate solution 
to such problems lies in removing the interstate restriction on the movement of food 
grains and in making this policy initiative credible, as there are fears that such restrictions 
would be imposed again. 
In India traditionally the government fixed prices for both producers and 
consumers, it decided how much to distribute where, how much of stocks to release or 
accumulate for price stabilisation and so on. But private agents operate at costs lower 
than public costs in both storage and trade and their operations will not be excessively 
speculative in the presence of public intervention for price stabilisation. In this context it 
is important to note that the traders￿ storage decisions are based on their anticipation of 
future scarcity. Public interventions to manage price risks should be designed such that 
they do not unduly restrict the normal flow of commodities in the economy but allow for 
smooth functioning of private trade and market prices to determine resource allocation. 
What is required now is a complete overhaul of the food policy. Safety nets to consumers 
such as the PDS should be delinked and designed separately from price support or 
procurement policies.  
Support price should not be fixed at unduly high levels. The government can set a 
price band of minimum (floor) and maximum (ceiling) prices so that markets can freely 
determine equilibrium prices so long as they are within this band and the government can 
step in only when prices tend to go out of this band. Such price interventions should 
provide a protection against distress sales during surplus situations or price spikes under 
periods of shortage. Complete elimination of price volatility by the government through  50  
inter-regional or inter-seasonal policies is neither desirable nor feasible. There should be 
enough scope for traders to undertake the arbitrage transactions that are worthwhile, and 
not be hindered by restrictions on storage, movement and access to trade and credit. Such 
restrictions would need to be either permanently eliminated or significantly reduced.  
That is, private sector should be allowed to operate more freely in the market and 
to trade and store stocks based on its expectations from the market. Current reforms are 
proposing to use the new economic environment by allowing a larger role for the private 
sector and restricting the role of FCI to timely sales and purchases to maintain stability in 
food prices and resort to exports and imports of food grains, when required. Such 
reforms, if followed through properly, would help make public food spending much more 
worthwhile. The high costs of maintaining public stocks can be reduced through 
encouraging private storage, which plays a complementary role to public storage. These 
costs can also be reduced through liberalisation of private external trade and the 
government is already moving in this direction. Agricultural trade liberalisation has a 
favourable impact on resource use efficiency in agriculture and it has been shown that 
domestic price stability need not increase with liberalisation. To sum up, removal of 
restrictions on private storage and trading activities would go a long way in promoting 
food security in the country. 
The budgetary savings of the central government realized by limiting the role of 
FCI can be used to provide subsidy to the states for the specific purpose of procuring 
grains through their agencies, private or public, in order to serve the PDS through their 
network of fair price shops. Given the cost factor, they can choose the most appropriate 
way to purchase grain. PDS would serve the poor better if, in addition to improving 
targeting performance, purchases are made from the free market in the nearest and 
cheapest surplus zone. Jha and Srinivasan (2001a) show that if PDS purchases were made 
at market prices, the benefit cost ratio would, in fact, be higher than the historically 
observed ratios. The amount saved from food subsidy could be given to states in the form 
of food stamps or vouchers, which would be distributed to the households by the local  51  
governments/ panchayati raj institutions [Radhakrishna and Subbarao (1997)].
14 The 
storage activity can also be decentralized to avoid cross hauling of grain by transferring 
procurement operations to states to control the food subsidy bill of the central 
government.  
 
4.  MULTI-COMMODITY SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Welfare impacts of domestic reforms in the form of market deregulation and 
freeing of interstate trade from controls can best be analyzed using a spatial equilibrium 
model. We therefore build a multi regional and multi commodity model and analyze the 
impact of domestic trade liberalization in the case of rice and wheat markets in India in a 
partial equilibrium framework. In the spatial trade equilibrium model for rice and wheat, 
we divide the country into 18 large/ major states (synonymously called regions) that 
account for 99% of total production of these grains. Demand and supply functions for 
rice and wheat are specified for each state based on elasticity estimates available from the 
existing literature. These functions are calibrated for the base year 2000-01 using data for 
that year on all exogenous and endogenous variables. In the model regional demands and 
supplies of rice and wheat interact with each other through their substitution possibilities 
both in consumption and in production. Equilibrium prices and other variables are 
obtained as a solution to the commodity balance equations subject to the constraints 
imposed due to government interventions. The set of equations that clear the markets and 
the set of inequalities that represent price interventions by the government are solved as a 
Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) using PATH Solver in GAMS. 
                                                 
14 However, operation of food stamps has faced several difficulties in different countries, as described by 
Jha and Srinivasan (2001a).  52  
4.2  DEMAND AND SUPPLY FUNCTIONS 
We consider linear demand functions, which incorporate the effects of own price, 
cross price and income. For each region i, the open market demand function is specified 
as follows: 
D(i)  = α(i) + β(i) pr(i) + γ(i) qr(i) + λ(i) y(i)  (1) 
where 
pr(i)  = Own retail price 
qr(i)   = Retail price of the other crop 
y(i)   = Per capita income 
The supply function is also assumed linear. It depends on the weighted average of 
market and procurement prices received by the farmers
15: 
S(i) = a(i) + b(i)  wap(i) + c(i) qf(i)  (2) 
where 
S(i)   = Production 
wap (i)= {λ pf(i) + (1 ￿ λ) lvp(i)}  = weighted average of procurement and    
market prices 
pf(i)   = Own farm harvest price  
lvp= Levy price (MSP in case of wheat and levy procurement price in case of 
rice) 
qf(i)   = Weighted average farm harvest price of the other crop 
                                                 
15 Depending on the production patterns in different states, rice and wheat can be substituted for each other 
in production only in some states. But from the available literature we could not get any significant cross-
price elasticity estimates and had to drop this variable from the supply equations for all states.  53  
4.3 INTERSTATE  TRADE   
In order to model scenarios with different degrees of domestic movement 
restrictions we assume that these restrictions that arise due to policies, infrastructure 
bottlenecks and other trade obstacles manifest themselves in the form of an implicit tariff 
on interstate trade. In the base case this implicit tariff is obtained endogenously from the 
model by imposing a constraint that total interstate trade generated in equilibrium does 
not exceed the amount observed in the base year. Given the base year total interstate 
trade, the implicit tariff variable ￿ita￿ adjusts to keep the sum of all regional imports (tm, 
which is also equal to the sum of all exports) generated endogenously in the model from 
exceeding this level. This is specified in the model as the following complementarity 
condition.  
tm ≥ Σj
 Σi T(i,j)  ⊥     ita ≥ 0  (3a)  
T(i,j) denotes the amount exported by region i to j or equivalently the amount 
imported by region j from i. 
This complementarity condition implies that if total trade (Σj
 Σi T(i,j)) is < tm, the 
total observed interstate trade in base year, then ita =0. Alternatively if ita > 0 then it 
implies that (Σj
 Σi T(i,j)) = tm. 
Trade from Region i to Region j is determined by the following complementarity 
condition  
T(i,j) ≥ 0          ⊥     [p(i) + tc(i,j)+ traders￿ margins] (1 + ita) ≥ p(j) (3b)  
where  
T(i,j) =  Trade from region i to region j 
tc(i,j) is the transportation cost from state i to j  
p(i) is wholesale price.   54  
The above complementarity condition says that trade will not take place (T(i,j)=0) 
so long as the sum of purchase cost in state i and cost of transporting grains to state j 
inflated by the implicit tariff exceeds the returns, the open market price in state j ([p(i) + 
tc(i,j)] (1 + ita) > p(j)). Trade takes place so long as the reverse inequality holds. Perfectly 
competitive markets imply that trade will continue from state i to j until all the arbitrage 
benefits are exhausted and total cost equals the open market price in the destination state. 
Thus, T(i,j) > 0 implies that [p(i) + tc(i,j)] (1 + ita) = p(j).  
Explicit use of transport cost is not followed according to the current modeling 
practice. However, it can effectively capture product differentiation between different 
regions and is also useful when this cost comprises a large component of price due to 
underdeveloped transport infrastructure. For these interpretations and modeling of 
transport costs explicitly see, e.g., L￿fgren and Robinson (1999) and Piet (2002). 
4.4 FOREIGN  TRADE   
External trade is modeled by treating the rest of the world as another region with 
which individual states can directly trade by incurring the additional costs of transport 
from the nearest/ cheapest port. Given the large size that Indian trade can constitute in 
world trade, we make the large country assumption so that higher imports into India cost 
more while higher exports fetch lower prices. Thus, we express export (import) price as a 
function of exports (imports). 
Export price = border price ￿ ec * total exports - port clearance charges 
Import price = border price + ic * total imports + port clearance charges 
where border price is expressed in domestic currency, ic is the import coefficient and ec 
the export coefficient. These are obtained from their respective price elasticities of 
exports (imports) with respect to exports (imports), evaluated at the base year values.  
Exports take place so long as the price received remains higher than the cost of 
purchasing the grains plus transport cost from the state center to the port. Imports take  55  
place if it is cheaper to import than to buy in the domestic local market. Exports/imports 
are therefore obtained from the following complementarity conditions: 
EX(i,￿ROW￿) ≥ 0    ⊥     [p(i) + tc(i,￿ROW￿)+ traders￿ margins] ≥ XP  (4a)  
IM(i,￿ROW￿) ≥ 0    ⊥     [MP + tc(i,￿ROW)+ traders￿ margins]  ≥ p(i)  (4b)  
Where EX, IM denote exports and imports and XP, MP denote their respective prices. 
4.5  PRICE RELATIONSHIPS  
Equilibrium prices computed in our model refer to the wholesale level prices. 
Retail price which enters the demand equation is given as: 
pr(i) = p(i) * (1 + retail margin)   (5) 
Since we do not have data on retail profit margins, we assume it to be the same 
percentage as the wholesale margin applied on farm harvest prices to derive wholesale 
prices. 
Farm harvest price which enters the supply equation is given as: 
pf(i) = p(i) / (1 + wholesale margin + marketing cost)  (6) 
Prices 
PDS Price in state i for both rice and wheat is expressed as a fixed percentage 
lower than the market price: PDSP(i) = νi p(i)  
Procurement Price (same for all states, exogenous):  
Rice: Fixed Levy Price 
Wheat: Fixed Minimum Support Price (MSP)  56  
4.6  PUBLIC INTERVENTION  
Quantities distributed through the Public Distribution System are fixed 
exogenously for each state. 
PDS: Fixed quantity for each state (exogenous) 
Procurement  
Since procurement is in the form of levy for rice it is fixed exogenously as a 
percentage of production.  
Rice procurement(i):   proc_R(i) = µi S(i) 
However, in case of wheat it is procurement is determined endogenously based on 
the Minimum Support Price policy.  
Wheat procurement (i): Endogenous determined by the complementarity 
condition: 
proc_W(i) ≥ 0          ⊥     p(i) ≥ MSP (7) 
where 
proc(i) = Government procurement of wheat 
µi  = levy fraction of output in state i 
MSP  = Minimum Support Price 
The above complementarity condition implies that wheat procurement will be 
zero so long as the open market is higher than MSP. And positive procurement of wheat 
implies open market price is equal to MSP.  57  
4.7 WELFARE  GAINS   
Change in Producer Surplus 
PS = S(i) (wap1 ￿ wap0) + ‰ (spe) S(i) (wap1 ￿ wap0)
2 /wap0  
where  
wap0 = base year weighted average of farm and market prices, 
wap1 = current year weighted average of farm and market prices. 
spe = price elasticity of supply. 
 
Change in Consumer Surplus 
CS = - D(i) (pr1 ￿ pr0) - ‰ (dpe) D(i) (pr1 ￿ pr0)
2 /pr0  
where 
pr0 = own retail base year price, 
 pr1 = own retail current year price. 
  Dpe = price elasticity of demand. 
Gains to Traders 
Apart from consumers and producers, other agents in the economy also 
experience welfare changes. They include traders who earn profit margins by trading 
within state from farm to wholesale market (wholesale traders) and from wholesale to 
retail market (retail traders) and inter-state traders. The surplus of these traders arises 
from different sources. 1) If production goes up, more grain is brought from farm gate to 
wholesale market and hence increases their surplus. 2) If more grain is traded across 
states, inter-state traders gain. 3) If more grain is consumed then retailers’ surplus goes 
up. The entire amount of difference between prices at the two points of trade does not 
constitute the income of traders as they incur some costs to provide services (e.g., finding  58  
a buyer and arranging payments etc). Wholesalers help in the delivery of grain from farm 
gate to the wholesale markets (within state transaction) or between wholesale markets in 
different states.  
Using data on profit margins in trading from farm to wholesale market and from 
wholesale to retail market, we can calculate the gains from trade accruing to traders in 
each state. The gains from trade are obtained by comparing the surpluses in different 
scenarios as compared to that in the base scenario. 
Wholesale Traders’ Surplus (from farm to wholesale markets) 
To get this surplus, we multiply the margin with the wholesale price and local 
production net of procurement, net exports abroad and net exports to other states. This 
captures the margins of wholesalers both from within and without the state i. 
WTS(i) = margin * p(i) * [S(i) ￿ proc(i) ￿ {E(i) ￿ M(i)} ￿ {Σj T(i,j) ￿ Σj T(j,i)}] 
Retail Traders’ Surplus (from wholesale to retail markets) 
The retail traders￿ surplus is obtained by applying the margin to the free market 
demand times the retail price. 
RTS(i) = margin * pr(i) * D(i) 
Savings in Government Costs 
Total government cost = purchase cost + procurement incidental cost + storage 
cost + distribution cost  59  
Where    
Purchase cost = government procurement*MSP, 
Procurement incidental cost = government procurement * incidental cost, 
Storage cost = (procurement ￿ PDS)*storage cost, 
Distribution = PDS* distribution cost 
Sale realization = PDS*central issue price 
Net government cost = total government expenditure ￿ sales realization 
Under the scenario of movement restrictions, there is no change between 
reference and changed scenarios in PDS related variables. 
4.8 MARKET  EQUILIBRIUM   
The market clearing condition equates net availability to demand in each state. 
Since PDS quantities are exogenously specified, the condition reduces to equating open 
market demand with net supply, which caters to the domestic open market demand. The 
net availability is obtained by subtracting from production the outflows from the state, 
which consist of net regional imports, government procurement and net foreign exports. 
Thus the equilibrium condition for state i is   
           S(i) + {Σj T(i,j) ￿ Σj T(j,i)} ￿ proc(i) ￿ {E(i) ￿ M(i)} = D(i)  (8) 
Markets are cleared by p(i).  
The MSP is fixed at such a level that the quantity procured is more than enough to 
cover the PDS requirements. The difference between the procurement quantity and PDS 
is taken to be the stocks held by the government. 
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5.  REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS ON DOMESTIC MOVEMENT OF 
GRAINS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Imposition of internal trade restrictions is a ubiquitous phenomenon in the 
developing world. This has been observed by, among others, Bhagwati and Chakravarty 
(1969), Krishna and Raychaudhuri (1980) and Jha (2002) for India; Ellis et al (1997) for 
Sri Lanka, Minot and Goletti (2000) for Vietnam, Kherallah et al (2000) for Egypt and 
DrŁze and Sen (1993) for several countries in Africa (e.g., Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana) 
and Asia (e.g., India). It is often believed that speculative activities by private operators 
can be destabilising due to lack of knowledge about future prices and that the government 
can control such manipulative practices by actively participating in storage and trading 
activities to allay fears of future scarcity. Governments also fear that private traders 
follow collusive practices and legal restrictions to counteract them may not succeed.  
In line with such arguments, food grain markets in India have faced several 
interventions including storage and movement controls through policies such as the 
Essential Commodities Act and zoning that prohibits private trade in food grains across 
broad zones (Table 5.1).
16 There is, however, no unanimity on this line of reasoning. 
DrŁze (1990), e.g., argues ￿there is little evidence that food markets in India easily lend 
themselves to collusion and manipulation.  If anything, zoning is likely to facilitate such 
(collusive) practices￿. DrŁze and Sen (1993) cite the cases of Botswana, Cape Verde, 
Kenya, and Zimbabwe, which successfully averted famine by inducing private trade to 
supplement the efforts of the public sector in moving food towards vulnerable areas. 
Moreover, a comparison of Kenya and Botswana shows that presence of controls in 
Kenya and none in Botswana led to more stable prices in Botswana. It is not necessarily 
                                                 
16 The Department of Consumer Affairs of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, 
is entrusted with regulation of domestic and interstate trade and implementation of ECA and Prevention of 
Black Marketing & Maintenance of Supply of Essential Commodities Act (1980). The functions of this 
Department also include ensuring uniform standards of grades and measures across the country.  61  
the case that private trade involves mostly exploitative traders. It has often been found 
that poor buyers and sellers who very long distances, on foot if necessary, in order to 
transact food at more advantageous prices. This is not to undermine the role of public 
sector in food supply management but that should be performed as a creative form of 
intervention rather than the imposition of negative restrictions on the operations of 
private trade.  
There may be a case for government intervention under market failure. For 
example, under perfect competition, private operations would lead to efficiency but 
distributional considerations may require government intervention. There are other 
conditions that may warrant government intervention. For example, under conditions of 
famines limited private opportunities to exploit spatial arbitrage may result in localised 
scarcities and require public intervention [Ravallion (1987)]. Although private trade will 
iron out spatial price differentials in the course of time but under famines, markets may 
take much longer than usual to do so. Under normal circumstances, slow response of 
trade to local shortages could be attributed to constraints imposed by long-term contracts 
devised to avoid risk.  
The main rationale for domestic movement restrictions in India was to help 
procurement of grain by government agencies. This was required when the procurement 
was in the form of a levy. It was felt that dependence on private trade would result in 
high prices for consumers. Hence the government procured grain at below market price 
(levy) and distributed it across the country through the public distribution system (PDS) 
at subsidized prices. But such zoning policies considerably and systematically increased 
(rather than reduce) interstate food price dispersion thereby worsening the situation of 
hardship for deficit households in deficit states. Due to this perverse effect and the 
associated costs to the government, complete elimination of price volatility by the 
government through inter-regional or inter-seasonal policies is neither desirable nor is it 
feasible. On the contrary, private agents operate at costs lower than public costs in both 
storage and trade. To take advantage of arbitrage benefits, they buy grains at low prices  62  
in peak seasons or from surplus areas thereby lifting up the prices. They sell them when 
prices are high during lean season or in deficit areas thereby bringing down the high 
prices. They thus play a stabilizing role by pursuing their own goals of profit 
maximization. But, the government￿s price stabilization policy with narrow price bands 
or pan-seasonal and pan-territorial pricing reduces the incentives of private sector 
operators for inter-temporal storage and spatial arbitrage activities. As a result, there is 
lower private trade due to lower arbitrage benefits, which in turn leads to higher public 
storage and associated cost. Encouraging private trade can thus reduce high public 
carrying costs. 
Table 5.1￿Indian States: Prevalence of Storage & Trade Restrictions 
Limits on Storage 
State  Commodities  Agents  Limits: Stocks/ Time period 
Gujarat Pulses  License  holders  25  quintals 
      Others  9 quintals 
Andhra Pradesh  Pulses & oils       
   Raw materials     1 month 
   Finished goods     ‰ month 
Punjab Rice      250  quintals 
West Bengal  Rice  Wholesale dealers  750 quintals 
   Wheat  Wholesale dealers  400 quintals 
Kerala Sugar      250  bags 
Uttar Pradesh     Wholesale dealers  1000 quintals 
Maharashtra     Wholesale dealers  15 days 
Assam     Wholesale dealers  10 quintals 
Trade Restrictions       
State Agents  Restrictions 
Andhra Pradesh  Farmers  Permit required for direct sales outside state 
Tamil Nadu  Farmers  Permit required for direct sales outside state 
Tanjore district  Farmers  Control on movement of paddy out of district 
Maharashtra     Control on movement of cotton 
 
Source: Government of India (2001).  63  
Production of rice and wheat in India is concentrated in some states. For wheat, 
UP, Punjab, Haryana, MP and Rajasthan contribute close to 90% of total production. For 
rice, the concentration is spread across WB, UP, AP, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Bihar, 
contributing about 75%. Given this concentration and the large size of consuming areas 
outside of these states, there is a large mismatch between production and demand in both 
surplus and deficit states (Table 5.2). This disparity gives rise to a wide scope for private 
traders to move grains from surplus to deficit areas. However, many supporters of public 
intervention seem to ignore the very existence of private operators who can undertake 
spatial and temporal arbitrage transactions in storage and trade that are worthwhile and 
add to social welfare and improved economic efficiency, if not hindered by restrictions 
on storage, movement and access to trade and credit. 
The Government of India (GOI) has recently taken steps towards deregulation of 
both domestic and international trade of agricultural commodities and removal of 
restrictions on interstate movement of commodities. The state governments are expected 
to introduce appropriate laws to remove restrictions to enable farmers and companies to 
jointly promote both domestic and foreign trade. Analyzing the implications of this 
initiative forms the core of this Chapter, which is based on the spatial equilibrium model 
built in Chapter 4. Apart from analyzing the policy implications of relaxing restrictions 
on interstate movement of food grains we also analyze implications of reduced transport 
costs to reflect better trading conditions. The specific features of the model include the 
use of demand and supply patterns of rice and wheat at a regionally disaggregated level. 
Traders￿ costs of transactions, transport and profit margins, price wedge between farm 
harvest, wholesale and retail prices, GOI￿s policies of PDS, procurement, stocks and 
external trade and its associated costs are all modeled so that welfare gains from reforms 
at various levels can be captured. The model is run for alternative scenarios. The focus of 
this Chapter is on calculating efficiency gains in terms of benefits to producers, 
consumers and traders and cost savings to government from deregulating domestic grain 
markets. In particular, it examines the effectiveness of this policy initiative in the 
presence of liberalized external trade. 64  
Table 5.2￿Surplus/ Deficit States in India 
Wheat Rice  State 


















Andhra Pradesh  Deficit  -0.21  0.22  Deficit  -0.88  10.84 
Assam Deficit  -0.32  0.62  Deficit  -3.17  11.92 
Bihar Deficit  -1.93  5.26  Deficit  -2.29  7.59 
Gujarat Deficit  -1.79  4.22  Deficit  -0.35  1.95 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 
Deficit -3.95  7.06  Deficit  -0.41  4.69 
Karnataka Deficit  -0.48 0.74  Deficit  -0.63 5.55 
Kerala Deficit  -0.43  0.43  Deficit  -7.19  8.97 
Maharashtra Deficit  -2.00  2.83 Deficit -0.82  2.91 
Madhya Pradesh  Deficit  1.54  5.88  Deficit  -0.14  5.32 
Orissa Deficit  -0.45  0.46  Deficit  -2.91  14.14 
Tamil Nadu  Deficit  -0.33  0.33  Deficit  -1.36  9.88 
Goa Deficit  -1.93  1.93  Surplus  2.00  6.64 
West  Bengal Deficit  -0.74  1.49 Surplus 1.11  11.34 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
Surplus 1.55  5.96  Deficit  -2.16  3.64 
Rajasthan Surplus  0.35 9.19  Deficit  -0.03 0.3 
Haryana Surplus  20.22  9.76  Surplus  8.65  0.94 
Punjab Surplus  34.20  8.98  Surplus  24.37  0.79 
Uttar Pradesh  Surplus  1.84  8.68  Surplus  1.86  3.63 
 
Source: Chand (2002). 
Note: Per capita monthly surplus is obtained as per capita production less per capita demand. 
 
We describe various restrictive policies pertaining to domestic trade in grains in 
Section 5.2. In Section 5.3 we present a description of scenarios and simulations followed 
in Section 5.4 by the results on efficiency gains. Finally, we present a summary of 
findings in Section 5.5.  
5.2  DOMESTIC TRADE AND MARKETING HURDLES  
FCI undertakes the movement of food grains from surplus to deficit areas. It 
moves about 22 million tonnes of food grains over an average distance of 1500 kms. On a 
daily basis this amounts to an average of 4,00,000 bags of food grains transported by rail,  65  
road and inland waterways (http://fciweb.nic.in/tran_ind.htm). The Department of Food 
and Public Distribution co-ordinates and monitors the movement taking note of 
availability, allocations, off-take and storage capacity. Movement Division in the 
Department of Public Distribution works in co-ordination with FCI and Railways to 
optimize movement and stocking of food grains. Table 5.3 presents amounts of food 
grains transported from major surplus states to deficit States and Table 5.4 the break-up 
between grains and sugar.  
Table 5.3￿Interstate movement by FCI ￿ by Source (Million Tonnes)  
Year Ex-Punjab Ex-Haryana  Total  Ex-North  Ex-AP 
2000-01 8.205  2.437  10.765  2.896 
2001-02 




Table 5.4￿Interstate movement by FCI ￿ by Commodity (Million Tonnes)  
Year  Food grains  Sugar  Total 
1995-96  20.3 1.3 21.6 
1996-97  23.6 1.2 24.8 
1997-98  19.1 1.1 20.2 
1998-99  19.1 1.1 20.2 
1999-00  22.1 0.7 22.9 
2000-01  16.2 0.3 16.5 
2001-02(P)  




Rice and wheat procured in the markets and purchase centers is first collected in 
the nearest depot and from there despatched to recipient States all over India from Imphal 
in Manipur to Kanyakumari in Tamnil Nadu and to the higher reaches of the Himalayas 
in the North. The stocks to Kashmir valley, Himachal Pradesh, North-East, Sikkim, 
Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep etc., which don￿t have rail link, are fed by 
road and other means.  66  
In March 1993, the central government decided to treat the entire country as a 
single food zone for interstate and intra-state movement of food grains and advised the 
states/UTs to take action accordingly. However, currently while GOI treats the entire 
country as a single food zone for free movement of food grains, some states such as West 
Bengal and Jammu & Kashmir continue to restrict intra-state movement of paddy/rice in 
order to maximize procurement or to prevent smuggling across the international border 
areas (http://fcamin.nic.in/pol_ind.htm). Besides the statutory restrictions, some states 
impose informal restrictions on movement of food grains outside the state during 
particular periods of the year. There are also stock limits on rice in Andhra Pradesh, 
Tamil Nadu and Jammu and Kashmir in line with local requirements. But there is no such 
limit on wheat and its products in most of the states although they are directed by GOI to 
impose stock-limits on these items if the situation so warrants. Some of the restrictions 
imposed by states are written instructions while others are oral orders or word of mouth 
instructions whose documentation is difficult to obtain and traders associations or Vyapar 
Mandals, the sufferers of such restrictive and often illegal practices could be the only 
source for this kind of information. According to GOI (2001), ￿￿ the restrictions have 
continued even without adequate justifications because it hits the interests of certain class 
of renters who have had a parasitic existence on the restrictions imposed decades earlier￿. 
GOI (2001) argued for strengthening the role of private trade in storage and 
distribution of food grains by removing the restrictions so as to give it an incentive to 
make significant investment in grain handling operations.  Towards this end, it also 
recommended tax concessions to the private sector. In line with such recommendations, a 
recent directive by GOI aims to do away with such restrictions. The Department of 
Consumer Affairs has issued a Central Order titled ’Removal of (Licensing 
Requirements, Stock Limits and Movement Restrictions) on Specified Foodstuffs Order￿, 
2002, under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, vide GSR 104 (E), dated 
15.2.2002. It is meant to facilitate free trade and movement of food grains, and to enable 
farmers to get best prices for their produce, achieve price stability and ensure availability 
of food grains in deficit areas. Under this order any dealer can freely buy, stock, sell, 
transport, distribute, dispose, acquire, use or consume any quantity of wheat, paddy/rice,  67  
coarse grains, sugar, edible oilseeds and edible oils without any license or permit. This 
order overrides any order from state governments. Issue of any control order by the States 
under the delegated powers for regulating by licenses, permits or otherwise, the storage, 
transport, distribution, etc. of the specified commodities would now require the prior 
concurrence of the Central Government. 
Apart from restrictions on trading across states, private trade has also been 
suffering from problems in marketing. For example, under ECA, they are required to 
obtain a large number of permits and licenses from the authorities, submit returns 
periodically and carry out inspections, all of which add to transaction costs. Moreover, 
there are poor facilities in terms of market infrastructure, cold storage facilities, mandi 
facilities and roads for which the private sector could make productive investment. The 
controls and restrictions, which include the persistent threat of arrest, act as disincentives 
to production and distribution of essential commodities by organized companies that can 
exploit economies of scale and modernize the food sector. See Box 5.1 for different types 
of barriers that exist in interstate trade. Das-Gupta (2003) analyses various fiscal barriers 
to trade and finds that while road check posts are necessary on revenue grounds in the 
short run, but costs of check posts can be reduced by suitable reform in the long run. The 
costs they impose include an administration cost burden on the exchequer, a fixed cost on 
traders irrespective of the size of transactions and risk costs on importers. Furthermore, 
check posts and mobile squads cannot ensure foolproof enforcement and revenue leakage 
occurs despite their existence. A useful alternative to generate revenue from cross-border 
trade is to develop better information technology and interstate information exchange 
system. For example, integrated, (multi-department) electronically equipped check-posts 
are planned in Karnataka and exist in AP and Gujarat. Das-Gupta (2003) also suggests 
￿automatic green channel treatment￿ for selected large firms, which are known to 
maintain good records and accounts.  68  
Box 5.1￿Barriers to Interstate Trade and Commerce 
 
Road infrastructure: National Highway networks are designed for long distance traffic shifting local 
traffic to side-roads. Carrying twice the permissible load in commercial vehicles in connivance 
with road transport authorities leads to annual corruption worth Rs.200 billion and reduces life of 
pavements by 30-60% in turn reducing average speeds by 20-30 km per hour amounting to a loss 
of Rs.200-300 billion per year.  
Constitutional provision: Article 301 allows State legislature ￿throughout the territory of India￿ to 
￿impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or 
within the State as may be required in the public interest￿. Article 304 provides for a state to 
impose, by law, any tax on goods imported from other states that is also imposed on goods 
produced in the state concerned. 
Detention of vehicles: This causes loss of time, high fuel consumption and idling of vehicles resulting in 
underutilization of capacity and lower operational viability. But the practice continues at RTO 
(Regional Transport Offices) and Police Check-Posts (for checking documents, driving and 
traffic safety etc.); Good-Related Check-Posts (for taxes ￿ octroi, sales tax, entry permit, tolls 
etc.); and Others (checking by Flying Squads, Movement of Essential Commodities, and other 
checks by local authorities). Existence of check-posts does not contribute significantly to 
checking tax evasion. On the contrary, the more the number of check-posts, the higher is the 
wastage resulting from stoppage of traffic. For example, paper clearance/ check-posts etc. 
account for 12% of total trip time between Delhi and Mumbai. 
Interstate and National Permits: For vehicles operating within a state: permit by paying the motor 
vehicle tax of the State. Two categories for operating in more than one state: (i) counter-signature 
permits and permits under reciprocal agreements ￿ operator pays tax of both the home state and 
of the other state, and (ii) national permits introduced by GOI in 1975 for movement between the 
home State and three or more other States ￿ operator pays tax for home State and a composite tax 
for each of the other States.  
Other Barriers in Trucking Operation: Complex paperwork ￿ 58 forms in Central Motor Vehicles 
Rules, 1989; Complex Practices ￿ goods entering a state require Entry Permit ￿ Form 32 to be 
filled in by the buyer with information on the consignment, e.g., nature of the commodity, name 
and address of the seller, total amount of goods in terms of quantity and value, name of the 
transporter, registration number of the truck, date of dispatch, etc. As these details are filled in at 
different stages of the transport chain from the seller ￿ transporter ￿ driver ￿ booking agent ￿ 
buyer, the Form is likely to remain incomplete leading to recourse of ￿dispute resolution￿ at the 
buying state￿s border. 
 
 
Source: Debroy and Kaushik (2002). 
 
The government is adopting measures to improve agricultural marketing by 
establishing regulated markets, constructing warehouses, grading and standardizing 
produce, weights and measures, and providing information on agricultural prices. It also 
advised the state governments to enact marketing legislation to provide competitive and 
transparent transactional methods to protect interests of the farmers.  Consequently, as on  69  
31 March 2000, out of 7262 wholesale markets, 7169 have been covered under 
regulation.  
Similarly, 15% of nearly 28000 rural periodical markets function under 
regulation. This has to some extent helped producers/sellers at the wholesale assembling 
level. However, despite these reforms, there is no scope under the existing law for direct 
marketing by farmers for procurement. Functionaries such as commission agents, traders, 
processors, weigh man, surveyors, brokers all have to obtain license to function in the 
market area. The lengthy procedures and documentation for licensing under the rules and 
byelaws add further to the marketing and trading costs. 
5.3  SCENARIOS AND SIMULATIONS 
It is normally observed that the public sector agencies visualize private trade as a 
competitor to FCI. Based on this, they assume that private traders will mimic the 
behavior of FCI (e.g., in transporting grains for PDS from Punjab to Kerala). Since the 
FCI serves several objectives simultaneously the optimization problem underlying its 
decisions regarding shipping of grain to different regions is unknown to us. The 
information requirements for a centralized decision making exercise may not be easily 
available. However, with competitive markets and free domestic trade, markets would 
reveal all the information needed by private profit maximizers who choose the least cost 
options of trade. Surplus states would then sell their excess produce either to deficit states 
or to foreign countries.
17 For instance, one can imagine that private trade will always 
occur between neighboring states and not directly from Punjab to Kerala as assumed by 
public agencies. As a number of states are located between a surplus and a deficit state, it 
is expected that they will buy from the former and sell to the latter to take advantage of 
                                                 
17 In a simple prototype CGE model with two urban and two rural regions, where urban regions alone trade 
with the rest of the world or the border region, which is assumed adjacent to the urban regions, L￿fgren and 
Robinson (1999) show from simulation results that gains can accrue from reduction in transport costs, 
investment in roads and infrastructure, trade liberalization and a larger role for foreign trade.
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the arbitrage opportunities. This is what is likely to happen when markets are free from 
movement restrictions. 
The ideal comparison of a reform scenario of reducing domestic trade restrictions 
with the reference scenario is one where the former is with and the latter without 
interstate trade possibilities. However, it is not realistic to assume a scenario of zero 
interstate trade, as there are non-producing states whose consumption would be zero in 
the absence of trade (PDS quantity alone may not be enough). We also don’t have 
observations on the actual levels of state-wise inter-regional trade in the base year though 
we do have data on aggregate trade in the base period. We therefore model the scenario 
with movement restrictions as one in which an implicit tariff applies on interstate trade. 
Movement restrictions are induced due to policy restrictions such as physical controls on 
movement, octroi, mandi charges, etc. They could also be induced by infrastructural and 
institutional bottlenecks. Efficiency gains can therefore be obtained either through policy 
reform or through infrastructure and institutional investments. The policy hurdles act like 
implicit tariff on interstate trade raising the cost of transactions. One could imagine that it 
should be possible to reduce this cost in a short duration. Policy induced efficiency gains 
may work quickly in the short to medium run and have a large effect but may still be 
limited to a certain level. Higher levels of reduction may then be possible only through 
investments that help to cut down transport costs due to factors such as reduction in fuel 
costs and completion of road projects. Better roads would provide a much smoother ride 
to trucks reducing time taken, fuel consumed and hence costs. Fuel costs could also be 
reduced through technological innovations (e.g. more fuel-efficient trucks) or through 
reduction in fuel prices (say due to discovery of new oil wells). This changes can 
however be expected only in the medium to long run. The policy induced effects are 
modeled in terms of a reduction in implicit tariff, whereas infrastructural improvements 
are modeled in terms of reduction in transport costs.  71  
5.3.1 Reference  Scenario 
We define the base scenario as one, where movement restrictions exist and hence 
total interstate trade cannot exceed a certain level (which in the model is taken to be the 
equilibrium level observed in the base period). Trade and transport costs for interstate 
trade are set at actual levels in the base period. We take the base year as 2000-01 and 18 
states that account for 99% of the country￿s grain production. The model equilibrium 
results give the implicit tariff in the base case as 8.4% for rice and 4.9% for wheat as 
mark-ups on cost of purchase plus transport cost from one state to another. 
5.3.2 Changed  Scenarios 
We model relaxation of interstate trade restrictions by simulating different 
degrees of movement restrictions. This is implemented by reducing the implicit tariff on 
interstate trade by varying magnitudes. As mentioned above the implicit tariff reflects 
traders￿ costs arising due to policy related variables such as controls, licenses and permits 
etc. This tariff adds to the final price paid by consumers and creates a deadweight loss in 
the economy, as it does not accrue to any economic agent. In addition to this, we also 
consider reduction in transport costs for improving inter-regional trade. We consider four 
alternative scenarios as given in Table 5.5. First, in Scenarios 1 and 2, we consider two 
levels of reduction in implicit tariff: 50% and 100%. The latter case (Scenario 2) refers to 
complete elimination of movement restrictions in trading across states. In Scenarios 3 and 
4, we consider the cases where in addition to the complete removal of interstate 
restrictions, transport costs are reduced by 25% and 50% respectively. Since implicit 
tariff can be reduced in the short run, it should be possible to implement Scenario 1 in the 
immediate future. Complete elimination of policy hurdles may need a little more time and 
could be implemented in the medium term (Scenario 2). Reduction in transport cost, 
requiring possible investments in roads and infrastructure, could be achieved in the 
medium to long term (Scenarios 3 and 4). With our simulations we obtain potential gains 
in terms of benefits to producers, consumers, traders, cost savings to the government and 
regional price stability.  72  
The reduction in implicit tariff considered in our scenarios could be due to 
reduction or elimination in any of the taxes, mandi charges or other statutory charges 
levied by the government. If we would like to obtain efficiency gains from reforming any 
of these individual taxes/charges, then we need to explicitly introduce these variables in 
the model. This exercise, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Table 5.5￿Scenarios for Simulation 
Scenario  Reduction in Implicit 








--- ---  --- 
Scenario 1  50%  ---  Short Run 
Scenario 2  100%  ---  Medium Run 
Scenario 3  100%  25%  Medium Run 
Scenario 4  100%  50%  Medium-Long Run 
 
5.4 REGIONAL  REDISTRIBUTION AND EFFICIENCY GAINS 
5.4.1 Production  and  Consumption 
Let us first take the case of rice. In the aggregate, total production and market 
demand for rice do not change much as movement restrictions are relaxed (Table 5.6). 
Since PDS quantities are assumed fixed, this means that total consumption does not 
change either. But there is a distinct change in the spatial pattern of consumption and 
production as between surplus and deficit states, creating a ￿ripple effect￿ through the 
country (Figure 5.1). In the major producing/ surplus states, namely AP, Haryana, Punjab 
and UP, domestic consumption falls and production rises (Tables 5.7 to 5.11). 
In the case of wheat, production in surplus states does not change as market 
equilibrium price is equal to MSP, which is unchanged (Figure 5.2). But compared to the 
base case, aggregate national consumption rises by more than 2 million tonnes.  73  
Consumption picks up in particular in major consuming states including Bihar, Gujarat 
and MP.  
5.4.2  Procurement and Public Stocks  
We assume, as is the current practice that there is levy procurement for rice and 
procurement at Minimum Support Price (MSP) for wheat. Our results reveal that with 
fixed levy percentages for rice procurement, the absolute level of its procurement rises 
due to higher production, though marginally by 0.07 million tonnes (Table 5.6). Since no 
such levy is imposed on wheat, there is a reduction in government wheat procurement by 
2.5 million tonnes, which as we shall see, is on account of better price offers from 
domestic trade with other states (Figure 5.2). While Punjab and UP cut down sale to FCI 
at MSP by as much as 0.86 and 1.1 million tonnes, Haryana gives away almost 0.2 
million tonnes more in procurement. Since there is not much change in production and 
consumption in this state, it achieves higher procurement by lowering its trade with 
Gujarat and HP where prices fall due to interstate trade liberalization (Figure 5.4 and 
Table 5.13).  It is easy to see that as a major part of rice output is under levy, most of the 
changes occur through wheat. For example, wheat￿s domestic consumption (including 
any private storage) rises by more than 2 million tonnes. This is mainly on account of 
lower stockholding by the FCI. 
The net effect of a far lower procurement for wheat than the increase in rice 
procurement results in a net reduction in total procurement which in turn reduces buffer 
stock holding of FCI (Table 5.6) When interstate transaction cost is reduced, surplus 
states increase their trade with other states and depend lesser on government price 
support. Total government stocks go down by 2.45 million tonnes from the base level of 
44 million tonnes with complete elimination of movement restrictions and reduction of 
transport costs by half. This is driven largely by lower procurement of wheat as PDS 
demand is assumed fixed at the base level.  74  
5.4.3  Domestic Trade  
The directions of trade change in line with arbitrage opportunities from varying 
regional prices as seen from Table 5.13 and Figures 5.3 and 5.4. For example Gujarat, HP 
and Rajasthan find it relatively cheaper to import wheat from Punjab than from Haryana 
due to removal of trade restrictions. The combination of lower consumption and higher 
production for rice ends up in higher net exports by surplus states to other states as can be 
expected from freer domestic trade. Between Scenario 0 (base case) and Scenario 4, 
regional rice trade rises by 1.5 million tonnes (Table 5.12). AP, UP and WB export more 
rice to other states (Figure 5.5). Assam, Bihar and TN import more. As in the case of rice, 
there is an increase in domestic quantity traded for wheat though it is much higher at 2.25 
million tonnes. Domestic regional exports of wheat grow substantially from Punjab (more 
than 1 million tonnes between Scenarios 0 and 4) and UP (1.5 million tonnes) as a result 
of fewer restrictions on trade. At the same time, major importing states ￿ Bihar, Gujarat 
and Maharashtra ￿ buy more wheat from other states (Figure 5.6).   
5.4.4 Foreign  Trade 
When tariff is reduced, quantity traded domestically increases for both 
commodities while there is a reduction for both in external trade (Table 5.6). Given that 
world prices are lower than domestic prices, our simulations show no exports of either 
rice or wheat (Table 5.6). However, individual states find it cheaper to import from 
abroad than from neighbouring states. For example, TN imports both rice and wheat 
whereas Kerala goes in for wheat import from abroad and from Karnataka and MP 
instead of its base period imports mainly from UP. Total imports fall for both leading to a 
fall in import price paid (Figure 5.7).  
5.4.5 Price  Stability 
In the deficit states, because of increased supply due to interstate trade, wholesale 
and weighted average prices fall and so does production (Tables 5.7 to 5.11). The  75  
opposite holds true in surplus states except for wheat growing regions where the 
equilibrium price continues to be the MSP. The net effect is that as trading costs are 
lowered due to reduction of restrictions on intra-country movement of grains, prices 
stabilize across states in the country even though average national price for rice rises and 
that for wheat falls (Figures 5.3 and 5.4). Another finding from this study is that a 
reduction in transport cost in addition to lowering implicit tariff has a much larger impact 
in terms of price regional stability. This perhaps implies that infrastructure investments 
do hold a better key to improved domestic trade than mere policy reforms. 
5.4.6  Surplus to Economic Agents  
To make comparisons tractable, we compare Scenario 3 with the Base Scenario 0, 
i.e., the changes arising from complete elimination of movement restrictions (100% 
implicit tariff reduction) and 25% reduction in transport cost. The reforms envisaged in 
this study show a rise in consumer surplus from both rice and wheat though some states 
gain and the others lose (Table 5.15). But producer surplus rises only for rice and it falls 
in the case of wheat. Interestingly, there is a fall in producer surplus and rise in consumer 
surplus in the case of wheat in almost all the states. There is no change in producer 
surplus in states that are surplus in wheat (Haryana, Punjab and UP) since their local 
market prices do not change, remaining at the level of MSP. Consumer surplus is positive 
in all states being the largest in deficit states (e.g., Bihar, Kerala and Rajasthan). It is nil 
in the surplus states of Haryana, Punjab and UP as prices do not change in these states.  
The model structure used here enables us to calculate welfare gains accruing to 
wholesale and retail traders. It is quite interesting to note that while the traders incur a net 
welfare loss in the case of rice they gain in the case of wheat trade in all states. This 
perhaps has to do with MSP-based free procurement for wheat but a levy for rice, which 
allows farmers and traders to freely trade the grains without being tied to FCI for part 
sales of marketable surplus. The magnitude of traders￿ surplus is much smaller than that 
for consumers and producers. In the aggregate at the national level, total producer surplus 
and consumer surplus are both positive. So is the surplus of wholesale traders. They gain  76  
through higher stability of interstate prices that allows them to trade more profitably. 
There is a very small loss in retail traders￿ surplus, which when added to the rest, still 
yields a net positive gain in welfare in the economy. 
5.4.7 Government  Costs 
Table 5.12 presents reduction in government cost that occurs from deregulating 
domestic trade. Since PDS quantities and prices are kept unchanged in the model, the 
costs of PDS and its sales realization remain unchanged due to reforms. However, 
interestingly and expectedly the costs of procurement and storage both fall. The cost 
savings rise as more restrictions are removed, moving through Scenarios 1 to 4. These 
savings could be as high as Rs.1200 crores with simple policy reform (Scenario 2) to 
Rs.3000 crores with both short and long-term policy changes (Scenario 4). This is in 
addition to the potential gain in terms of consumer plus producer surplus of more than Rs. 
3800 crores in Scenario 4. 
5.5  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Public policy towards food grain markets has tended to be highly interventionist 
with the central and state governments actively involved in grain storage and restrictions 
on the movement of food grains across states. These restrictions are often based on the 
assumption that markets cannot be expected to perform well in alleviating local 
scarcities. The continuation of such policies is based on the belief that such grain is 
bound for speculative stocks of traders in the deficit areas rather than for current sale. But 
since the constraints imposed on private trade through such restrictions are binding, as 
seems to be the case, then this implies that the markets will transfer grain in the right 
direction ￿ from surplus to deficit areas ￿ and in larger quantities than the FCI. In fact, 
zoning policies considerably and systematically increased (rather than reduce) interstate 
food price dispersion thereby worsening the situation of hardship for deficit households 
in deficit states.   77  
Our simulation results show that private trade always takes place between 
neighboring states and not directly from Punjab in the north to Kerala in the south as is 
normally visualized by the government/ or its agencies who assume that private traders 
will directly compete with FCI in, e.g., transporting from Punjab to Kerala for PDS. The 
kind of optimization problem that FCI solves in shipping grain to different regions is not 
known to us due to lack of information requirements for this exercise. However, with 
competitive markets and free domestic trade, markets reveal all information needed to 
private profit maximizers who will obviously choose least cost options of trade. It is 
interesting to note that the direction of trade between any two states is determined more 
by the arbitrage possibilities rather than their deficit/ surplus status. External exports do 
not take place for either rice or wheat due to unattractive international prices and absence 
of export subsidies in the model. However, we observe that individual states find it 
attractive to import from abroad than buying locally from other states. 
Aggregate procurement of rice and wheat falls, as traders prefer to trade with 
other states than sell to FCI at MSP, but the composition of stocks in terms of rice and 
wheat changes. This holds especially for wheat, which has no levy. But for rice, levy 
procurement curtails the possibility of trade with other regions particularly since the levy 
percentage is as high as 50% to 75% in some states.  The immediate effect of lower total 
procurement is that FCI￿s buffer stocks fall leading to a savings in cost of both 
procurement and storage.  
We note that with reduction of interstate trade barriers, traders lose in rice trade 
but gain in wheat trade in all states. This perhaps has to do with MSP-based free 
procurement for wheat but a levy for rice, which allows farmers and traders to freely 
trade the grains without being tied to FCI for part sales of marketable surplus. In the 
aggregate at the national level, total surplus of wholesale traders is positive who gain 
through higher stability of interstate prices that allows them to trade more profitably. 
Although there is a very small loss in retail traders￿ surplus, it still yields a net positive 
total gain in welfare in the economy.  78  
Results from our simulations show that if external trade is liberalized the 
consumers in deficit states with ports may benefit compared to those in the interior 
surplus states. In particular, we note that two states namely Kerala would find it 
worthwhile importing wheat and Tamil Nadu both rice and wheat from abroad than from 
neighbouring domestic markets. However, as domestic infrastructure is developed and 
transport costs reduce, their dependence on foreign trade would go down. On the other 
hand, because of poor road and marketing infrastructure the interior states may not be 
able to compete with exporting foreign countries. 
There is a steep reduction in government cost from deregulating domestic trade as 
costs of procurement and storage both fall. The cost savings rise as more restrictions are 
removed. These savings could be as high as Rs.1200 crores with simple policy reform 
and rise to Rs.3000 crores with both short and long-term policy changes. This is in 
addition to the notional potential gain in terms of consumer plus producer surplus of more 
than Rs. 3800 crores. 
We thus find it socially efficient to open up domestic markets for trade in grains 
by encouraging private agents to participate in marketing and investment. This can be 
facilitated by a number of long-term policy changes to reduce transaction costs of private 
traders. These include encouraging investment and modernization through improved 
infrastructure (e.g., roads/ ports/ storage), larger scale of operation (e.g., bulk handling/ 
transport) and innovations (e.g., fuel-efficient trucks). But more importantly, the 
government needs to develop better institutions for improving market information, 
grading/labeling facilities etc. 
Even though the gains illustrated to accrue from the above changes seem to be 
small, note that they are derived from small changes in policy and reduced transportation 
cost. We also note that freeing of domestic trade as such would not solve the problem 
excessive food grain stocks with the government. So long as high MSP for wheat and 
levy procurement of rice remain intact, they would keep adding continually to large grain 
stocks with FCI through rising procurement. Much higher gains in efficiency and  79  
economic welfare are possible through lower MSP for wheat sufficient to provide 
insurance in low price years, abolition of rice levy, decentralization of FCI￿s operations, 
in addition to opening up the markets for both domestic and external trade and 
encouraging investment in infrastructure.   


















RICE                            
Scenario 0  48.175  79.454  1312  31.56  7.29  7.71  0.281 0 24.27 
Scenario 1  48.177  79.490  1321  31.58  7.29  8.23  0.269 0 24.29 
Scenario 2  48.176  79.532  1333  31.61  7.29  8.75  0.251 0 24.32 
Scenario 3  48.181  79.552  1337  31.62  7.29  8.98  0.247 0 24.33 
Scenario 4  48.186  79.572  1341  31.63  7.29  9.21  0.242 0 24.34 
WHEAT                            
Scenario 0  43.490  67.205 775  23.82  3.87  5.33  0.102 0 19.95 
Scenario 1  43.962  67.175 771  23.30  3.87  5.80  0.092 0 19.44 
Scenario 2  44.481  67.142 766  22.75  3.87  6.27  0.089 0 18.89 
Scenario 3  45.150  67.100 759  22.02  3.87  6.93  0.075 0 18.16 
Scenario 4  45.820  67.058 753  21.30  3.87  7.58  0.059 0 17.43 
TOTAL                            
Scenario 0  91.67  146.66  2087  55.38  11  13.04  0.383 0 44.22 
Scenario 1  92.14  146.67  2092  54.89  11  14.03  0.361 0 43.73 
Scenario 2  92.66  146.67  2098  54.36  11  15.02  0.340 0 43.20 
Scenario 3  93.33  146.65  2096  53.64  11  15.90  0.322 0 42.49 
Scenario 4  94.01  146.63  2094  52.92  11  16.79  0.301 0 41.77 
 
Notes: 1 crore = 10 million. Prices are measured in Rs./ quintal and quantities in million metric tonnes. 
 
The Scenarios are defined as follows: 
Scenario 0: Base Case 
Scenario 1: 50% Implicit Tariff Reduction 
Scenario 2: 100% Implicit Tariff Reduction 
Scenario 3: 100% Implicit Tariff Reduction + 25% Transport Cost Reduction 
Scenario 4: 100% Implicit Tariff Reduction + 50% Transport Cost Reduction  80  
Table 5.7￿Scenario 0: Base Case, where movement restrictions exist 
 
Results for Rice 












































AP  5.94 11.49  1365 999 5.31 1.93 -0.24 0  0  0 0
Assam  2.37 3.93  1582 1060 1.82 0.38 0.25 0  0  0 0
Bihar  7.23 5.51  1425 1147 0.00 0.13 1.73 0  0  0 0
Goa  0.08 0.15  1312 1056 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0  0  0 0
Gujarat  0.81 1.02  1223 973 0.07 0.12 -0.14 0  0  0 0
Haryana  0.17 2.70  1153 910 1.87 0.00 -0.66 0  0  0 0
HP  0.23 1.11  913 735 0.00 0.03 -0.88 0  0  0 0
J&K  0.45 0.41  1081 870 0.00 0.07 0.04 0  0  0 0
Karnataka  1.86 3.75  1329 990 1.14 0.95 -0.74 0  0  0 0
Kerala  2.04 0.77  1561 1256 0.00 0.49 1.27 0  0  0 0
MP  3.59 0.98  1388 979 0.45 0.28 3.07 0  0  0 0
Maharashtra  2.00 1.99  1444 1162 0.00 0.37 0.02 0  0  0 0
Orissa  3.74 4.72  1425 1008 2.18 0.66 1.20 0  0  0 0
Punjab  0.17 9.22  1153 910 6.39 0.00 -2.66 0  0  0 0
Rajasthan  0.13 0.16  1231 936 0.07 0.00 0.05 0  0  0 0
TN  4.32 7.34  1548 1038 3.39 1.21 0.09 0  0  0 0
UP  5.12 11.66  1204 919 5.39 0.32 -1.15 0  0  0 0
WB  7.91 12.56  1204 926 3.48 0.34 -1.17 0  0  0 0
All-India  48.18 79.45  1312    31.56 7.29 0.00 0  0  0 0
 
Results for Wheat 












































AP  0.19 0.01  928 768 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
Assam  0.17 0.09  1062 879 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
Bihar  5.66 4.47  892 738 0.00 0.55 1.19 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
Goa  0.03 0.00  977 0 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
Gujarat  1.75 0.65  904 748 0.00 0.29 1.10 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
Haryana  2.03 9.65  740 710 7.40 0.05 -0.22 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
HP  0.29 0.60  933 772 0.00 0.03 -0.31 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
J&K  0.63 0.15  1067 882 0.00 0.03 0.48 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
Karnataka  0.22 0.24  890 736 0.00 0.20 -0.03 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
Kerala  0.11 0.00  1050 0 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
MP  4.43 3.90  892 738 0.00 0.29 0.53 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
Maharashtra  2.19 0.98  910 753 0.00 0.63 1.21 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
Orissa  0.17 0.01  910 753 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
Punjab  2.19 15.55  740 711 12.01 0.01 -1.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Rajasthan  5.77 5.47  846 700 0.00 0.33 0.30 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
TN  0.07 0.00  1008 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
UP  16.90 24.38  740 635 4.40 0.89 -3.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
WB  0.71 1.06  757 626 0.00 0.53 -0.35 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
All-India  43.49 67.21  775    23.82 3.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 81  
Table 5.8￿Scenario 1: Movement Restrictions are reduced by 50% 
 
 Results for Rice 












































AP  5.84 11.50  1390 1009 5.31 1.93 -0.35 1.83 -168  231 63
Assam  2.42 3.93  1550 1047 1.82 0.38 0.31 -2.03  90  -102 -12
Bihar  7.36 5.49  1399 1126 0.00 0.13 1.87 -1.83 210  -115 94
Goa  0.08 0.15  1337 1076 0.00 0.01 -0.07 1.91  -2  3 1
Gujarat  0.79 1.02  1248 992 0.07 0.12 -0.17 2.04 -25  21 -4
Haryana  0.17 2.71  1181 916 1.88 0.00 -0.67 2.43  -6  61 55
HP  0.22 1.11  983 791 0.00 0.03 -0.90 7.65 -18  62 44
J&K  0.44 0.41  1112 895 0.00 0.07 0.03 2.85 -25  10 -15
Karnataka  1.81 3.76  1354 1004 1.15 0.95 -0.80 1.88 -49  75 26
Kerala  2.09 0.77  1526 1229 0.00 0.49 1.32 -2.21  79 -21 57
MP  3.64 0.98  1364 969 0.45 0.28 3.11 -1.77  97 -19 77
Maharashtra  2.06 1.98  1416 1140 0.00 0.37 0.07 -1.93  63 -44 19
Orissa  3.83 4.71  1399 998 2.17 0.66 1.29 -1.83 106 -99 8
Punjab  0.16 9.24  1181 916 6.40 0.00 -2.67 2.43  -6 208 203
Rajasthan  0.12 0.16  1256 946 0.07 0.00 0.04 2.03  -4  3 0
TN  4.40 7.32  1517 1026 3.38 1.21 0.19 -1.99 155  -182 -26
UP  4.99 11.68  1232 930 5.40 0.32 -1.29 2.33 -163  263 101
WB  7.78 12.58  1232 942 3.49 0.34 -1.31 2.33 -236  284 48
All-India  48.18 79.49  1321    31.58 7.29 0.00 0.01  98  640 738
 
 Results for Wheat 












































AP  0.19 0.01  925 765 0.00 0.00 0.19 -0.37  0.75  -0.02 1
Assam  0.17 0.09  1056 873 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.61  1.27  -0.46 1
Bihar  5.73 4.46  872 721 0.00 0.55 1.27 -2.32  137.00  -76.56 60
Goa  0.03 0.00  954 0 0.00 0.00 0.03 -2.41  0.75  0.00 1
Gujarat  1.81 0.65  883 730 0.00 0.29 1.16 -2.32  45.88  -11.31 35
Haryana  2.04 9.65  740 711 7.48 0.05 -0.14 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
HP  0.30 0.60  912 754 0.00 0.03 -0.30 -2.32  7.51  -10.78 -3
J&K  0.65 0.15  1020 843 0.00 0.03 0.50 -4.41  35.34  -5.70 30
Karnataka  0.22 0.24  889 735 0.00 0.20 -0.03 -0.10  0.20  -0.17 0
Kerala  0.11 0.00  1024 0 0.00 0.03 0.11 -2.45  3.04  0.00 3
MP  4.54 3.89  872 721 0.00 0.29 0.66 -2.32  102.82  -66.75 36
Maharashtra  2.22 0.98  889 735 0.00 0.63 1.24 -2.32  57.94  -17.16 41
Orissa  0.18 0.01  889 735 0.00 0.00 0.17 -2.32  3.98  -0.23 4
Punjab  2.20 15.55  740 708 11.72 0.01 -1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Rajasthan  5.88 5.46  827 684 0.00 0.33 0.42 -2.32  130.51  -88.86 42
TN  0.09 0.00  982 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.55  2.13  0.00 2
UP  16.93 24.38  740 634 4.11 0.89 -3.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
WB  0.69 1.06  775 641 0.00 0.53 -0.37 2.34  -13.02  15.49 2
All-India  43.96 67.18  771    23.30 3.87 0.00 -0.01  516.09  -262.51 254 82  
Table 5.9￿Scenario 2: Movement Restrictions are completely eliminated (reduced 100%) 
 
Results for Rice 












































AP  5.79  11.51 1398 1013 5.32 1.93 -0.40 2.46  -226 311 85
Assam  2.46  3.92 1526 1037 1.81 0.38 0.35 -3.55 158  -178 -20
Bihar  7.45  5.48 1381 1112 0.00 0.13 1.96 -3.08 355  -194 161
Goa  0.08  0.15 1345 1083 0.00 0.01 -0.07 2.56  -3  4 1
Gujarat  0.78 1.03  1256  998 0.07 0.12 -0.18 2.75 -33  28 -5
Haryana  0.16 2.71  1219  923 1.88 0.00 -0.67 5.78 -13 145 132
HP  0.20 1.12  1069  861 0.00 0.03 -0.92 17.08 -39 140 101
J&K  0.43 0.41  1153  928 0.00 0.07 0.01 6.68 -58  24 -34
Karnataka  1.79  3.76 1362 1009 1.15 0.95 -0.82 2.53  -66 102 36
Kerala  2.15  0.76 1473 1186 0.00 0.49 1.39 -5.60 202  -54 148
MP  3.66 0.98  1347  962 0.45 0.28 3.14 -2.96 162 -32 130
Maharashtra  2.15  1.97 1367 1101 0.00 0.37 0.18 -5.29 176  -122 54
Orissa  3.88 4.70  1381  990 2.17 0.66 1.35 -3.08 181  -167 14
Punjab  0.16 9.26  1219  923 6.41 0.00 -2.69 5.78 -13 495 482
Rajasthan  0.11 0.16  1286  958 0.07 0.00 0.03 4.52  -8  7 -1
TN  4.52  7.30 1473 1008 3.37 1.21 0.34 -4.81 380  -439 -59
UP  4.81 11.70  1270  946 5.41 0.32 -1.49 5.54 -381  626 244
WB  7.60 12.60  1270  964 3.49 0.34 -1.51 5.54 -555  674 119
All-India  48.18 79.53  1333      31.61 7.29 0.00 0.02  217 1369 1587
 
Results for Wheat 












































AP  0.20  0.01 904 853 0.00 0.00 0.20 -2.60  5.49  -0.12 5
Assam  0.17 0.09  1032  704 0.00 0.00 0.08 -2.86  5.94  -2.16 4
Bihar  5.80  4.45 851 753 0.00 0.55 1.35 -4.65  276.12  -152.96 123
Goa  0.03  0.00  910  0 0.00 0.00 0.03 -6.90 2.19 0.00 2
Gujarat  1.87  0.65 862 612 0.00 0.29 1.22 -4.65  93.07  -22.59 70
Haryana  2.05  9.65 740 739 7.47 0.05 -0.13 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
HP  0.30  0.60 890 805 0.00 0.03 -0.30 -4.65  15.08  -21.54 -6
J&K  0.66  0.15 974 718 0.00 0.03 0.52 -8.71  70.52  -11.25 59
Karnataka  0.22  0.24 868 810 0.00 0.20 -0.02 -2.47  5.16  -4.40 1
Kerala  0.12  0.00  979  0 0.00 0.03 0.12 -6.74 8.73 0.00 9
MP  4.66  3.88 851 718 0.00 0.29 0.78 -4.65  208.44  -133.36 75
Maharashtra  2.25  0.98 868 718 0.00 0.63 1.27 -4.65  116.91  -34.28 83
Orissa  0.19  0.01 868 612 0.00 0.00 0.17 -4.65  8.17  -0.45 8
Punjab  2.21  15.55 740 721 11.50 0.01 -1.84 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
Rajasthan  5.99  5.45 807 807 0.00 0.33 0.54 -4.65  264.16  -177.54 87
TN  0.09  0.00  976  0 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.15 2.65 0.00 3
UP  16.99  24.38 740 657 3.77 0.89 -3.62 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
WB  0.69  1.06 776 633 0.00 0.53 -0.37 2.51  -13.93  16.60 3
All-India  44.48 67.14  766      22.75 3.87 0.00 -0.01  1068.68  -544.06 525 83  
Table 5.10￿Scenario 3: Movement Restrictions reduced 100% and Transport Costs 25% 
 
Results for Rice 












































AP  5.83 11.50  1386 1008 5.31 1.93 -0.35 1.58 -146  199 54
Assam  2.52 3.92  1482 1020 1.81 0.38 0.42 -6.33 284  -317 -32
Bihar  7.48 5.48  1373 1106 0.00 0.13 2.00 -3.63 419  -229 191
Goa  0.08 0.15  1346 1084 0.00 0.01 -0.07 2.65  -3  4 1
Gujarat  0.76 1.03  1280 1016 0.07 0.12 -0.20 4.67 -55  47 -8
Haryana  0.15 2.72  1252 930 1.88 0.00 -0.68 8.62 -19 216 197
HP  0.19 1.13  1139 917 0.00 0.03 -0.94 24.77 -54 204 150
J&K  0.41 0.41  1185 954 0.00 0.07 0.00 9.63 -83  35 -48
Karnataka  1.80 3.76  1359 1007 1.15 0.95 -0.82 2.30 -60  92 32
Kerala  2.19 0.76  1442 1161 0.00 0.49 1.43 -7.58 275 -73 202
MP  3.66 0.98  1348 963 0.45 0.28 3.13 -2.91 159 -32 127
Maharashtra  2.15 1.97  1363 1097 0.00 0.37 0.18 -5.59 186  -128 58
Orissa  3.90 4.70  1373 987 2.17 0.66 1.37 -3.63 213  -196 17
Punjab  0.15 9.27  1252 930 6.43 0.00 -2.70 8.62 -19 738 719
Rajasthan  0.11 0.16  1302 965 0.07 0.00 0.02 5.81 -10  9 -1
TN  4.59 7.29  1442 996 3.37 1.21 0.42 -6.80 541  -621 -80
UP  4.71 11.72  1290 954 5.41 0.32 -1.59 7.19  492  813 1306
WB  7.50 12.62  1290 975 3.50 0.34 -1.62 7.19  718  876 1594
All-India  48.18 79.55  1337    31.62 7.29 0.00 0.02  418 1639 2057
 
Results for Wheat 












































AP  0.22 0.01  863 695 0.00 0.00 0.21 -7.02  15.57  -0.32 15
Assam  0.18 0.09  959 772 0.00 0.00 0.09 -9.73  20.69  -7.33 13
Bihar  5.90 4.44  823 663 0.00 0.55 1.46 -7.76  465.61  -254.96 211
Goa  0.03 0.00  868 0 0.00 0.00 0.03 -11.25  3.67  0.00 4
Gujarat  1.95 0.65  832 669 0.00 0.29 1.31 -8.02  163.91  -38.94 125
Haryana  2.05 9.65  740 709 7.59 0.05 -0.01 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
HP  0.31 0.60  853 686 0.00 0.03 -0.28 -8.66  28.37  -40.10 -12
J&K  0.68 0.15  916 737 0.00 0.03 0.54 -14.19  116.22  -18.29 98
Karnataka  0.23 0.24  836 673 0.00 0.20 -0.01 -6.07  12.93  -10.77 2
Kerala  0.13 0.00  919 0 0.00 0.03 0.13 -12.43  16.93  0.00 17
MP  4.83 3.87  823 663 0.00 0.29 0.97 -7.76  354.17  -222.29 132
Maharashtra  2.30 0.98  836 673 0.00 0.63 1.33 -8.16  208.06  -60.11 148
Orissa  0.20 0.01  836 673 0.00 0.00 0.19 -8.16  14.92  -0.80 14
Punjab  2.22 15.55  740 699 11.16 0.01 -2.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Rajasthan  6.08 5.44  790 636 0.00 0.33 0.64 -6.63  380.48  -252.94 128
TN  0.12 0.00  919 0 0.00 0.00 0.04 -8.78  7.77  0.00 8
UP  17.02 24.38  740 615 3.28 0.89 -4.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
WB  0.70 1.06  767 617 0.00 0.53 -0.35 1.32  -7.38  8.73 1
All-India  45.15 67.10  759    22.02 3.87 0.00 -0.02  1801.92  -898.12 904 84  
Table 5.11￿Scenario 4. Movement Restrictions reduced 100% and Transport Costs 50% 
 
Results for Rice 












































AP  5.87 11.49  1374 1003 5.31 1.93 -0.31 0.71  -66  90 24
Assam  2.59 3.91  1438 1002 1.81 0.38 0.49 -9.10 413  -455 -42
Bihar  7.51 5.48  1366 1099 0.00 0.13 2.03 -4.16 482  -262 220
Goa  0.08 0.15  1348 1085 0.00 0.01 -0.07 2.76  -3  4 1
Gujarat  0.74 1.03  1303 1034 0.07 0.12 -0.23 6.60 -77  67 -11
Haryana  0.15 2.72  1285 937 1.89 0.00 -0.69 11.47 -25 288 263
HP  0.18 1.14  1210 974 0.00 0.03 -0.96 32.48 -68 268 200
J&K  0.41 0.41  1190 958 0.00 0.07 0.00 10.11 -87  36 -50
Karnataka  1.80 3.76  1356 1005 1.15 0.95 -0.82 2.09 -55  84 29
Kerala  2.22 0.76  1412 1136 0.00 0.49 1.46 -9.54 348 -91 257
MP  3.65 0.98  1349 963 0.45 0.28 3.12 -2.84 156 -31 124
Maharashtra  2.16 1.97  1359 1094 0.00 0.37 0.19 -5.87 196  -135 61
Orissa  3.92 4.69  1366 984 2.17 0.66 1.39 -4.16 245  -225 20
Punjab  0.14 9.29  1285 937 6.44 0.00 -2.71 11.47 -25 983 958
Rajasthan  0.11 0.16  1318 971 0.07 0.00 0.02 7.13 -12  11 -1
TN  4.66 7.27  1412 983 3.36 1.21 0.50 -8.78 703  -801 -97
UP  4.62 11.73  1310 962 5.42 0.32 -1.69 8.87  603 1003 1606
WB  7.40 12.63  1310 986 3.50 0.34 -1.73 8.87  881 1081 1962
All-India  48.19 79.57  1341    31.63 7.29 0.00 0.02  641 1915 2556
 
Results for Wheat 












































AP  0.23 0.01  822 680 0.00 0.00 0.23 -11.43  26.62  -0.52 26
Assam  0.18 0.09  886 733 0.00 0.00 0.10 -16.60  36.09  -12.48 24
Bihar  6.00 4.43  796 658 0.00 0.55 1.57 -10.87  658.88  -356.68 302
Goa  0.03 0.00  825 0 0.00 0.00 0.03 -15.59  5.22  0.00 5
Gujarat  2.04 0.65  801 662 0.00 0.29 1.39 -11.39  237.50  -55.24 182
Haryana  2.06 9.65  740 712 7.57 0.05 -0.02 0.00  0.00  0.00 0
HP  0.32 0.59  815 674 0.00 0.03 -0.27 -12.68  41.87  -58.59 -17
J&K  0.70 0.14  857 709 0.00 0.03 0.56 -19.68  162.94  -25.29 138
Karnataka  0.24 0.24  804 665 0.00 0.20 0.00 -9.66  21.04  -17.12 4
Kerala  0.14 0.00  860 0 0.00 0.03 0.14 -18.13  25.89  0.00 26
MP  5.01 3.86  796 658 0.00 0.29 1.15 -10.87  504.90  -310.96 194
Maharashtra  2.36 0.97  804 665 0.00 0.63 1.39 -11.68  301.56  -85.86 216
Orissa  0.22 0.01  804 665 0.00 0.00 0.20 -11.68  22.17  -1.14 21
Punjab  2.22 15.55  740 702 10.94 0.01 -2.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Rajasthan  6.17 5.44  774 640 0.00 0.33 0.74 -8.61  499.08  -328.20 171
TN  0.15 0.00  860 0 0.00 0.00 0.09 -14.71  13.70  0.00 14
UP  17.04 24.38  740 627 2.78 0.89 -4.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
WB  0.71 1.06  758 627 0.00 0.53 -0.34 0.13  -0.74  0.87 0





Figure 5.1￿Rice: Changes in Open Market Demand, Production and Procurement Trade 
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Figure 5.2￿Wheat: Changes in Open Market Demand, Production and Procurement 
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Table 5.13￿Pattern of Interstate Trade (Million Tonnes)  
Rice Wheat 





+ 25% Transport 
Cost Reduction 





+ 25% Transport 
Cost Reduction 
AP.KER 0.024  0.669  AP.KER      0.025 
AP.TN     0.263  AP.TN     0.026 
GOA.KER  0.070 0.073  HAR.GUJ  0.024 0.003 
GUJ.KER  0.144 0.012  HAR.HP  0.087 0.007 
GUJ.MAH     0.181  HAR.RAJ  0.110  0.004 
GUJ.TN     0.009  HP.JK  0.482  0.537 
HAR.KER 0.039      KAR.GOA 0.025  0.010 
HAR.MP  0.838 0.698  KAR.KER  0.001 0.002 
HAR.ORI 0.134  0.511  MP.KER     0.103 
HAR.RAJ     0.012  MP.TN     0.018 
HAR.TN  0.040     MAH.GOA     0.018 
HP.HAR  0.394 0.539  PUN.GUJ  1.075 1.302 
HP.JK 0.041      PUN.HP  0.084  0.247 
HP.PUN  0.397 0.399  PUN.RAJ  0.187 0.633 
HP.RAJ 0.045      UP.BIH 1.194  1.459 
KAR.KER 0.744  0.672  UP.KER  0.075     
KAR,TN     0.146  UP.MP  0.529  1.087 
PUN.KER 0.041      UP.MAH  1.207  1.346 
PUN.MP  0.227 2.433  UP.ORI  0.074 0.189 
PUN.ORI  0.741 0.652  WB.AP  0.187 0.264 
PUN.RAJ     0.012  WB.ASS  0.079  0.090 
PUN.TN 0.050      WB.ORI 0.082     
UP.BIH  1.134  1.590          
UP.MAH  0.017             
WB.AP     0.584          
WB.ASS  0.250  0.417          
WB.BIH  0.591  0.408          
WB.ORI  0.328  0.211          
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Table 5.14￿Changing Trading Partnerships with Freer Domestic Trade 
Rice 
Trading State  Scenario 0  Scenario 3 
Andhra Pradesh  Kerala           Kerala  Tamil Nadu      
Goa  Kerala           Kerala          
Gujarat  Kerala           Kerala  Maharashtra Tamil 
Nadu 
  






Orissa   Rajasthan    
Himachal Pradesh Haryana  Jammu & 
Kashmir 
Punjab Rajasthan  Haryana Punjab       
Karnataka  Kerala           Kerala  Tamil Nadu      






Orissa   Rajasthan    
Uttar Pradesh  Bihar  Maharashtra        Bihar          
West Bengal  Assam  Bihar  Orissa     Andhra 
Pradesh 
Assam Bihar Orissa 
Wheat 
Trading State  Scenario 0  Scenario 3 
Andhra Pradesh                 Kerala  Tamil 
Nadu 
     
Haryana Gujarat  Himachal 
Pradesh 
Rajasthan      Gujarat  Himachal 
Pradesh 
Rajasthan    
Himachal Pradesh Jammu & 
Kashmir 
            Jammu & 
Kashmir 
        
Karnataka  Goa  Kerala           Goa  Kerala       
Madhya Pradesh                 Kerala  Tamil 
Nadu 
     
Maharashtra                 Goa          
Punjab Gujarat  Himachal 
Pradesh 
Rajasthan      Gujarat  Himachal 
Pradesh 
Rajasthan    
Uttar Pradesh  Bihar  Kerala  Madhya 
Pradesh 
MaharashtraOrissa Bihar  Madhya 
Pradesh 
MaharashtraOrissa
West Bengal  Andhra 
Pradesh 
Assam  Orissa        Andhra 
Pradesh 
Assam Orissa     
 
Notes: 
Scenario 0: Base Case 
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6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study evaluates the domestic and international trade and marketing policies 
in India and obtains the effects of deregulating domestic markets and liberalizing external 
trade on the food grain sector. To alleviate household food insecurity the Government of 
India (GOI) supports several food-based programs that are amongst the largest in the 
world. But pervasive inefficiencies in implementation observed in several such programs 
seriously undermine their ability to achieve the intended goals. The government is now 
making attempts to improve the effectiveness of public spending by rationalizing 
expenditure. It has altered the design of programs, e.g., by adopting better targeting 
methods such as through income-based identification and social and demographic 
characteristics of households etc. It is also attempting to reform pricing policy with a 
view to encourage better private sector participation. 
Traditionally the government fixed prices for both producers and consumers, it 
decided how much to distribute where, how much of stocks to release or accumulate for 
price stabilisation and so on. But a comparison of costs and functioning of the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI, a government of India agency) and private traders shows that 
the latter operate at costs lower than public costs in both storage and trade despite several 
controls and restrictions. The analysis carried out in this Report demonstrates the 
desirability of a greater role for the private sector in distribution, trade and storage of 
food grains.  
Public policy towards food grain markets has tended to be highly interventionist 
with the central and state governments actively involved in grain storage and restrictions 
on the movement of food grains across states. These restrictions are often based on the 
assumption that markets cannot be expected to perform well in alleviating local 
scarcities. The continuation of such policies is based on the belief that such grain is 
bound for speculative stocks of traders in the deficit areas rather than for current sale. But 
it has been shown that zoning policies considerably and systematically increased (rather   94
than reduce) interstate food price dispersion thereby worsening the situation of hardship 
for deficit households in deficit states.  
Public interventions to manage price risks should be designed such that they do 
not unduly restrict the normal flow of commodities in the economy but allow for smooth 
functioning of private trade and market prices to determine resource allocation. The high 
costs of maintaining public stocks can be reduced through encouragement of private 
storage, which plays a complementary role to public storage, and liberalization of 
external trade. Efficient functioning of private agents would also require the removal of 
restrictions such as limits on stock holdings and controls on movement of grain across 
state boundaries. Since such constraints appear to be binding, opening up the markets to 
free domestic as well as international trade would transfer grains in the right direction ￿ 
from surplus to deficit areas ￿ and perhaps in larger quantities than FCI. Support price 
should not be fixed at unduly high levels but provide a protection against distress sales 
during surplus situations. Complete elimination of price volatility by the government 
through inter-regional or inter-seasonal policies is neither desirable nor feasible. There 
should be enough scope for traders to undertake the arbitrage transactions that are 
worthwhile, and not be hindered by restrictions on storage, movement and access to trade 
and credit. Such restrictions would need to be either permanently eliminated or 
significantly reduced.  
A major contribution of this study is to analyze and quantify the impacts of 
relaxation of restrictions on private domestic trade of rice and wheat based on a spatial 
equilibrium model of inter-state trade that takes place under arbitrage opportunities. A 
unique feature in our analysis of Indian grain markets is that wholesale and retail traders 
are considered as a separate set of agents in addition to consumers, producers and the 
government. The analysis throws up some interesting results.  
Public sector agencies are known to visualize private traders as a competitor to 
FCI. Based on this, the general perception is that private trade will mimic the behavior of 
FCI by, e.g., transporting grains from Punjab in the north of the country to Kerala in the   95
south. However, contrary to this perception, private trade does not necessarily take place 
only and directly between a surplus and a deficit states. Our results show that it is 
possible for a deficit state to import grains from a neighboring deficit state, which in turn 
could import from another deficit or a surplus state or even from abroad depending on 
arbitrage benefits. With freer domestic trade, markets reveal all information needed to 
private profit maximizers who obviously choose least cost options of trade.  
As restrictions are relaxed, prices stabilize across states and there are welfare 
gains to producers, consumers and wholesale traders at the national level. The gains are 
much higher in the case of wheat compared to rice. This could be due to the fact that rice 
market continues to be controlled through levy procurement. There is a steep reduction in 
government cost from deregulating domestic trade as costs of procurement and storage 
both fall due especially to lower wheat procurement since traders prefer to sell wheat in 
other states than to FCI, fetching them a better price than MSP. In a liberalized trade 
regime for both domestic and foreign trade, states make new trading partners 
domestically and may even prefer to trade abroad than domestically to make the best of 
price differences.  
The gains illustrated to accrue from liberalizing domestic and foreign trade are 
derived from small policy changes that reduce/ eliminate movement restrictions and also 
from reduced transportation cost. The problem of excess stock accumulation would 
however not be solved by these policy changes. So long as high minimum support price 
(MSP) for wheat and levy procurement of rice remain intact, much higher gains in 
efficiency and economic welfare are possible if opening up the markets for both domestic 
and external trade is accompanied by investment in roads and other infrastructure; lower 
MSP for wheat just sufficient to provide an insurance in low price years; abolition of rice 
levy and decentralization of FCI￿s operations.   
It is thus socially efficient to open up markets for trade in grains by encouraging 
private agents to participate in marketing and investment. This can be facilitated by a 
number of long-term policy changes to reduce transaction costs of private traders. These   96
include encouraging investment and modernization through improved infrastructure (e.g., 
roads/ ports/ storage), larger scale of operation (e.g., bulk handling/ transport) and 
innovations (e.g., fuel-efficient trucks). But more importantly, the government needs to 
develop better institutions for improving market information, grading facilities etc. 
The government has already initiated steps to encourage private participation in 
grain markets. The role of FCI is proposed to be restricted to timely sales and purchases 
to maintain stability in food prices and resort to exports and imports of food grains, when 
required. The budgetary savings of the central government realized by limiting the role of 
FCI can be used to provide subsidy to the states for the specific purpose of procuring 
grains through their agencies, private or public. Given the cost factor, they can choose the 
most appropriate way to purchase grain. But more needs to be done. If price distortions 
are eliminated, farmers could shift away from rice and wheat and diversify to high value 
farming that offers higher market price such as fruits and vegetables, poultry and dairy. 
Subsidized loans could be offered to improve the restricted access to credit and to 
encourage private storage facilities that are used co-operatively. In line with this, the 
National Policy on Handling and Storage of Foodgrains envisages encouragement of 
private sector for building storage capacities for rental use by government agencies and 
also development of infrastructure for integrated bulk handling, storage and 
transportation of food grains. 
As for external policy, the era of globalization has brought with it new 
opportunities as well as challenges to the food security system. Being a signatory to the 
WTO, the country is moving towards more open trade in agriculture. The challenges are 
in terms of developing appropriate marketing infrastructure and institutions to deal with 
trade in agricultural commodities and appropriate policies to deal with price risk. The 
opportunities under liberalized external trade are in terms of reduced dependence on 
buffer stocks and greater dependence on trade for price stabilization. As India becomes a 
major force in the global rice and wheat markets, new strategies are required to sustain its 
position. As part of a new strategy, the government plans to promote exports through   97
long-term credit, removal of export restrictions, establishment of Agricultural Export 
Zones and transport subsidies for exports of rice and wheat from government 
warehouses. But it also needs to improve facilities for grading and measuring standards, 
and address quality problems. Exporters face distribution and storage problems too. In 
order to take full advantage of growing exports, the exporters would need to have better port 
and domestic infrastructure facilities, which are currently very meager. The ports are highly 
congested, have obsolete equipment, are managed by government controlled port trusts and 
thus marred by bureaucracy. Loading a ship takes enormous time and is extremely slow 
compared to international standards. Improving these facilities would go a long way in 
reducing the high handling costs and margins of exporters and make India competitive in 
the world grain markets.    98
APPENDIX: BASE YEAR DATA 2000-01 
COMPILATION, ADJUSTMENT AND SOURCES 
 
A.1 WHOLESALE  MARGINS 
Wholesale price equals farm harvest price plus a mark-up comprising traders 
margin, marketing cost and transport cost. The traders￿ margin includes margins of the 
wholesalers and, in the case of rice, also the rice millers. The marketing cost consists of 
statutory charges (purchase tax, market fee, surcharge, commission), cost of material, 
labour and storage, processing cost (for paddy) forwarding charges and interest on 
working capital. Using data from Chand (2002), we calculate these costs as percentage of 
wholesale price for the base year. For the FCI corresponding to traders￿ margin we 
consider its administrative costs. In this case, we calculate the rates as percentage of total 
purchase cost plus other costs including administration and post-procurement incidental 
costs. The data for FCI are taken from GOI (2002a) and CACP (2000). 
A.2 RETAIL  MARGINS 
While modeling consumer demand we consider the retail price, which is obtained 
by applying the retail margin to inflate wholesale price taken from Chand (2002). See 
Table A.1 for base year data on prices. 
A.3 INTER-STATE  TRANSPORT  COST 
Private transport cost data is from Chand (2002) and FCI data from CACP (2000). 
In order to obtain state x state transport cost matrix, we use the data on transport cost per 
quintal by truck from Punjab to other states as given by Chand and extrapolate it to 
generate the entire matrix based on approximate metric distances. In doing so, we assume 
that it will cost the same to transport goods to states with similar distances. However, for 
three states, namely Assam, HP and J&K we double this cost under the assumption that   99
the physical and natural geographical barriers such as hills, mountains, rivers and other 
country boundaries in between make it that much more costly to transport grains from 
these states to all the other destinations in the country.  
A.4 FOREIGN  TRADE 
External trade is modeled by treating the rest of the world as another region with 
which individual states can directly trade by incurring the additional costs of transport 
from the nearest/ cheapest port. The cost of foreign trade incurred by a state is obtained 
from the transportation costs of moving goods from the state to the nearest port and port 
charges. Net export price received is defined as border price (fob) minus domestic trade 
cost (transportation plus traders￿ margin) minus port charges. Net import price paid is 
defined as border price (cif) plus domestic trade cost plus port charges. 
The export (import) coefficients are obtained from the price elasticity of exports 
(imports) with respect to exports (imports), evaluated at the base year values. Port 
clearance charges up to 1995 are taken from Pursell and Gupta (1996) and extrapolated to 
2000-01 based on observed growth rates. The border prices for the base year 2000-01 are  
Rice:  $ 149.1 per ton  (Thai 35% broken) 
Wheat: $ 126.8 per ton  (US Hard Red Winter) 
Exchange rate: Rs. 46.64 per US $ 
Port Clearance Charges = Rs. 80.5 per Quintal 
 
Sources: GOI (2002a), Department of Food and Public Distribution. Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food 
and Public   Distribution; Handbook of Statistics (2002), RBI and Pursell and Gupta (1996). 
A.5 PDS  PRICE 
We have two types of central issue prices (CIPs) for families below poverty line 
(BPL) and above poverty line (APL), but offtake falls under three categories (BPL, APL 
and AAY ￿ the Antyodaya Anna Yojana program for the poorest of the poor). We   100
clubbed AAY with BPL and took a weighted average of APL and BPL CIPs to compute a 
common PDS price: 
           PDS price = CIPA (APL/total off take) + CIPB (BPL/total offtake). 
where  
CIPA = APL’s CIP 
CIPB = BPL’s CIP 
 
Sources: GOI (2002a), Department of Food and Public Distribution. Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food 
and Public Distribution. 
 
A.6  PROCUREMENT, LEVY AND MSP 
Data on statutory levy percentage for rice procurement is taken from Annual 
Report (2002), Department of Food and Civil Supplies, Government of India. It is to be 
noted however, that effective levy differs from statutory levy in most states and the 
difference is quite substantial in some states (Figure below). To be consistent with base 
year actual levy, we therefore assumed the levy in the model to be equal to the effective 
levy. 
In the model we derive equilibrium solution in terms of wholesale price. But since 
levy prices and MSP are fixed in terms of farm-gate prices, we inflated them using the 
wholesale margins to make them comparable to the wholesale level prices. For this 
purpose we used the margins pertaining to surplus states from where the Government 
makes procurement. See Tables A.2-A.4 for base-year data on quantities and prices 
related to PDS and procurement. 
Data on MSP for wheat and levy rice prices are taken from Bulletin of Food 
Statistics 2000. Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India and 
http://www.indiastat.com/   101











































A.7 DEMAND  ELASTICITIES 
We use data from Murty (1997) on own price elasticity separately for rural & 
urban areas, so we use weighted average of these with population weights to compute the 
state-wide price elasticity of demand. We also assume that the price elasticity for the 
following states are the same as the corresponding states given on the right hand side: 
Uttar Pradesh        -   Assam & Bihar 
Punjab      -    HP  &  JK 
Tamil  Nadu       -    Kerala 
M P       -     W B  
Karnataka     -    Goa 
A P       -     O r i s s a  
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Similarly, we use weighted averages to calculate income and cross price elasticity 
of demand. Source: Gulati and Kelly (1999, page no.148 and 149). Table A.5 presents the 
elasticities used in the model. 
A.8 SUPPLY  ELASTICITIES 
A.8.1  Own price elasticity of supply 
We use all India elasticity for wheat due to non-availability of state-wise data. 
The production is taken as net production obtained after adjusting for seed, feed and 
wastage. The ratio of net to gross production is 0.924 for rice and 0.879 for wheat. 
Source: Jha and Srinivasan (1999). 
A.8.2  Cross price elasticity of supply 
In order to get cross price elasticity of supply between rice and wheat, we need to 
know the states where these crops are substitutable. The following information revealed 
no such substitution. 
Substitutability of crops in major states of India is as follows: 
Andhra Pradesh  (rice, ragi, mesta), (jowar, maize, bajra), (cotton, groundnut, sesamum), (wheat, gram) 
Assam                    (rice, jute), (moong, gram, urad, cotton, wheat) 
Bihar  (ragi, rice, jute), (wheat, barley, peas, gram, sugarcane) 
Maharashtra  (linseed, wheat, gram), (sugarcane, wheat, gram), (jowar, bajra, maize, cotton) 
Madhya Pradesh  (linseed, wheat, gram), (jowar, bajra, cotton) 
Karnataka  (rice, ragi), (jowra, sugarcane), (cotton, groundnut), (bajra, maize) 
Orissa  (rice, ragi, jute) 
Punjab (wheat,  barley,  gram, peas), (jowar, bajra, maize, cotton, sugarcane) 
Rajasthan  (jowar, bajra, maize, pulses), (wheat, barley, gram, peas) 
Tamil Nadu  (rice, ragi, mesta), (jowar, maize, bajra), (cotton, groundnut, sesamum) 
Uttar Pradesh  (wheat, barley, gram, peas), (jowar, bajra, maize, sugarcane) 
 
Source: Bansil (1990), page 347  
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As the above data shows no substitution in production of rice and wheat in major 
producing states, so, in calibrating the supply functions, we do not incorporate cross-price 
elasticities. 
 
Table A.1￿Base Year (2000-01) Prices: Rs. Per Quintal 
WHOLESALE PRICE RETAIL PRICE  STATE 
WHEAT  RICE WHEAT RICE 
Andhra Pradesh  1002 1291 1146 1477 
Assam 1038 1328 1216 1554 
Bihar 957 1247 1108 1378 
Goa 1016 1305 1261 1465 
Gujarat 863 1152 1062 1418 
Haryana 739 1028 876 1218 
Himachal Pradesh  739 1105 876 1310 
Jammu & Kashmir  927 1216 1098 1442 
Karnataka 988 1277 1058 1368 
Kerala  1027 1317 1138 1459 
Madhya Pradesh  868 1158 960 1261 
Maharashtra  932 1222 1157 1372 
Orissa  902 1192 978 1292 
Punjab  739 1028 876 1218 
Rajasthan  1016 1097 840 1248 
Tamil Nadu  752 1305 1114 1515 
Uttar Pradesh  988 1028 852 1176 
West Bengal  791 1028 1040 1100 
 
Sources: Chand (2002) and http://www.indiastat.com/   104
Table A.2￿Base Year (2000-01) Quantities: Million Tonnes 
SUPPLY DEMAND  OPEN  MARKET 
DEMAND 
PROCUREMENT PDS  STATE 
WHEAT RICE WHEAT RICE WHEAT RICE WHEAT RICE WHEAT RICE 
Andhra  Pradesh  0.01 11.45  0.17 8.21 0.16 6.28 0.000 7.173 0.003 1.927
Assam 0.09  3.89  0.17 3.18 0.16 2.80 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.380
Bihar 4.50  5.42  5.77 8.33 5.35 8.20 0.000  0.008  0.430 0.132
Goa 0.00  0.15  0.03 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.000  0.000  0.002 0.009
Gujarat 0.65  1.01  2.14 0.99 1.85 0.87 0.000  0.000  0.287 0.117
Haryana 9.65  2.68  2.06 0.20 2.01 0.20 4.498  1.477  0.048 0.002
Himachal Pradesh  0.59  0.12  0.36 0.22 0.33 0.19 0.000  0.001  0.028 0.026
Jammu & Kashmir  0.15  0.41  0.71 0.47 0.68 0.40 0.000  0.000  0.031 0.069
Karnataka 0.24  3.73  0.39 2.93 0.19 1.98 0.000  0.230  0.199 0.948
Kerala 0.00  0.75  0.14 2.86 0.11 2.37 0.000  0.000  0.030 0.489
Madhya Pradesh  3.89  0.96  4.77 4.32 4.48 4.04 0.351  1.030  0.289 0.283
Maharashtra 0.98  1.95  2.74 2.82 2.11 2.44 0.000  0.036  0.627 0.374
Orissa 0.01  4.61  0.17 5.19 0.17 4.53 0.000  0.918  0.000 0.663
Punjab 15.55  9.15  2.18 0.19 2.17 0.19 9.424  6.935  0.012 0.000
Rajasthan 5.55  0.16  5.19 0.17 4.86 0.17 0.539  0.026  0.331 0.001
Tamil Nadu  0.00  7.22  0.20 6.14 0.20 4.93 0.000  1.720  0.001 1.210
Uttar  Pradesh  24.94 11.54 15.15 6.34 14.26 6.01 1.545 1.212 0.889 0.321
West  Bengal  1.06 12.43  1.20 9.10 0.66 8.76 0.000 0.000 0.533 0.340
Total  67.86 77.64 43.53 61.72 39.79 54.43 16.357  20.766 3.742 7.292
 
Sources: GOI (2002a), Bulletin of Food Statistics 2000. Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, 
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Table A.3￿Levy Procurement of Rice: 2002-2003 Kharif Marketing Season 
Sl No  Name of the State/UT  Category  Quantum of Levy 
1. ANDHRA  PRADESH  MILLERS/DEALERS  50% 
2. ASSAM  MILLERS  50%   
3. BIHAR  MILLERS/DEALERS  40%  or  2500 qtls. compound levy on 
millers. 
25% or 500 qtls. compound levy on 
wholesalers. 
4. GUJARAT  MILLERS  10% 
5. HARYANA  MILLERS/DEALERS  75%   
6. HIMACHAL  PRADESH  MILLERS/DEALERS  50% 
7. KARNATAKA  MILLERS/DEALERS  33.33% 
8.  MADHYA PRADESH  MILLERS/DEALERS  30% (Raw rice) 
9. MAHARASHTRA  MILLERS  30% 
10. ORISSA  MILLERS  75% 
11. PUNJAB  MILLERS/DEALERS  75%   
12. RAJASTHAN  MILLERS/DEALERS  50% 
13.  TAMIL NADU  MILLERS/DEALERS  50%  
14.  UTTAR PRADESH  MILLERS/DEALERS  60% (Western UP) 
40% (Some Distts.in  
Eastern UP)  
15. UTTARANCHAL  MILLERS/DEALERS  60% 
16. WEST  BENGAL  MILLERS  50% 
17. CHANDIGARH  MILLERS/DEALERS  75% 
18. DELHI  MILLERS/DEALERS  75% 
19. PONDICHERRY  MILLERS/DEALERS  10% (20% transport levy)   106
Table A.4￿State-wise Prices of Levy Rice (raw & parboiled) in Kharif Marketing Season 
2000-2001 and 2001-2002 (Rupees per Quintal) 
 
RAW RICE  PAR BOILED 
COMMON  GRADE "A"  COMMON  GRADE "A" 
  SR.NO. STATE 
2000-
2001 
2001-2002  2000-2001  2001-2002 2000-2001 2001-2002 2000-2001 2001-2002 
1.  ANDHRA 
PRADESH 
899.80 935.10  949.60  985.00  900.90 931.00  950.00 980.10 
2.  ASSAM 845.90  879.10  892.50  926.00 847.80 875.80  893.80 921.80 
3.  BIHAR 861.20  895.10  908.80  942.60 863.00 891.60  909.80 938.50 
4.  CHANDIGARH 876.70 911.10  925.10  959.50 878.20 907.40  925.90 955.10 
5.  DELHI 896.50  937.50  946.20  987.40 897.70 933.40  946.60 982.60 
6.  GUJARAT 826.60  859.10  872.10  904.60 828.80 856.10  873.70 901.00 
7.  HARYANA 904.20  939.10  954.30  989.10 905.30 935.00  954.70 984.30 
8.  KARNATAKA 830.40  863.10  876.20  908.80 832.60 860.10  877.70 905.10 
9.  MADHYA 
PRADESH 
839.70 872.70  886.00  919.00  841.70 869.50  887.30 915.10 
10.  MAHARASHTRA 831.50  863.10  877.20  909.20 833.70 860.50  878.70 905.60 
11.  ORISSA 869.00  903.10  917.00  951.10 870.60 899.50  917.90 946.80 
12.  PONDICHERRY 822.70  855.10  868.00  900.40 825.00 852.20  869.70 896.80 
13.  PUNJAB 903.60  939.10  953.70  989.10 904.70 935.00  954.00 984.30 
14.  RAJASTHAN 881.30  915.90 930.00 964.60 882.70 912.10  930.70 960.10 
15.  UTTAR 
PRADESH 
868.90 903.10  917.00  951.10  870.60 899.50  918.00 946.80 
16.  WEST BENGAL  826.60  875.10  872.10  921.50 828.80 871.90  873.70 917.60 
17.  CHHATISGARH  -  871.10 -  917.30 - 868.00  - 913.50 
18.  UTTARANCHAL  -  883.10 -  930.00 - 879.80  - 926.00 
 
Source: http://fcamin.nic.in/pol_proc_price.htm.  














WHEAT RICE  RICE WHEAT RICE WHEAT  WHEAT RICE 
Andhra  Pradesh  -2.403  -0.888 0.320 0.370 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.060
Assam  -0.669  -0.806 0.330 0.380 0.040 0.100  0.090 0.060
Bihar  -0.669  -0.806 0.330 0.380 0.040 0.100  0.090 0.115
Goa  -1.250  -1.322 0.320 0.370 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.090
Gujarat  -1.240  -1.152 0.310 0.360 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.115
Haryana  -0.533  -1.037 0.320 0.370 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.060
Himachal  Pradesh -0.426  -0.995 0.320 0.370 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.090
Jammu & Kashmir  -0.426  -0.995 0.320  0.370  0.050  0.100  0.090  0.090
Karnataka  -1.250  -1.322 0.320 0.370 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.115
Kerala  -1.933  -0.750 0.310 0.360 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.115
Madhya  Pradesh  -1.186  -0.558 0.320 0.370 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.115
Maharashtra  -0.764  -0.984 0.310 0.360 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.115
Orissa  -2.403  -0.888 0.320 0.370 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.115
Punjab  -0.043  -0.995 0.320 0.370 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.060
Rajasthan  -1.047  -1.832 0.330 0.380 0.040 0.100  0.090 0.115
Tamil  Nadu  -1.933  -0.750 0.310 0.360 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.090
Uttar  Pradesh  -0.669  -0.806 0.330 0.380 0.040 0.100  0.090 0.060
West  Bengal  -1.186  -0.558 0.300 0.370 0.050 0.100  0.090 0.060
Average  -1.113  -0.969            0.090  0.091
 
Sources: Gulati and Kelly (1999), page 148-149; Murty (1997), page B-33, Jha and Srinivasan (1999). 
  108
REFERENCES 
Acharya, S.S. 2001. ￿Domestic agricultural marketing policies, incentives and 
integration.￿ Chapter 3 in: S.S. Acharya and D.P. Chaudhri (eds.), Indian 
Agricultural Policy at the Crossroads: Priorities and Agenda, Rawat Publications, 
New Delhi. 
 
Administrative Staff College of India (ASCI). 2001. A Study of the Costs of Acquisition 
and Distribution of Food Grains by the Food Corporation of India, Hyderabad. 
 
Bansil, P.C. 1990. Agricultural Statistical Compendium, Food Grains Volume-I, Techno-
Economic Research Institute, New Delhi. 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish and S. Chakravarty. 1969. Contributions to Indian Economic Analysis: 
A Survey, Supplement to American Economic Review 59(4), 2-73. 
 
Bigman, David, Shlomo Reutlinger. 1979. Food Price and Supply Stabilization: National 
Buffer Stocks and Trade Policies. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61, 
657-667. 
 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2002. India corruption row halts food aid, by 
Omer Farooq, BBC reporter in Hyderabad, BBC News World Edition, Friday, 23 
August, 2002. 
 
Chand, R. 2002. Government intervention in food grain markets in the new context, 
(Study Report Prepared for Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public 
Distribution), National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy Research. 
 
Chand, R. 2003. Domestic reforms for trade liberalization: Analysis and approaches, 
Paper presented at the Workshop on ￿Analysis of Trade Liberalization for Poverty 
Alleviation￿, April 21-25, Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
 
Chander, Parkash. 2001. Subsidy reforms and poverty alleviation, IMF Working Paper 
WP/01/126, International Monetary Fund. 
 
Coady, D., Grosh, M. and John Hoddinott. 2002. Targeting of transfers in developing 
countries: Review of experience and lessons, Social Safety Net Primer Series, 
World Bank. 
 
Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP). 2000. Report on the harvest 
season￿. 
  109
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG). 2000. 
http://www.cagindia.org/reports/civil/2000_book3/index.htm 
 
Daily Excelsior. 2001. Business ￿ Alarm bells ringing among 55,000 strong FCI staff, 
New Delhi, Aug 16. 
 
Das-Gupta, A. 2003. Internal trade barriers in India: Fiscal check posts, mimeo. 
 
Debroy, Bibek and P.D. Kaushik. 2002. Barriers to inter-state trade and commerce ￿ The 
case of road transport, paper prepared for the Commission for Contemporary 
Studies, Rajiv Gandhi Institute, New Delhi. 
http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/volume2book3.htm 
 
DrŁze, J. 1990. Famine prevention in India, Chapter 1 in: J. DrŁze and A. Sen (eds.), The 
Political Economy of Hunger ￿ Volume 2: Famine Prevention, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
 
DrŁze, Jean. 2001. Starving the poor, The Hindu, February 26, 27, New Delhi. 
 
DrŁze, J. and A. Sen.1993. Hunger and Public Action, Oxford University Press, Delhi. 
 
Dutta, B. and B. Ramaswami. 2001. Targeting and efficiency in the public distribution 
system: Case of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, Economic and Political 
Weekly, May 5, pp 1524-1532. 
 
Ellis, F., Senanayake, P. and M. Smith. 1997. Food price policy in Sri Lanka, Food 
Policy 22(1), 81-96. 
 
Expenditure Reforms Commission. 2001. Report on Food Security, Chairman: K.P. 
Geethakrishnan, former Finance Secretary, Government of India. 
 
Government of India. 1991. Report on the Operations of the Food Corporation of India, 
Bureau of Industrial Costs and Prices, Ministry of Industry, New Delhi. 
 
Government of India. 2001. Report of the Tenth Plan Working Group on Public 
Distribution System and Food Security, Development Policy Division, Planning 
Commission. 
 
Government of India. 2002a. Report of High Level Committee on Long-Term Grain 
Policy, Department of Food and Public Distribution. Ministry of Consumer 
Affairs, Food and Public Distribution. 
 
Government of India. 2002b. Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002-07), Vol. II: Sectoral Policies 
and Programmes ￿ Nutrition, Planning Commission.   110
 
Gulati, A. and T. Kelly. 1999. Trade liberalization and Indian agriculture. (Page no.148 
and 149). Oxford University Press. 
 
Gulati, A., Satu K￿hk￿nen and P.K. Sharma. 2000. The Food Corporation of India: 
Successes and failures in Indian food grain marketing, Chapter 10 in: Satu 
K￿hk￿nen and Anthony Lanyi (eds.), Institutions, Incentives and Economic 
Reform in India, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd. 
 
Gulati, A. and S. Narayanan. 2003. Rice trade liberalization and poverty, Economic and 
Political Weekly, January 4, 45-51. 
 
Hoda, A. and Ashok Gulati. 2002. Indian agriculture, food security and the WTO-AOA, 
South Asia Initiative, ICRIER-ICAR-IFPRI Conference on ￿Economic Reforms 
and Food Security ￿ The Role of Trade and Technology￿, New Delhi-110003, 
India, April 24-25, 2002. 
 
Islam, Nurul, and Saji Thomas. 1996. Food price stabilization in developing countries: 
issues and experiences in Asia, Food Policy Review 3, Washington, D.C.: 
International Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
Jha, Shikha. 2002. Domestic trade restrictions and food security, Chapter 4 in: K. Parikh 
and R. Radhakrishna (eds.), India Development Report, Oxford University Press. 
 
Jha, Shikha and P.V. Srinivasan. 1997. Food grain price stabilization: Implications of 
private storage and subsidized food distribution, Journal of Policy Modelling 19 
(6), 587-604, 1997. 
 
Jha, Shikha and P.V. Srinivasan. 1999. Grain price stabilization in India: Evaluation of 
policy alternatives, Agricultural Economics 21, 93-108. 
 
Jha, Shikha and P.V. Srinivasan. 2001a. Taking the PDS to the poor: Directions for 
further reform, Economic and Political Weekly, September 29, 3779-3786. 
 
Jha, Shikha and P.V. Srinivasan. 2003a. On targeting food subsidies, in: K. Seeta Prabhu 
(ed.), Proceedings of the Symposium on Reforming India￿s Social Sectors: 
Strategies and Prospects, organised by University of Mumbai, UN and NABARD, 
April 16-17, 1998, Social Science Press. Forthcoming. 
 
Jha, Shikha
 and P.V. Srinivasan.
 2003b. On improving the effectiveness of PDS in 
achieving food security in: S.M. Dev, K.P. Kannan and N. Ramachandran (eds.), 
Food Security in India: Emerging Issues and Policy Options, CESS Hyderabad, 
forthcoming. 
  111
Jha, Shikha and Dina Umali Deininger. 2003. Food and nutrition expenditures in India: 
On the way to achieving food security?, mimeo. 
 
Kherallah, M., L￿fgren, H., Gruhn, P. and M.M. Reeder. 2000. IFPRI, Wheat policy 
reform in Egypt: Adjustment of local markets and options for future reforms, 
Research Report 115, IFPRI, Washington, D.C. 
 
Knudsen, Odin, and John Nash. 1990. Domestic price stabilisation schemes in developing 
countries, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 539-558. 
 
Krishna, Raj and G.S. Raychaudhuri. 1980. Some aspects of wheat and rice price policy 
in India, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 381, Washington D.C. 
 
L￿fgren, H. and Sherman Robinson. 1999. Spatial networks in multi-region computable 
general equilibrium models, Trade and Marketing Division (TMD) Discussion 
Paper No. 35, IFPRI, Washington, D.C. 
 
Minot, N. and F. Goletti. 2000. Rice market liberalization and poverty in Vietnam, 
Research Report 114, IFPRI, Washington, D.C. 
 
Mooij, J. 1999. Real targeting: The case of food distribution in India, Food Policy 24: 49-
69 
 
Murty, K.N. 1997. Trends in consumption and estimation of income and price elasticities 
of demand for Major Crops in Semi-Arid Tropics of India ￿ A Compendium, 
Socio-Economics and Policy Division Progress Report ￿123, ICRISAT, page B-
33. 
 
Nair, K.N. 2000. Food security and the PDS in Kerala, Chapter 10 in: Krishnaji, N. and 
T.N. Krishnan (eds.), Public support for food security: The Public Distribution 
System in India, Sage Publications. 
 
Parikh, K., Ganesh Kumar, A. and G. Darbha. 2003. Growth and welfare consequences 
of rise in MSP, Economic and Political Weekly, March 1, 891-895. 
 
Piet, Laurent. 2002. Assessing locally defined environmental policies in the agricultural 
sector: A multi-regional CGE modelling approach, paper presented at the 
International Conference on Policy Modelling EcoMod 2002, Brussels, July 4-6. 
 
Pursell, Garry and Ashok Gulati. 1993. Liberalising Indian agriculture: An agenda for 
reform, Policy Research Working Papers WPS 1172, Policy Research 
Department, World Bank. 
  112
Pursell, Garry and Anju Gupta. 1996. Trade policies and incentives in Indian agriculture: 
Background statistics and protection and incentive indicators, 1965-95. World Bank. 
 
Radhakrishna, R. and K. Subbarao. 1997. India￿s Public Distribution System: A National 
and International Perspective, World Bank Discussion Paper No.380. 
 
Rao, V.M. 2001. The making of agricultural price policy: A review of CACP reports, 
Journal of Indian School of Political Economy 13(1), Jan-Mar, 1-28. 
 
Ravallion, M. 1987. Markets & Famines, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 
Shariff, Abusaleh, Prabir Ghosh, S.K. Mondal. 2002. State-Adjusted Public Expenditure 
on Social Sector and Poverty Alleviation Programmes, EPW, vol XXXVII, No. 8, 
February 23. 
 
Singh, B. 1999. Bulk handling and storage of food grains. Paper presented at the 
Workshop on Food grain Marketing Policies to meet Food Security Needs in the 
21st Century, organised by Ministry of Food and Consumer Affairs; National 
Society for Promotion of Development Administration, Research and Training; 
and World Bank, June 14-15, Dehradun. 
 
Srinivasan, P.V. and Shikha Jha. 2001. Liberalized trade and domestic price stability: The 
case of rice and wheat in India, Journal of Development Economics 65(2), 417-
441, August 2001. 
 
Tyagi, D.S. 1990. Managing India’s food economy: Problems and alternatives, Sage 
Publications, New Delhi. 
 
Umali-Deininger, Dina and K.W. Deininger. 2001. Towards greater food security for 
India￿s poor: Balancing government intervention and private competition, 
Agricultural Economics 25, 321-335. 
 
van de Walle, D. 1998. Targeting revisited, World Bank Research Observer 13(2), 231-
248. 
 
World Bank. 1999. India ￿ Food grain marketing policies: Reforming to meet security 
needs, Rural Development Unit, South Asia Region, Working Paper, Report No. 
18329, May 27. 
 
World Bank. 2001. India ￿ Improving household food and nutrition security, Report No. 
20300-IN, Rural Development Sector Unit. 
 
World Bank. 2002. Poverty in India ￿ The Challenge of Uttar Pradesh, Report No. 
22323-IN, PREM Sector Unit, South Asia Region, May.  113
MTID DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
1.  Foodgrain Market Integration Under Market Reforms in Egypt, May 1994 by 
Francesco Goletti, Ousmane Badiane, and Jayashree Sil. 
 
2.  Agricultural Market Reforms in Egypt: Initial Adjustments in Local Output 
Markets, November 1994 by Ousmane Badiane. 
 
3.  Agricultural Market Reforms in Egypt: Initial Adjustments in Local Input 
Markets, November 1994 by Francesco Goletti. 
  
4.  Agricultural Input Market Reforms: A Review of Selected Literature, June 1995 
by Francesco Goletti and Anna Alfano. 
 
5.  The Development of Maize Seed Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, September 1995 
by Joseph Rusike. 
 
6.  Methods for Agricultural Input Market Reform Research: A Tool Kit of 
Techniques, December 1995 by Francesco Goletti and Kumaresan Govindan. 
 
7.  Agricultural Transformation: The Key to Broad Based Growth and Poverty 
Alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa, December 1995 by Christopher Delgado. 
 
8.  The Impact of the CFA Devaluation on Cereal Markets in Selected CMA/WCA 
Member Countries, February 1996 by Ousmane Badiane. 
 
9.  Smallholder Dairying Under Transactions Costs in East Africa, December 1996 
by Steven Staal, Christopher Delgado, and Charles Nicholson. 
 
10.  Reforming and Promoting Local Agricultural Markets: A Research Approach, 
February 1997 by Ousmane Badiane and Ernst-August Nuppenau. 
 
11.  Market Integration and the Long Run Adjustment of Local Markets to Changes in 
Trade and Exchange Rate Regimes: Options For Market Reform and Promotion 
Policies, February 1997 by Ousmane Badiane. 
 
12.  The Response of Local Maize Prices to the 1983 Currency Devaluation in Ghana, 
February 1997 by Ousmane Badiane and Gerald E. Shively. 
 
 
   114




13.  The Sequencing of Agricultural Market Reforms in Malawi, February 1997 by MylŁne 
Kherallah and Kumaresan Govindan. 
 
14.  Rice Markets, Agricultural Growth, and Policy Options in Vietnam, April 1997 by 
Francesco Goletti and Nicholas Minot. 
 
15.  Marketing Constraints on Rice Exports from Vietnam, June 1997 by Francesco 
Goletti, Nicholas Minot, and Philippe Berry. 
 
16.  A Sluggish Demand Could be as Potent as Technological Progress in Creating 
Surplus in Staple Production: The Case of Bangladesh, June 1997 by Raisuddin 
Ahmed. 
 
17.  Liberalisation et Competitivite de la Filiere Arachidiere au Senegal, October 
1997 by Ousmane Badiane. 
 
18.  Changing Fish Trade and Demand Patterns in Developing Countries and Their 
Significance for Policy Research, October 1997 by Christopher Delgado and 
Claude Courbois. 
 
19.  The Impact of Livestock and Fisheries on Food Availability and Demand in 2020, 
October 1997 by Christopher Delgado, Pierre Crosson, and Claude Courbois. 
 
20.  Rural Economy and Farm Income Diversification in Developing Countries, 
October 1997 by Christopher Delgado and Ammar Siamwalla. 
 
21.  Global Food Demand and the Contribution of Livestock as We Enter the New 
Millenium, February 1998 by Christopher L. Delgado, Claude B. Courbois, and 
Mark W. Rosegrant. 
 
22.  Marketing Policy Reform and Competitiveness: Why Integration and Arbitrage 
Costs Matter, March 1998 by Ousmane Badiane. 
 
23.  Returns to Social Capital among Traders, July 1998 by Marcel Fafchamps and 
Bart Minten. 
 
24.  Relationships and Traders in Madagascar, July 1998 by M. Fafchamps and B. 
Minten. 
   115
MTID DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
25.  Generating Disaggregated Poverty Maps: An application to Viet Nam, October 
1998 by Nicholas Minot. 
 
26.  Infrastructure, Market Access, and Agricultural Prices: Evidence from 
Madagascar, March 1999 by Bart Minten. 
 
27.  Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy, March 1999 by Marcel Fafchamps 
and Bart Minten. 
 
28.  The Growing Place of Livestock Products in World Food in the Twenty-First 
Century, March 1999 by Christopher L. Delgado, Mark W. Rosegrant, Henning 
Steinfeld, Simeon Ehui, and Claude Courbois. 
 
29.  The Impact of Postharvest Research, April 1999 by Francesco Goletti and 
Christiane Wolff. 
 
30.  Agricultural Diversification and Rural Industrialization as a Strategy for Rural 
Income Growth and Poverty Reduction in Indochina and Myanmar, June 1999 by 
Francesco Goletti. 
 
31.  Transaction Costs and Market Institutions: Grain Brokers in Ethiopia, October 
1999 by Eleni Z. Gabre-Madhin. 
 
32.  Adjustment of Wheat Production to Market reform in Egypt, October 1999 by 
Mylene Kherallah, Nicholas Minot and Peter Gruhn. 
 
33.  Rural Growth Linkages in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, October 
1999 by Simphiwe Ngqangweni. 
 
34.  Accelerating Africa￿s Structural Transformation:  Lessons from East Asia, 
October 1999, by Eleni Z. Gabre-Madhin and Bruce F. Johnston. 
 
35.  Agroindustrialization Through Institutional Innovation:  Transactions Costs, 
Cooperatives and Milk-Market Development in the Ethiopian Highlands, 
November 1999 by Garth Holloway, Charles Nicholson, Christopher Delgado, 
Steven Staal and Simeon Ehui. 
 
36.  Effect of Transaction Costs on Supply Response and Marketed Surplus:   




   116
MTID DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
37.  An Empirical Investigation of Short and Long-run Agricultural Wage Formation 
in Ghana, November 1999 by Awudu Abdulai and Christopher Delgado. 
 
38.  Economy-Wide Impacts of Technological Change in the Agro-food Production 
and Processing Sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa, November 1999 by Simeon Ehui 
and Christopher Delgado. 
 
39.  Of Markets and Middlemen: The Role of Brokers in Ethiopia, November 1999 by 
Eleni Z. Gabre-Madhin. 
 
40.  Fertilizer Market Reform and the Determinants of Fertilizer Use in Benin and 
Malawi, October 2000 by Nicholas Minot, Mylene Kherallah, Philippe Berry. 
 
41.  The New Institutional Economics: Applications for Agricultural Policy Research 
in Developing Countries, June 2001 by Mylene Kherallah and Johann Kirsten. 
 
42.  The Spatial Distribution of Poverty in Vietnam and the Potential for Targeting, 
March 2002 by Nicholas Minot and Bob Baulch. 
 
43.  Bumper Crops, Producer Incentives and Persistent Poverty: Implications for 
Food Aid Programs in Bangladesh, March 2002 by Paul Dorosh, Quazi 
Shahabuddin, M. Abdul Aziz and Naser Farid. 
 
44.  Dynamics of Agricultural Wage and Rice Price in Bangladesh: A Re-examination, 
March 2002 by Shahidur Rashid. 
 
45.  Micro Lending for Small Farmers in Bangladesh: Does it Affect Farm 
Households￿ Land Allocation Decision?, September 2002 by Shahidur Rashid, 
Manohar Sharma, and Manfred Zeller. 
 
46.  Rice Price Stabilization in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Policy Options, October 
2002 by Paul Dorosh and Quazi Shahabuddin 
 
47.  Comparative Advantage in Bangladesh Crop Production, October 2002 by Quazi 
Shahabuddin and Paul Dorosh. 
 
48.  Impact of Global Cotton Markets on Rural Poverty in Benin, November 2002 by 
Nicholas Minot and Lisa Daniels. 
   117
MTID DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
49.  Poverty Mapping with Aggregate Census Data: What is the Loss in 
Precision? November 2002 by Nicholas Minot and Bob Baulch. 
 
50.  Globalization and the Smallholders: A Review of Issues, Approaches, and 
Implications, November 2002 by Sudha Narayanan and Ashok Gulati. 
 
51.  Rice Trade Liberalization and Poverty, November 2002 by Ashok Gulati and 
Sudha Narayanan. 
 
52.  Fish as Food: Projections to 2020 Under Different Scenarios, December 2002 by 
Christopher Delgado, Mark Rosegrant, Nikolas Wada, Siet Meijer, and 
Mahfuzuddin Ahmed. 
 
53.  Successes in African Agriculture: Results of an Expert Survey. January 
2003 by Eleni Z. Gabre-Madhin and Steven Haggblade. 
 
54.  Demand Projections for Poultry Products and Poultry Feeds in Bangladesh, 
January 2003 by Nabiul Islam. 
 
55.  Implications of Quality Deterioration for Public Foodgrain Stock Management 
and Consumers in Bangladesh, January 2003 by Paul A. Dorosh and Naser Farid. 
 
56.   Transactions Costs and Agricultural Productivity: Implications fo Isolation for 
Rural Poverty in Madagascar, February 2003 by David Stifel, Bart Minten, and 
Paul Dorosh. 
 
57.  Agriculture Diversification in South Asia: Patterns, Determinants, and Policy 
Implications, February 2003 by P.K. Joshi, Ashok Gulati, Pratap S. Birthal, and 
Laxmi Tewari. 
 
58.  Innovations in Irrigation Financing: Tapping Domestic Financial Markets in 
India, February 2003 by K.V. Raju, Ashok Gulati and Ruth Meinzen-Dick. 
 
59.  Livestock Intensification and Smallholders: A Rapid Reconnaisance of the 
Philippines Hog and Poultry Sectors, April 2003 by Agnes Rola, Walfredo Rola, 
Marites Tiongco, and Christopher Delgado. 
 
60.  Increasing Returns and Market Efficiency in Agriculture Trade, April 2003 by 




   118
 MTID DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
61.  Trade Liberalization, Market Reforms and Competitiveness of Indian Dairy 
Sector, April 2003 by Vijay Paul Sharma and Ashok Gulati.  
 
62.  Technological Change and Price Effects in Agriculture: Conceptual and 
Comparative Perspective, April 2003 by Eleni Gabre-Madhin, Christopher B. 
Barrett, and Paul Dorosh.  
 
63.  Analyzing Grain Market Efficiency in Developing Countries: Review of Existing 
Methods and Extensions to the Parity Bounds Model, September 2003 by Asfaw 
Negassa, Robert Myers and Eleni Gabre-Madhin.  
 
64.  Effects of Tariffs and Sanitary Barriers on High- and Low-Value Poultry Trade, 
February 2004 by Everett B. Peterson and David Orden.  
 
65.  Regionalism: Old and New, Theory and Practice, February 2004 by Mary E. 
Burfisher, Sherman Robinson, and Karen Thierfelder.  
 
66.  Grain Marketing Policy Changes and Spatial Efficiency of Maize and Wheat 
Markets in Ethiopia, February 2004 by Asfaw Negaassa, Robert Myers and Eleni 
Gabre Madhin.  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 